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ABSTRACT
MOVEMENT MEDIA, ENERGY ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF
HOMETOWN IN THE ANTI-765KV POWER TRANSMISSION TOWER
STRUGGLE OF MIRYANG IN SOUTH KOREA

SEPTEMBER 2017
SU YOUNG CHOI
B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, SOUTH KOREA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY of MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Henry Geddes

This dissertation argues for expanding a practice approach to media combined
with cultural studies to address the continuing problems of technological deterministic
tendencies in the field of alternative, radical and citizen’s media research. Applying this
approach specifically, this study offers the concept of movement media as an organized
set of practices that creates spaces of action to connect what is separated and mediate
cultures for social change. Drawing on twelve months of online and off-line fieldwork,
the dissertation develops an ethnographic account of movement media in the Miryang
environmental struggle against the Korea Electronic Power Corporation’s 765,000voltage transmission line construction. Focusing on the protest participants’ primary
practices—sit-ins, candlelight vigils, and gifting food—as well as the corporation’s
monetary and temporal practices, the dissertation analyzes what movement media were,
why they appeared, how they developed, persisted or transformed, and what the
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consequences of movement media were in forming or transforming political culture,
thereby promoting activism around energy issues. Based on this ethnographic case study,
the dissertation contributes to ways of understanding the complexities of communication
processes in movement media that are deeply entangled with a locale’s cultural,
historical, and political-economic contexts.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 An Ethnography of Movement Media
It was almost 11 pm on February 27, 2015. The Friday night train, a KTX (Korea
Train eXpress), was heading southward and packed with passengers. The villagers, Ms.
Yoon Kang-sook1 and Ms. Sim Ga-in and their spokesperson, Mr. Yoo Jung-hwan were
among them, riding back home from a daytrip to Korea’s ten million-populated,
metropolitan capital of Seoul to their inland city of Miryang. Miryang is located in South
Korea’s southeastern region; while its physical size (308.5 square miles) is actually larger
than that of Seoul (233.7 square miles) or Chicago (234.0 square miles), most of its land
is rural with the exception of its small downtown area (11.2 square miles). Its elderlyand retiree-centered population of 100,000 relies mainly on farming and tourism.
In contrast with the typical impression of an agricultural region as pastoral and
peaceful, Miryang recently has become a household name for an environmental struggle
against governmental energy development projects that has involved its residents’ longterm protest against the state-run Korea Electronic Power Corporation (hereafter,
KEPCO). More specifically, the residents have opposed KEPCO’s construction of a
765,000-volt transmission line2 penetrating their farming and residential areas. Their
1

All the names appearing here are false names, except for the ones of public officials. Also, the names are
written after Korean style that locates family name first.
2

This 56-mile line linking the Singori nuclear power plants and the North-Kyungnam substation was strung
along 162 transmission towers. The height of each tower was 393 feet—approximately a 40-story
building—and its weight was 441,000 lbs. on average. Miryang is the area in which 69 towers were built in
the above project. While the project was aligned with the governmental policy of nuclear energy expansion,
the local residents found it problematic due to the destructive influence of transmission lines. In particular,
the environmental impact of electromagnetic fields generated from mega-scale transmission lines on the
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resistance has been particularly persistent, involving a three-year occupation of KEPCO’s
construction sites. Even after a police force of two thousand finally cracked down on the
villagers’ protest camps on June 11, 2014, the residents have continued their activism by
enlarging its scope to the national level.
To promote public engagement with problems of energy development, the
Miryang residents and activists invited the public to a free screening of documentaries
about the protest. Today’s screening of the documentary Miryang Arirang in Seoul at the
Indie Space, an independent movie theater, was but one of many other cultural and
political events that were organized to spark awareness about their environmental
struggle. Kang-sook and Ga-in, Miryang villagers and female farmers in their late fifties
and early forties, had been protesting continuously while their neighbors had given up the
struggle one by one especially after KEPCO’s construction was completed in September
2014. Jung-hwan, a former middle school teacher in his early forties, accompanied them
as the struggle’s spokesperson. He also hosted the residents’ Q&A talk with the audience
that followed the film. On that day, the Seoul audience was very supportive with their full
presence spilling over the one hundred seats. The Q&A after the film was directed not
only to the residents’ protest experiences, but also to protests in other areas against new
government-led construction of nuclear power plants, substations, and mega-scale
transmission towers.

human body and the environment was controversial. Scientific debates over the long-term effects of
electromagnetic radiation remained inconclusive. Regardless, once a mega-scale transmission line had been
built at other sites, this new environmental materiality often provoked negative consequences for the
residents’ lives such as disrupted farming, impaired livestock breeding, noise pollution from transmission
towers, a sharp drop in real estate prices, and endangered sustainability of inter-generational social relations
due to health concerns.

2

As soon as we sat on the seats on the train back to Miryang, Kang-sook, one of
the female farmers, began her local insiders’ talk which she might not had necessarily
shared with the public she just had in the theater. It was about one of her neighbors who
recently had changed his political position from “against” to “for” towards the
construction of the “steel towers.” This neighbor now had joined the local economic
development projects funded by KEPCO to receive compensation for the negative effects
which the residents would have to endure living and working under or near the
transmission line. Kang-sook was expressing her frustration over her neighbor’s
“unbelievable betrayal” as much as criticizing his false claim that she had not shared
agricultural water that they had developed together. Her friend Ga-in showed her
sympathy by briefly adding her own example of conflict with a different neighbor while
Jung-hwan and I listened to their stories. Leaving the problem of endless internal
conflicts among the residents unsolved with deep sighs, these women then moved on to
talking about which documentary about the Miryang protest that they preferred.
I was surprised by the choices of Kang-sook and Ga-in as much as intrigued by
their follow-up discussion about what people like to see on the screen. Kang-sook said,
“Although I appreciate every other movie, Legend of Miryang, Old Hope, and this one
[Miryang Arirang, screened on the day], I like My Pleasant Home 101 the best…” Ga-in
agreed enthusiastically, “Me, too! Me, too!” I wondered why they did not choose
Miryang Arirang in which they themselves appear as the two main protagonists along
with two elderly females, all of whom were vividly voicing why the residents have
protested. In addition, this movie was considered representative enough to be the
‘official’ documentary for today’s screening event to fundraise for the legal defense of
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the villagers who were being sued and fined by KEPCO. Jung-hwan also could not wait
to ask about their preferences: “Why? Because it was made in a pleasant manner?” “No,
no.” Kang-sook corrected him. “It’s because My Pleasant Home 101 shows well the good
heart of our supporters who came to Miryang to help us and show solidarity. As a person
at the front against the construction, I always have felt so grateful to these supporters for
their participation in our fight.” She added, “You know what? Also, I honestly think our
fight might have been collapsed already without these people.” Her emphasis on the
significance of supporters outside Miryang as precious allies of and resources for the
dissenting residents, whose number had been decreasing over the long period of the
struggle especially after the construction’s completion, also seemed to correspond with
the internal conflicts that she had just intensely spoken about. Jung-hwan, however,
refuted Kang-sook’s alignment with My Pleasant Home 101, reasserting the value of the
representations within Miryang Arirang that introduced the protest to a larger public as
much as its mobilization of legal funds. He sounded defensive a bit as well: “But people
don’t want to see supporters. They want to watch the fight of the residents.” Despite her
own preference, Kang-sook agreed quickly. “I know. People from the outside want to see
us more [than the supporters] …”
In this conversation, Kang-sook eventually toned down her fascination with the
film My Pleasant Home 101 despite her alignment with the key relationships between the
Miryang residents and the outside urban supporters that are described in the
documentary. She changed her preference because she ultimately agreed with Junghwan’s main point: a documentary about the Miryang protest that is to be used for public
screening—the film Miryang Arirang in this case—should focus mainly on depictions of
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the residents in order to meet the expectations of a larger public from whom potential
supporters could be newly recruited. This point reflects the phenomenon in which the
presence of Miryang Halmae has become the central ‘medium’ or ‘interface’ by which
the national-scale audience or public has responded to the Miryang residents’ protests.
Halmae, the southern dialect of halmeonee, means ‘grandmother,’ but with more of an
intimate nuance that is likewise felt in the usage of the English word ‘granny.’ Miryang
halmae might sound like a plain and homey collective term that points only to a group of
elderly female villagers who live in Miryang. However, this idiom has emerged as a
broader reference to a unique social category of protestors. Moreover, it has become part
of an unprecedented social movement vocabulary in Korea that is as commonly used and
understood as such traditional terms as ‘the people,’ ‘grassroots,’ ‘workers,’ and
‘activists.’ Under the umbrella of this newly carved ‘fame,’ the residents have been able
to connect with other protest groups all across Korea as well as to reach out further to the
nation’s general public. Given such a public notion of Miryang Halmae as a respectable
or alternative model for resistance3, the villager Kang-sook thus readjusted her favorite
depiction of the struggle, My Pleasant Home 101 which centralizes the mutual relations
of the residents and the supporters rather than solely ‘the grandmothers.’
This dissertation sheds light on the myriad of sociocultural practices that Kangsook experienced and observed in the protest settings that might have affected the Kangsook’s first choice for her favorite documentary. It is important to note that these

Many social (movement) organizations also paid honor to the residents. For instance, Korean Women’s
Association United awarded a prize, The Activist of The Year, to Miryang female villagers in 2014. The
organization acclaimed the residents’ activism as an alternative model for social movement
(http://my765kvout.tistory.com/421, a blog page of The Anti-765 Transmission Tower Committee, accessed
on March 30, 2017 [In Korean]).
3
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practices kept appearing through her embodied memories and verbal appreciations of
certain social relations that were formed via such practices. So a crucial question arises:
how are these practices—which are integrated with Kang-sook’s grounded protest
experiences—related to the media dynamics of the Miryang protest such as the rise of
Miryang Halmae as a new type of protestor? I argue that it is significant to recognize and
relate various sociocultural practices rather than focusing solely on ‘media use’ from a
promotional or utilitarian view which Jung-hwan showed in the above dialogue. Even
when they might not look like media use nor practices per se in a direct and immediate
manner, these practices nonetheless are the important bridges that connect to the
changing contexts or conditions. What is crucial here to this analysis is that such
connections also shape and reshape the position of media or the ways of media use within
the contemporary environmental movement.
In particular, this dissertation study refers not only to the neo-developmental
regime as a specific sociopolitical context for changing environmental activism, but also
to the responses of the South Korean public to the Miryang villagers’ protests. The neodevelopmental state is an idea of political economy scholarship to understand current
East Asian capitalism as a path-dependent transformation of the old developmental state,
especially referring to political shifts since the 2000s. Especially, while implementing the
neo-liberal reforms during post-IMF crisis (1997–2001), the state re-legitimized itself in
the national political economy by embracing the reforms and renewing a stateconglomerate alliance (Hundt, 2005). This state has “a distinct state-led model that differs
substantially from the liberal, neo-corporatist or welfare state varieties of capitalism in
the West” (Kalinowski, 2015, p. 244).
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It also has two chief features. One is its focus on governmental spending to
support global expansion or competitiveness of national big businesses. This
concentration functions without “providing weaker players—such as employees,
consumers, small and medium-sized enterprises, and minority shareholders—with the
means to protect themselves from powerful market actors” (Kalinowski, 2015, p. 262).
The other feature of the neo-developmental state is the centrality of the construction
sector in its government industrial policy that generates high expenditures for statefunded infrastructure projects, even though the country already has a well-developed
infrastructure (Cho, 2003).
The energy policy of the South Korean government is an example of how the neodevelopmental state operates. On the one hand, the government supports the nuclearconstruction-industry complex’s4 expansion of its domestic construction of nuclear power
plants and accompanying substations and transmission lines. On the other, the
government also awards loans to these construction industries to promote the companies’
commercial nuclear exports based on the domestic energy facilities as their references. In
the case of the 765,000-voltage transmission line that cuts across Miryang, the line was a
part of the newly developed Singori III Nuclear Power Plant while the plant’s reactor

4

http://cyber.kepco.co.kr/kepco/EN/G/htmlView/ENGDHP001.do?menuCd=EN070501 In the English
version of the KEPCO promotion website entitled the “Nuclear Energy Solution,” One KEPCO Team is
introduced as the association made up of the KEPCO and nuclear energy generation construction
corporations including the known South Korean business conglomerates. It consists of “Doosan Heavy
Industries & Construction, Samsung Engineering, Hyundai Engineering & Construction, Daelim, SK,
Dong-A, GS and Daewoo” along with the alliance with “global players” such as Westinghouse of the
United States and Toshiba of Japan. Accessed on March 30, 2017.
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was the reference model for the 18.6 billion-dollar export contract to build a nuclear
power plant with the United Arab Emirates in 20095.
This variety of construction has led not only to large-scale environmental
destruction, but also a series of conflicts with local populations. It is because local
residents have been forced to be displaced, “dispossessed,” and sacrificed in order for the
coalition of infrastructure businesses to generate its continuous profits (Harvey, 2009).
Despite the endless protests of local residents, however, the policy principally has
ignored their rights and living conditions as well as the environment. It is primarily
because the government alignment with the interests of the coalition of big conglomerates
and government agencies like the state-run KEPCO has rarely been challenged seriously.
International political economist, Hundt (2009) points out that the “Korea’s
developmental alliance” between state and capital formed “the infrastructural power” that
has constantly survived though its adaptation to novel national and international contexts.
In addition, this industry-oriented government policy did not generate effective
counter-actions from civil society in general (Cho, 2003). A representative case was the
failure of citizens to stop the Lee administration (2007-2011)’s construction of the
controversial infrastructure called the “Four-river Restoration Project” which led to a
massive scope of environmental devastation. Environmental organizations and
academics—like the Professors’ Organization for Movement Against Grand Korean
Canal, a group of 2,800 scholars—did accuse the government of twisting data and
ignoring expert opinions about negative environmental impacts ranging from water
5

http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/589174.html The vice president of KEPCO, Byun
Joon-yeon said in a press conference on May 23 3013 that power transmission towers must be completed as
the part of Singori III nuclear power plant: “Otherwise, KEPCO would have to pay penalty for 0.25% of
monthly construction expense of the plant to the United Arab Emirates by the contract made in 2009.”
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quality to flood control to rainfall patterns (Lee, 2009). Still, these critiques did not lead
to public opposition large enough to stop the governmental projects.
After being institutionalized and stabilized since the 1990s after democratization,
the Korean environmental movement has tended to avoid direct confrontations over
development projects that usually have accompanied conflicts between governmentbacked corporations and local residents (Hong & Ku, 2014). Moreover, the Korean
public today holds contradictory views about developmentalism and environmentalism,
as reflected in their framing of environmental problems as matters of “individual anxiety”
rather than as broader societal “structural issues” that necessitate political action and
citizen participation (Kim, 2008).
Consequentially, once an area is selected to be used for a certain type of energy
development project by one of the state-sponsored energy corporations, its local residents
are doomed to a series of deprivation of their voices and rights not only in the whole
decision-making procedure, but also in the handling of various environmental, economic,
and social consequences surrounding the construction. Local residents, without being
well-informed and fully persuaded by a corporation about why a particular construction
project is necessary and how they will be secured from any negative impact on their
environment, are driven frequently into a struggle to protect their property as much as to
demand a recognition of their way of life.
As seen in the case of the Miryang villagers, the process of protesting against the
construction often has become a journey for local residents into dealing with countless
lawsuits from corporations, physical confrontations with construction workers and police
officers, subsequent arrestments, press conferences, and street demonstrations. In other
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words, these residents on the one hand have had to stand up to the construction-energy
industry complex backed by the local and central governments, courts, and the police
force. On the other hand, the public’s interest in correcting energy infrastructure and
policies is generally minor while environmental organizations’ serious involvement in
direct conflicts has decreased as well.
I suggest that to understand the rise of Miryang Halmae, one views this
phenomenon within the hegemonic context of the neo-developmental state in which prior
forms of activisms and movement organizations (not solely political parties) have
retreated while a reformulated state-conglomerate alliance has been maintained and
updated. Accordingly, construction projects that accompany environmental devastations
and dispossessions of local populations have continued. Such conditions have
necessitated a new form and space in which social and political grievances and dissenting
voices can be expressed and concentrated.
The appearance of ordinary people as a new model of protestor can be understood
in such a context. Actually, most of Miryang residents were neither seasoned activists nor
were these local sites and groups experienced social movement scenes and organizations
before. Rather, they were ‘unexpectedly’ driven to become involved in energy activism
because their ways of life, properties, and sociocultural connections were endangered of
being disrupted and uprooted by a sudden mega-scale energy development-related
construction project. This type of experience of ‘being expelled or uprooted from where
they live or work’ and becoming demokoon, meaning an experienced protestor, has been
widespread in diverse forms and sites under the neo-developmental regime (e.g., tenants
evicted from a result of urban redevelopment). Such expulsion may come about because
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the regime basically has been upheld by endless building projects—from power plants to
new skyscrapers—that usurp spaces upon which to build.
Kang-sook, Ga-in, and Jung-hwan are living in a world in which their perceptions
of and approach to media are significant and worthy of debate in terms of how they
mobilize public support and produce alternative discourse effectively. In this world,
unnaturalized and multifaceted views of media are necessary and helpful for participants
to creatively respond to the unestablished conditions of contemporary activism that is
surrounded by the minimized capacity of traditional institutions like political parties,
mass media, and movement organizations. With such considerations, how should we
understand media situated within these new dynamics of activism?
In this dissertation, I propose the idea of “movement media” that is based on a
practice approach to media in such a way that media are deeply integrated with the
political lives, culture, and imagination of ordinary people who have faced to create their
own activisms. These investigations in turn have led me to a set of questions about the
role of movement media in the formation and transformation of political culture which
influences on public engagement in environmental issues (Gunster, 2011, 2012; FoxwellNorton, 2015), particularly in the hegemonic context of the neo-developmental nationstate (Kim et al, 2015).
Conducting an ethnography of movement media, I have looked at how the protest
participants of the Miryang environmental struggle constitute and receive movement
media against all odds in response to the construction. In other words, by following why
and how movement media have appeared and persisted in the Miryang protests, I aim to
understand the place and consequences of movement media, in particular in ordinary
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people’s political lives in terms of their meaning-makings, imaginations, possibilities and
limits.

1.2 Alternative Media and Research Problems
I see my dissertation study in the nascent field of alternative media scholarship.
Scholarly interest in media produced by social, cultural, and political minorities or by
subordinated groups has exponentially grown during the last two decades (Atton &
Forde, 2016). Against the backdrop of technological developments in the Internet and
digital media, scholars have examined the possibilities of media i) less constrained by
bureaucratic or expert control and by commercial interests, or ii) operating in either
implicit or explicit opposition to the mainstream mass media. In other words, the
scholarship focuses on resistance and challenges to hegemonic media forms and content
as well as on social change and new visions such as “planetary imaginations” (FoxwellNorton, 2016, p. 13).
In this section, I will review the literature which notably gravitates to two primary
principles of “difference” and “opposition.” These two rationales are salient, despite their
various implications both in terms of concepts (e.g., alternative media, citizen media,
community media, radical media, critical media, and activist media) and theoretical
orientations that explicate power relations (e.g., radical democracy, anarchism, and
Marxism). Then I will problematize the inclination of the literature to media-centricity,
crude instrumentalism and dissociation from social contexts. This critique will be the
basis for my articulation of the conceptual use of “movement media” in a way that
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enables its discussion within the larger contexts of political culture and nation-state in the
next sections.

1.2.1 Different Media
‘Alternative media’ is one of the main concepts that orbit around the principle of
difference. First, what is meant by ‘alternative media’? Atton (2015, p. 1) conceptualizes
them as “media that bypass the usual channels of commercial production and distribution,
and that are most often organized and produced by ‘ordinary’ people, local communities,
and communities of interest.” This definition emphasizes ‘horizontal conditions of
production’ by designating “mode of production and distribution” and the features of
“producers” as criteria for their being alternative to the dominant, institutionalized,
commercial media operated by professionals in vertical expert culture. Based on this
definition, Atton (2015, p. 6) sees the roles of alternative media as offering democratic
and participatory ‘access’ to the media, and thus contributing to the issues of social
inclusion and community-building by promoting “amateur creative media practices for
example of how the mass media representations we take for granted may be challenged
and disrupted.”
Citizen’s media (Rodriguez, 2011) is another entry point by which we can find a
similar focus that challenges institutionalized social relations, and promotes participation
and recognition of the excluded in conceptualizations of media that are based on the logic
of difference. Drawing on Mouffe’s radical democracy, Rodriguez (2011) proposes to
understand citizen media practices as performative ways for local people to enact
citizenship and empower community by creating films and radios that embody their own
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situations, fears, and dreams. Other similar ideas—such as community media (Howley,
2005), participatory media (Deuze, 2006), our media (McChesney & Nichols, 2002),
tactical media (Raley, 2009), citizen witnessing (Allen, 2013), and ephemeral
intervention (Murphy & O’Driscoll, 2015)—also maintain their conceptual thresholds by
identifying and prioritizing the agency of under-privileged groups and sub-culture
communities with the goals and values of social inclusion, diversity, and horizontal social
relations (Mowbray, 2015).
This participatory approach of alternative media as a solution for recognizing and
incorporating the ‘differences’ of diverse, underrepresented groups, however, has been
criticized in terms of its political efficacy. Dean (2008, p. 103) is wary of “the fantasy of
abundance and participation” offered by the global expansions of networked
communication technologies. She argues that those fantasies enable us to perceive
ourselves as active, empowered, and included while actual political change depends on
each context without being insured solely by the multiplicity of production. Rather, the
intense circulation of content that results from digital communication would dilute or
foreclose “the antagonism necessary for politics.” Similarly, Fuchs (2010, p. 186) points
out the pitfall of “plurality without unity.” He warns that celebrating small-scale
productions and idealizing individualist self-expressions may lead to “neglecting
orientation towards the larger political public or actual political change projects” (Fuchs
2010, p. 174).
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1.2.2 Oppositional Media
The second cluster of the literature about radical media, activist media, and
critical media is organized around the logic of opposition. Rather than ‘bypassing’
hierarchical mass media, its focus concentrates on ‘confronting’ capitalist mass media
and seeking to form strong counter-hegemonies for social change by situating newly
defined media within relevant political environments. Consequently, its discussion is
often associated with social and political movements by regarding oppositional media as
instrumental vehicles of activism or viewing them as social movements in their own
right. Downing (2001, p. xi) views radical media as media that serve “to express
opposition vertically from subordinate quarters directly, at the power structure and
against its behavior, as much as to build support, solidarity, and networking laterally
against the policies.” In case of activist media, they are more straightforward in terms of
advocating their role as encouraging audience “to get actively involved in social change”
(Waltz, 2005, p. 3).
Fuchs (2010) suggests to see “critical media” by drawing from the Marxist notion
of “a proletarian public sphere” conceptualized by Negt and Kluge (1972/1993) as a
radicalization of Habermas’ (1989) public sphere (Calhoun, 1992). In contrast with
‘anarchist’ notions which prefer many small-scale, autonomous media, his definition of
critical media focuses on forging a ‘united front’ so as not to “get lost in self-contained
fragmentation of struggles” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 186). Thus, critical media are defined by
“critical form and content … counter-information and counter-hegemony that include the
voices of the excluded, the oppressed, the dominated, the enslaved, the estranged, and the
exploited” (Fuchs, 2010, pp. 178-179). Inheriting Negt and Kluge’s (1972/1993)
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emphasis on the sphere serving to generalize and unify the collective experiences of the
proletariat, Fuchs (2010) updates the notion of proletariat to encompass the multitude.
Beyond the original idea of proletariat as “industrial wage labor,” the multitude attempts
to include almost all types and identities of labor such as “the unemployed, house
workers, migrant workers, developing countries, retirees, students, precarious workers,
precarious self-employment, and knowledge workers” (Fuchs 2010, p. 185).
Prioritizing to formulate unity and political impacts, critical media do not distance
themselves from the idea of mass media (unlike many other definitions about alternative
media) as long as they challenge the dominant capitalist forms of media production,
structures, and content. This feature aligns with the goal of initiating large-scale political
communication processes in transforming society. Fuchs (2010, p. 186) argues that it is
better to have “a few widely accessible and widely consumed broad critical media” than
“many small-scale special interest media that support the fragmentation of struggles.” As
discussed above, scholarship has concentrated on media’s possibilities to differentiate
from or resist media’s mainstream, hegemonic forms and content.

1.2.3 Research Problems: Instrumentalism, Binarism, and Media-Centrism
Despite the contribution of expanding our knowledge about an array of media
which are different from or in opposition to the hegemonic forms of mass
communication, there are problems in the literature. These limitations can be summarized
as relating to instrumentalism, binarism, and media-centrism. The first problem of
instrumentalism is the mischaracterization of media technologies as mere value-neutral
tools which any groups that have alternative or subversive political goals can access and
use simply. However, the recent political-economic and software studies have reminded
16

us about the danger of perceiving digital media technologies independent of their
production conditions embedded within capitalist social and political relations. Showing
how the inherent inequalities of such relations can be translated or replicated within new
media software, Gehl (2014, p. 15) highlights the consequences such as “reducing online
interaction to like-it-or-not consumer choices, the surveillance, free labor exploited by
hegemonic social media, and promotion of a culture of anxiety and immediacy over
depth.”
In particular, many social media corporations do steer user activities through their
algorithmic control on the architecture of the platform. Selection mechanisms of content
and features such as liking, friending, following, and retweeting can facilitate certain user
activities (Langlois et al, 2009; Leistert, 2012). Highlighting “acceleration” and
“personalization” as two developments in social media-driven contemporary activism,
Poell and Van Dijck (2015) argue that social media’s techno-commercial mechanisms
influence activism in ways that potentially undermine its long-term efficacy. This
observation aligns with Milan’s (2015) emphasis on how the specific materiality of social
media, such as ‘Cloud,’ intervenes in the social movement actors’ meaning-making work,
and thereby fosters their politics of visibility as a process that originates and ends within
individuals rather than within groups. Moreover, social media are not free of political
power, as with the state authority’s surveillance operations, propaganda, and attempts to
control digital networks (Rahimi, 2011; Hussein & Howard, 2016).
Deterministic assumptions about the effects of alternative or oppositional media
further exacerbate the issue of instrumentalism. These assumptions especially go
unchecked when researchers concentrate on the potential of digital and new media to
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facilitate brand-new forms of reciprocity and solidarity in order to create counterpublicity interventions in the dominant public (Castells, 2012; Shirky, 2011). Uzelman
(2011) refers to this tendency of scholars to expect direct emancipatory outcomes from
certain strategies and tactics as “determinism of technique.” This rationale is also seen in
the literature’s production-oriented trends that do not give equivalent attention and
inquiry to the audience and reception sides, which some other scholars have identified
(Atton, 2009; Downing, 2003). Such an optimistic thesis, effects are based on a
perception of media technologies as instruments to be easily aligned with the will of the
subjects using them, however, is wishful and limited. Moreover, such a thesis can prevent
us from explicating more nuanced consequences of alternative or oppositional media by
reflecting them within elaborate social relations and complicated contexts.
The second obstacle is related to this approach’s binarism as well as to what
Mattoni & Trere (2014, p. 254) call the “one-medium bias,” a tendency to “prioritize the
analysis of one medium or one type of content—mainstream versus alternative—over the
others.” Early research about alternative media in particular made a clear distinction
between alternate media and dominant, mainstream, and hegemonic mass media in order
to articulate and emphasize their different values (Couldry & Curran, 2003). Recently,
however, scholars have questioned if this distinction is a helpful boundary, especially
given that “hybrid practices”—such as citizen journalism and user generated content
incorporated in mass media— have prevailed more and more (Hamilton, 2016). Scholars
have raised the necessity to erase the wall differentiating mainstream and alternative
media to understand participants’ media practices in an integrative manner (Kenix, 2011;
Rouch, 2014).
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Examining the 2011 Egyption uprising, Nanabhay and Farmanfarmaian (2011)
shed light on how the physical protests, the analogue satellite television and other
mainstream media, as well as digital internet and social media inform each other, given
that their inter-related spaces create what they call an “amplified public sphere.” Based
on investigating five mobilizations against precarity in Italy, Mattoni (2012, p. 16)
suggests the idea of “the media environment” to better capture the condition of activist
media practices by considering practitioners’ “need to consider different types of media
technologies and messages at the same time given the complexity of the communication
flows that shape contemporary societies.” The concept of “media ecology” by
Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCurdy (2013) also draws from a similar concern.
Lastly but most importantly, there is the issue of media-centrism, a tendency to
abstract the media from cultural contexts in which they operate (Couldry, 2006; Morley
2009, 2012). In fact, alternative media scholarship has affirmed the essentiality of rich
sociocultural and political contexts that situate media content and practices. For instance,
Atton (2015, p. 9) stresses that “… from the perspectives of history, geography, culture,
politics and economics … we should examine the reasons why alternative and
community media arise, how they develop in particular ways and in particular places, and
how they can enrich our understanding of the broader media landscape and its place in
society.” In spite of its declaration about the importance of these contexts, nevertheless,
the context of production as a social space that extends far beyond the immediate level of
individual medium rarely has been provided except few cases such as Couldry (2012).
Criticizing “thinness of available data and knowledge about social movement and media
technologies,” Barassi (2015, p. 18) argues that “it is only through an in-depth
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understanding of activists’ political cultures that we can fully appreciate the way in which
they organize their media practices.”
To properly understand the significance of media and communication practices
and processes created by social, cultural, and political minorities or subordinated groups,
we need to situate them within their specific, larger context, thereby moving beyond the
issues of instrumentalism, binarism, and media-centrism in the literature. In particular, I
will discuss the conceptualization of “movement media” in a way that locates the role of
media within a rich social context and political culture in the next section.

1.3 Theoretical Framework of Movement Media
This section presents how I came to conceptualize movement media as an
organized set of practices that creates spaces of action to connect what is separated and
mediate cultures for social change. I chose the concept of movement media to delineate
the variety of practices and processes that implicitly and explicitly build or intersect with
the context of the environmental movement that is highlighted by this dissertation
research. There are some conventional understandings of (social) movement media as
specific media messages (e.g., “content that is oriented towards action and rationale …
for education and information, for solidarity and growth” [Atton 2015, p. 8]) or carriers
for such messages (e.g. “independent channels of communication set up by activists and
social movement organizations to spread their words” [Rucht 2004, p. 29]). However,
both approaches of viewing movement media as particular messages and carriers—that
is, bounded objects or instrumental tools serving the goal of a social movement—keep us
from understanding them within the larger socio-cultural and political processes.
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Downing (2015, pp. 100-101) argues for conceptualizing social movement media
via a mobile metaphor that is based on “hydrodynamics and kinematics” in contrast to
static ones whose “architectural solidity” once upheld concepts like structure,
equilibrium, and the public sphere. His suggestion of using anti-stasis metaphors in
conceptualizing movement media is interesting in three aspects. Firstly, these metaphors
encourage us to place analytic attention on the motion, change, and the sociocultural
transformation processes associated with movement media. Secondly, a variety of water
and air metaphors—flood, eddies, rills, breeze, turbulence—are effective reminders of the
diverse scale, historical courses, and dynamics of power relations entangled with such
changes. Thirdly, these metaphors lead us to break away from theories about “tools” that
may have provided us with a solid foundation for our object of inquiry, but whose focus
persistently lies with its capacity to oppress or liberate human subjects. All of these
aspects support reasons why movement media should be examined beyond an
“ahistorical bent” and “razzmatazz fixation” based on the immediate transmission of one
or multiple media (Downing, 2015, p.106). Aligning with Downing’s aspiration, I will
conceptualize movement media by drawing on the dialectical aspects of practice theory
and cultural studies.

1.3.1 Practice Approach to Media
Practice theory appeared in the late 1970s with an “interest in looking at groundlevel sources of larger formations” (Ortner, 2006, p. 8). Sociologists like Bourdieu (1978)
and Giddens (1979) attempted to bridge and explain how the practices of social actors on
the ground are constrained by, but at the same time are able to reform large structures or
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systems over the long term. Given the opposition between “objectivist” and “subjectivist”
perspectives in those days, the dialectical move of practice theorists was an innovative
and “virtuous middle path” to secure “the human ability to act upon and change the
world” without totally disregarding “structural constraints” (Postill, 2010, pp. 6-7).
Scholars, however, disagreed with the degree of the influence that structural constraints
exercise at the level of practice. For example, Bourdieu’s “habitus” as individuals’
structured dispositions assumed the existence of many more structural constraints than
did Gidden’s idea of “transformational power of human action.” Nevertheless, in general,
practice theorists tried to save human agency to perform by viewing that structures and
systems do constrain social actors; still they are ultimately susceptible to be changed by
these actors’ practices. Combining these seemingly contradictory aspects dialectically
was a large contribution by the first wave of practice theorists (Postill, 2010).
While appreciating the foundation of practice theory that “grounded” structural
processes in the practical engagements and social relations of people on the ground,
Ortner (2006) attempted to correct its relative weakness in terms of recognizing the
questions of power, history, and culture. In the introduction of her book, Anthropology
and Social Theory: Culture, Power, and The Acting Subject, Ortner (2006) argued that
classic practice theory did not ignore power but neither did it make it central to its
theoretical framework. In other words, problems of power are indirectly assumed as
shadowy traces in practice theory in its description of ways in which structure is carved
(e.g., Bourdieu’s habitus) or avoided (e.g., Giddens’ agency) by social practices. Given
that critical work on inequality and domination needs more explicit engagement with the
theory of power, she found Gramsci’s notion of power as “hegemony” to be useful.
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Ortner also framed that the idea of hegemony, which is strongly controlling but never
complete nor total, is also compatible with the dialectic characteristic of practice theory.
Drawing on the historical work of Sahlin (1981) and on cultural and media studies based
on Willis (1977) and Hall et al (1980), Ortner (2006, p. 17) also emphasized that practical
theory needs more articulations with history and culture. Otherwise, it could go back to
“static and apolitical frameworks of functionalism” along with ahistoricity and a lack of
an elaborated sense of the play of power and culture in social life.
Agreeing with Ortner (2006)’s emphasis on the necessity of cultural, historical,
and political depths in the idea of practice, I start from discussing Couldry’s (2004, 2012)
practice approach to media. Thus, I include this theory’s contribution and complement its
weaknesses in my conceptualization of movement media. In his article Theorizing Media
as Practice, Couldry (2004, p. 36) proposed to view “media as the open set of practices
relating to, or oriented around media” along with the two initial questions: what are the
range of practices that are oriented to media? And what is the role of media-oriented
practices in ordering other social practices? Moreover, he suggested his practice approach
as an alternative to prior conceptualizations of media as texts (audience studies),
technologies (medium theory) and institutions (production research), claiming that this
shift would liberate media studies from the paradigm of literary criticism and place this
field within a broader sociology of action and knowledge.
Couldry (2004)’s initial practice approach to media was oriented exclusively to
such sociological concerns as how media play a role in constituting social order. In his
later work Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice, Couldry
(2012), however, demonstrates that his continuous interest in social theory has taken a
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more eclectic and integrative position vis-à-vis other views of media as technologies,
texts, and institutions. For example, in offering what he called “socially oriented media
theory,” he actively incorporated media theorist Zielinski’s (2006)’s deconstructive and
unnaturalized view of media—as spaces of action for constructed attempts to connect
what is separated—based on his own attention to ‘human action.’ On the issue of
representation that is taken seriously by audience studies which primarily see media as
texts, Couldry highlighted “the materiality of representations” that conceives
representations as “a material site for the exercise of, and struggle over, (symbolic)
power” (2012, p. 32). Couldry’s emphasis enables the investigation of representation
through practices of making and interpreting texts. Moreover, he recognized the interests
of the political economy of media—how power is sustained through institutions across
space and cuts through the complexities of the individual point of view—as a register
which balances accounts of individuals’ encounters with media, in particular through his
suggestion of “the principle of non-linearity” (Couldry, 2012, p. 31).
The main contribution of Couldry’s practice approach to media is its focus on
‘human action’ in studying media. Based on the question of What are people doing that is
related to media? a practice approach to media opened up the possibility of
understanding media beyond a consideration of them as objects, texts, perceptions, or
production processes. Especially by calling attention to the regularities of human action
as much as of context and resource that make certain types of media-related actions
possible or impossible, a practice approach can help us situate media within broader
social relations, thereby distancing them from the mediacentric tendency of prior media
studies.
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Nonetheless, in Couldry’s conceptualization of media as practice that seeks to
regularize human actions, contexts, and resources, there is not much place for the
understanding of the complexity of cultural formations and transformations nor the
materiality of power relations (Downey, 2015; Larsson, 2015). This is a weakness
because culture, power, and history are significant sources for understanding why such
‘regularities’ of human actions, contexts, and resources occur, continue, or reconfigure
along a specific locality or particularity. Spitulnik (2010), in the edited volume of
Theorizing Media and Practice, also raises the question as to whether culture is
understood to be part of practice, behind practice or out of the picture altogether. She
stresses that “the necessary critique of cultural holism does not leave us with just one
option … to dismiss the importance of culture and to abandon the culture concept”
(Spitulnik, 2010, p. 119).
Therefore, let us turn to the field of cultural studies to explore how its discussion
of culture can serve in conceptualizing ‘movement media’ along with practice theory. I
specifically will focus on three features of cultural studies’ approach to culture: grounded
view, eclectic flexibility, and diverse politicization. I will explore how these
characteristics help us embed movement media as practices that intersect with a rich web
of meanings, local histories and politics, and beyond.

1.3.2 Politicized Culture
The framework of culture as ‘a way of life’ instead of ‘an ideal of human
perfection’ was a key conceptual move that led to the birth of British cultural studies.
Williams (1961/2001, p. 57), in his pioneering chapter of “The analysis of culture” in The
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Long Revolution, defines culture as “a description of a particular way of life which
expresses certain meanings and values, not only in art and learning, but in institutions and
ordinary behavior.” The place for the refined forms of signification (e.g., art and
learning) is still there, but his definition clearly pushes the idea of culture into an
anthropological sense of ‘lived’ culture that is based on common experience or everyday
life (Bennett, 2015). From such a definition, Williams argues (1961/2001, p. 57) that the
analysis of culture “is the clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in
a particular way of life, a particular culture.”
The grounding of prior elitist and static culture as ‘manifestations of human
achievement’ onto ordinary and mobile ones as ‘living experience’ is the moment when
the analysis of culture becomes open-ended and interdisciplinary (Grossberg, 2008). This
is because the analysis of culture lies with the examination of what types of “elements”
exist in a way of life, how these elements are “patterned,” how these patterned elements
are “related” to one another, and how the complex of these relationships are “organized,”
characterized and changed (Williams 1961/2001, pp. 62-63). These elements, as Williams
suggests, can be the organization of production, the structure of the family and
institutions which express or govern social relationships, or the characteristic forms
through which members of a society communicate. Still, the list of these elements,
overlapping with the areas of anthropology, sociology, political economy, is not confined
or exhausted. Certain elements in a way of life, whose analysis would enable us to reveal
unexpected identities and discontinuities or correspondences among hitherto separate
areas by looking at how elements are organized, definitely may vary depending on time
and place.
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The grounded view of Cultural Studies—that creative activities are to be found
not only in art but in any other social scenes of activities in industry, engineering, and
emerging social institutions—combines with its other distinctive appreciation: that of a
‘felt’ sense. A felt sense is a ‘sensibility’ about a way of life, that is, how the particular
activities are associated with a way of thinking and living at a particular place and time.
Interestingly, Williams (1961/2001, p. 63) was quite concerned with this ‘sense’ to the
degree of declaring that “it is only in our own time and place that we can expect to know,
in any substantial way, the general organization.” His emphasis on the felt sense is related
to the tendency of appreciating empirical proximity to concrete locality and being
situated in a given time in terms of interpreting a way of life. The deeply ingrained spatial
and temporal registers in the concept of culture—that ground the study of culture within a
large web of contexts in a way similar to the anthropological approach—leads cultural
studies to be flexible in approaching diverse cultures as well as open and sensitive to
varying histories and changing contexts.
Being responsive and responsible to the project’s changing context—whether
geographical, historical, political, or institutional—is almost ‘a must’ beyond a
possibility. This is because cultural studies is not defined by a single object (e.g., as in
women’s studies) or a geographical region (e.g., as in area studies); thus there can be
several versions of cultural studies instead (Grossberg, 2008). This assumption—that the
knowledge and the tools of its production are contextually bound—has been supported by
several scholars. For instance, Morley (2015, p. 27), in his article Cultural Studies,
Common Sense and Communications: The infra-ordinary, the interdisciplinary and the
particular, reminds us that “British cultural studies has to be recognized as a very
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specific conceptual apparatus developed for the particular purpose of understanding the
dynamics of British culture in the 1960s and 1970s.” Through this reminder, Morley
(2015, p. 27) goes on to underscore that “we must consider the ways in which that
version of cultural studies now needs to be transposed and ‘translated’… to be applied to
the analysis of other cultures elsewhere.” Agreeing with his point about ‘effective
translation,’ I concurrently would like to highlight that there have been many attempts
originating in the Global South that align with the initial spirit of British cultural studies.
The work of Martín-Barbero (1993), one of the main references of Latin
American media and cultural studies, Communication, Culture, and Hegemony: From the
Media to the Mediation, is a good example. In his phenomenal book, Martín-Barbero
reworks the concept of communication that previously was framed by an informationcentered, linear transmission model; through this concept, he develops “a non-mediacentric theory of culture and communication” (Scolari 2015, p. 1098). More specifically,
Martín-Barbero (1993, p. 2) suggests viewing communication as “a social process of
mediations of cultures” rather than as a circulation of messages through media
technologies. His suggestion was based on his critique about the semiotic or information
model of communication which he sees as reducing and ‘caging’ the meaning of
communication as something immanent in the transmission process (Martín-Barbero
1993, p. 187). Instead, he proposes to understand communication as “the meeting point”
of conflicting and integrating political forces or “the center” of the social debate. This
position evolved not only from his critique, but also from his two conceptual attempts:
the first is to secure a variety of meanings created outside of the rigid schema of sender,
message, receiver such as a dance or a religious ritual while the second is to retain “social
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contradictions” and “expressions of conflict” not as “the residues of ambiguity” from the
perspective of cybernetic model, but as meaningful sites for the politics, constructing the
meaning of “social solidarity” (Martín-Barbero 1993, p. 207).
From such a definition of communication, cultures viewed as “the protagonists”
and “mediations” become “the center of the analysis” as a social ‘interface’ among
various cultures (Martín-Barbero, 1993, p. 3). Such an analysis of mediations entails
“looking at how culture is negotiated and becomes an object of transaction in a variety of
contexts” (Schlesinger 1993, p. xiii). To explicate these processes of negotiation or
transaction, Martín-Barbero concentrates on the actual ‘conditions’ or ‘modes’ of
reception and consumption of cultural products especially in wider social relations. This
is also an approach to understand the ways that people work out the meaning of their
lives as much as communicate and use the media. In regard to television in particular,
starting with the mediations means to consider the sites where “social materialization and
the cultural expression of television are delimited and configured” (Martín-Barbero 1993,
p. 215). He eventually went on to examine “the workings of hegemony and resistance”
and, therefore, the appropriation and repetition by “the subaltern classes” (MartínBarbero 1993, p. 222).
At the root of Martín-Barbero’s reformulation of the concept of communication
with the idea of mediation, there is a strong recognition not only of cultural differences
that he asserts do not imply counter-cultural dissidence or antiquated relics, but also a
history of Latin American modernity. His conscious effort to capture these particularities
as a vantage point for new theorization also can be seen in his remark: “A concept of
democracy based on universal citizenship and a homogeneous and centralized nation was
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incompatible with an acceptance of ethnic and cultural diversity (Martín-Barbero 1993,
pp. 192-193). Thus, by what Martín-Barbero calls “popular culture,” he strives to
highlight the lives of mestizajes who comprise a mixture of the indigenous Indian in the
rural peasant culture, the rural in the urban, and the folk culture in the popular cultures
and the popular in mass culture. The unique and respective socio-political existences of
mestizajes that had been buried under the homogenizing idea of mass society now
become the starting point of his analysis. Intentionally inverting the process of prior
analyses that had focused on the information model of communication, Martín-Barbero
(1993, p. 149) argues for “the theoretical and methodological shifts in Latin American
analysis of media and culture.” His registering of distinctive social realities that are full
of different tempos and cultural discontinuities also affects why he suggests to abandon
media-centrism: “In Latin America, the abdication of media-centrism is less the result of
an industrial reconversion of the media … is more influenced by social movements
making visible the mediations” (Martín-Barbero, 1993, p. 208).
The work of Martín-Barbero associated with a body of literature called as “Latin
American Alternative Communication Research” (Huesca & Dervin, 1994) or “Hispanic
American Critical Communication Research” (Schwarz & Jaramillo, 1986). This
scholarship was characterized by its “foregrounding the dialectical nature of theory and
practice” to search for theories of and for communication practice that are more sensitive
to and compatible with the Latin American context (Huesca & Dervin, 1994, pp. 54-55).
In particular, the quest for alternative communication models was primarily inspired from
a popular or grassroots practice which formed a larger movement to bring democracy to
nations that were under authoritarian rule. The Latin American scholars aimed to
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understand and articulate “the dialectical forces of a given moment” for structural change
towards democracy by finding ways to “interpret the communication processes developed
by grassroots sectors” despite oppressive conditions and their own lack of resources
(Schwarz & Jaramillo, 1986, p. 69).
As shown in both cases of British cultural studies and Latin American cultural
studies and alternative communication scholarship, cultural studies’ approach to culture
is highly politicized, connecting culture variously to the analyses of class, gender,
sexualities, race/ethnicity, urban/rural relations, or democracy; such politicization is
another distinctive feature to which this dissertation research attends. On this subject,
Ortner (2006) makes an interesting observation from the view of a cultural
anthropologist: she contends that in anthropology, critiques of culture concept have
centered primarily around “the problem of essentialism” by which culture easily turns
into a “stereotype (ethnic, racial, class),” labeling groups with “intrinsically culturally
prone to this or that (good or bad, model minorities or terrorists) pattern of behavior”
(Ortner, 2006, p. 12). Given this premise, she found cultural studies’ conceptualization of
culture as elements of a political process to be interesting, especially in its embedding of
the relationship between culture and specific groups of people within the issues of power
and inequality. This conceptualization is well illustrated in the classic work of Willis
(1977) about capitalist reproduction, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get
Working Class Jobs. This work shows how culture is deeply integrated with ways in
which the ongoing production of inequalities is being made, unmade, and remade. In
short, cultures are the site of ‘changes’ that involve multiple dimensions of power
relations such as class, race, gender, and nation (Grossberg 2008).
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In particular, cultural studies’ Gramsci-derived notion of hegemony, that of
strongly controlling but never total and absolute power, and thus constantly practiced and
resisted, can be variously appropriated in understanding culture, given its intermediate
and dialectic approach to power. Specifically, I point to Williams’ (1977) historical
framework of culture that stands on the basis of hegemony; here culture is a dynamic
interrelation among the dominant, the residual, and the emergent at every point in the
historical process. This distinction of dominant, residual, and emergent is a way to deal
with “the complexity of a culture” based on the idea of hegemony. The dominant is
“something effective or hegemonic at a certain current moment” while the emergent is
“new meaning, value, practice, and relationship which is continually being created…
substantially alternative or oppositional to the dominant culture” (Williams 1977, pp.
122-123). As certain experiences, meanings, and values which were effectively formed in
the past, the residual is something “which cannot be expressed or substantially verified in
terms of the dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and practiced on the basis of
residue” (Williams 1977, p. 122). These dynamic and changing elements and their
arrangements work to condition culture to be mobile, incomplete, and non-immune to
power.
Drawing on a practice approach to media (Couldry, 2004, 2012; Postill &
Peterson 2010) and on Williams’ (1977) historical framework of culture as introduced
above, I conceptualized movement media as an organized set of practices that creates
spaces of action to connect what is separated and mediate cultures for social change. On
the one hand, this definition sheds light on social actors’ ground-level activities and
articulations as well as their connections to and tacit knowledge about the broader
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cultures and contexts. On the other, it also orients us to see how these activities and
articulations contest certain hegemonies and reformulate wider social, economic,
historical, and political power relations, thereby accelerating people’s empowerment or
disempowerment (Grossberg 2008). Particularly following the suggestion of Spitulnik
(2010, p. 118), I focused on the following aspects when I examine the practices: how
multiple sets of practices are organized, what kinds of elements—from certain themes,
forces, and conditions to implicit and explicit linkages—come into play in systemizing
and structuring them, and how these practices might comprise and shape new political
experiences and social relations towards change. Thus, this dissertation research has
examined movement media in ways that are based on actors’ practices which themselves
are deeply integrated with a rich web of meanings, local histories and politics, and
beyond.

1.4 Research Questions and Scope of Inquiry
The dissertation is composed of three body chapters, each of which addresses
these three primary questions:
1)

What were the movement media and why did they appear?

2)

How did the movement media develop and persist or transform?

3)

What were the consequences of the movement media in forming or
transforming political culture, thereby promoting activism around
energy issues?

The first body chapter analyzes ways in which the iconicity of Miryang Halmae
as movement media was produced and received in the two central spaces of the protest:
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the sit-ins and the candlelight vigils. In particular, I focus on a set of practices directly
and indirectly related to creating, expanding, and embracing the meanings of the visual
images of the Miryang elderly female villagers. The meanings of such imageries—that
range from views of the women as victims to guardians and teachers—have enabled the
protest participants to respond to the legal, discursive, and political challenges and
antagonistic contexts. Following these processes, I identify the emergent political culture
based on new intergenerational social relations that interweave the residual culture of
rural residents with the oppositional consumer culture of urban supporters.
The second body chapter investigates KEPCO’s communication strategies,
focusing on how this state-run energy corporation has striven to configure the dominant
energy culture not by modifying its core notion—that the electricity infrastructure is a
politically neutral and universally beneficial technology—but rather by applying other
methods. More specifically, I analyzed a set of monetary and temporal practices of
KEPCO whereby the corporation has interacted with the local residents of Miryang and
the broader public especially in and after the moment of handling its legitimacy crisis.
The objective of this analysis is to gain an understanding of how corporate money
combined with temporal management have been converted to a compensatory agenda as
movement media which assists an industry actor in its handling of the mainstream energy
public. From this analysis, I found that the corporations’ communication strategies were
interlaced with the dominant cultural and political fabric of everyday life so that their
agendas could seamlessly influence public engagement with energy issues.
The last body chapter investigates how the participants of the Miryang protest
constituted their activism by centralizing their practices of the gifting of food. I argue that
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these practices can be viewed as movement media in the ways that they pull in or enlist
diverse cultures of varied social groups from both rural and urban areas. In other words,
the protesters’ gifting of food that accompanies the multiple reciprocities tended to act as
centripetal blenders mixing and integrating diverse social groups’ identities, values,
meanings, ethics, and techniques, which shaped the unique pattern of the Miryang
movement. In this process, the communitarian and traditional culture of this rural area
along with the social media culture of progressive urban youth and the alternative
consumer culture of urban housewives all were blended together and constructed into the
emergent energy activism.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

2.1 Multi-sited Ethnography of Movement Media
This research examined why movement media appeared and how they developed
and persisted or transformed in order to explore the consequences of movement media in
terms of forming and transforming political culture, thereby promoting an emergent type
of energy activism under the neo-developmental regime in the context of South Korea.
Focusing in on the case of the environmental struggle in Miryang, I investigated a variety
of practices of the protest participants. Practice, as a basic unit of analysis, is also the core
part of my conceptualization of movement media as an organized set of practices that
creates spaces of action to connect what is separated and mediate cultures for social
change.
Considering the research’s objectives, this dissertation study adopted an
ethnographic approach in order to understand the place and consequences of the
movement media within the rich context of ordinary people’s political lives, especially by
analyzing the ‘thick’ descriptions and ‘reciprocal’ interactions between researcher and
researched (Geertz 1973, Emerson 2001). As Falzon (2009, p. 1) aptly put it, ethnography
“privileges an engaged, contextually rich and nuanced type of qualitative social research,
in which fine grained daily interactions constitute the lifeblood of the data produced.”
Here such research of rich nuances is based on the field method of participant observation
as well as on informal and in-depth interviews.
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In particular, I drew on the insights of Marcus (1995) in his article, Ethnography
in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography, on the approach
which he refers to as ‘multi-sited ethnography’ and following discussions and updates
since his initial suggestion. I specifically looked at ways in which multi-sited
ethnography had been adopted and utilized by media anthropology and ethnography
scholarship in order to apply ‘multi-sited ethnography’ to my exploration of movement
media. In this chapter, after briefly reviewing the related literature, I discuss my
methodological decisions and strategies. Then I report on my participant observation and
in-depth interview.

2.1.1 Initial suggestion and debates
Altering the anthropological convention of single-sited methodology, Marcus
(1995) argued that multi-sited ethnography better captures the changing social
phenomena of contemporary societies, often called globalization or transnationalism
since the 1970s. Marcus was responding to the rise of “human groups in motion,” such as
diasporas (Mintz 1998, p. 117), as much as to the challenge in the late twentieth century
of preserving the idea of ‘the local’ that is immune to transformations on a larger scale.
As an alternative to focusing on a single site and framing it as a ‘local-global’ distinction,
what he suggested was to capture connections and relationships among people, things,
and places in multiple sites. Accordingly, the technique of ‘following’ was proposed as a
mode of constructing an ethnography. With this approach, an ethnographer can ‘follow’
people, things, conflicts, metaphors, plots, stories, or allegories. In this way, the local is
supposedly woven or paralleled with related local situations by a series of juxtapositions
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and associations which in themselves become the analysis from a wider perspective (e.g.,
the global or world system).
Subsequent debates about the methodological concerns (e.g., a loss of
ethnographic distinctiveness) and practical challenges (e.g., management of diverse
localities) are valuable to consider for this study. For example, Falzon (2009) introduces
two critiques in the introduction of his edited volume, Multi-sited Ethnography: Theory,
Praxis and Locality in Contemporary Research. The first is Hage’s (2005) warning about
the superficial use of multi-sitedness as a mere buzzword. Hage argues that multi-sited
ethnography tends to be used mechanically with an absence of ‘thick’ description, relying
on a tacit holism which multi-sited ethnography may imply in its ‘world system’
framework.
The second critique that Falzon presents is more about questioning the legitimacy
of the binary criterion of singular versus plural in terms of situating an ethnographer
within a site. Likewise, Candea (2007), in his article Arbitrary Locations: In Defense of
the Bounded Field-Site, argues that ethnography is more about setting up ‘arbitrary
locations’ and that the device of ‘following’ is what ethnographers always have utilized
in local settings as well. In other words, the process of ‘arbitrary’ selection or selflimitation is a core condition for an ethnographer when conducting fieldwork. Thus, what
matters more, Candea argues, is to be reflexive and self-critical in our methodological
decisions and to take responsibility for what we include and exclude, rather than
declaring either single- or multi-sitedness. I especially appreciate Candea’s call (2007,
p. 23) for methodological reflexivity, given that this approach embraces arbitrariness as
“a contingent window into complexity” rather than viewing it as “to be explained as
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incompleteness.” This reflexivity creates more transparency in discussing methodological
decisions, which is more effective than the simply assuming of the imagined totality of
cultural formation.
Marcus responds to critiques of his proposal with an emphasis on the flexibility of
multi-sited research. From the very start, he affirms that “… not all sites are treated by a
uniform set of fieldwork practices of the same intensity. Multi-sited ethnographies
inevitably are the product of knowledge bases of varying intensities and qualities”
(Marcus 2005, p.100). Based on this pragmatic position, also seen in his book
Ethnography through Thick and Thin (1998), Marcus (2011, p. 21) cautions against
‘dilution’ by arguing that “multi-sited ethnography should be justified by ethnographic
design and argument itself (e.g. in certain projects, certain sites are more strategic for
intensive investigation than others).” Considering the above discussion, I will present
later how and why I primarily followed certain types of people and phenomena.

2.1.2 Multi-sited ethnography in Media Anthropology and Ethnography
Now I turn to the works from a subfield of media anthropology and ethnography
in order to present how multi-sited ethnography has been applied in this dissertation
study. Among others, the work of Abu-Lughod’s (2005), Dramas of Nationhood: The
Politics of Television in Egypt, substantially applies a multi-sitedness to her ethnographic
exploration of national media. More specifically, she examines ‘the nation’ as an object
of inquiry through the lens of a single genre of television: drama serials. Abu-Lughod
(2005, p. 20) undertook her exploration by following producers of television texts in
Cairo and audience members in a village of Upper Egypt as well as “delving into the
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dramatic plots, characters, and emotions with which viewers themselves are
imaginatively engaged and in which writers and directors invest enormous creative
efforts.” Her in-depth description starts with an analysis of the responses of villagers in
Upper Egypt to the television serial. Then, she uses these responses as a springboard from
which to explore basic structures and broader social discourses in the lives of the
audience because she contends that the interpretations of villagers are necessarily
enmeshed within other social fields of meaning and power. Being mobile, she also
investigated how Cairo’s urban professionals work within structures of power and
organization as a result of their national or commercial interests. In doing so, AbuLughod (2005, p. 24-25) found that despite multiplicity and uneven tensions within the
nation, national television is “imbricated in deeply political efforts to make nations into
legitimate units, dominated by particular groups and with specific images of and visions
for themselves and for their citizens.” Abu-Lughod’s (2005) following of both the
producers and audience of television serials to explore ‘nationhood’ is a strong example
of the effective appropriation of multi-sitedness, especially considering the deep-rooted
division between production and reception studies in the field of communication and
media studies (Murphy, 2011).
Another way to apply multi-sited ethnography is to examine the link between
online and offline activities. For example, Marwick (2013) explored the tech scenes of
San Francisco as the birthplace for “Web 2.0” in order to understand the phenomena of
“self-branding” and “micro-celebrity” that are integrated with the ‘online status’ in social
media; importantly, she describes her project as ‘multi-sited ethnography.’ For Marwick,
data collection from more than one site was almost a necessity rather than a choice.
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Unlike the works of virtual or internet ethnography that are often conducted in a discrete,
bounded online community setting (Boellstorff 2008, Hine 2000, 2015), she found that
working in the tech scene in San Francisco involved a constant overlapping between
being in the physical and on line. Marwick (2013, p 10) portrays this fabric of reality as
“the rambling online tech scene includes comments, links, and aggregators that mix and
mash up information. I asked informants for good resources, followed links posted on
Twitter, learned about sites and tools at conferences…” Highlighting “what happens in
person and face-to-face interactions affect what happens on the internet, and vice versa.”
Marwick goes on to explain that being multi-sited was the appropriate strategy for
understanding a specific social condition in which social media are a core part of people’s
everyday lives.
The final study that I discuss before clarifying my methodological decision is
Media Practices and Protest Politics by Mattoni (2012). She analyzes five mobilizations
by precarious workers in Milan and Rome by using semi-structured interviews. Her work
is neither an ethnography nor methodologically conscious about multiple sites.
Nonetheless, her conceptualization of “the media environment” to explain social
movement actors’ socio-technical conditions that extend beyond one specific media
platform is very multi-sited: the idea behind her concept of media environment is that
researchers more effectively can follow and understand activists’ media practices when
they can associate a series of multiple technological objects and their diverse
communication flows which include both mainstream media and alternative media.
Further, I add the benefit of differentiating multiple media based on the significance and
relevance of each medium as Marcus suggested that researchers be ‘thick’ and ‘thin’
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selectively and strategically depending on a site. In summary, media anthropology and
ethnography researchers have utilized multi-sited ethnography to overcome hindering
binaries that range from production vs. reception and offline vs. online to one medium vs.
multiple media.

2.2. Sites, Participant Observation and Interview
In my study of multi-sited ethnography of movement media, that took place
between June 2014 and June 2015, I followed the dissenting Miryang residents,
specifically the protesting elderly female villagers because they were the most central and
visible group in this region’s environmental struggle. Their activities themselves were
very multi-sited, cutting across local, regional, national, and transnational levels.
Accordingly, following the protesters led me to join many sites that ranged from rural to
urban settings. More specifically, I participated in the residents’ sit-ins in the fields and
on the mountains, observing their confrontations with the police as well as with
construction workers. Candlelight vigils were also important activities that occurred both
in the rural hills and in the downtown area of Miryang. Following the villagers also led
me to attend their trials in the Miryang court, their press conferences in front of KEPCO
Headquarters and the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency, as well as numerous cultural
events (e.g., documentary screening, photo exhibit, book concert, healing camp) that
were held in urban spaces within the cities of Seoul, Busan, and Daegu. Moreover, in the
middle of observing connections and relationships among the protest participants, I
encountered numerous phenomena as well: they included iconic visual images, food, the
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protest committee’s blog, Facebook pages, smartphone message applications as well as
KEPCO’s electricity museum, websites and press releases.
Based on the flexible and pragmatic insights of Marcus (1998, 2011), I chose to
be ‘thick’ in Miryang and to be comparatively ‘thin’ in other sites, such as online spaces
and one-time events in urban areas. This decision to focus in on the town of Miryang was
made because the central site of the Anti-765kV Transmission Tower Struggle took place
on lands situated in several villages in Miryang. On these lands, KEPCO had built their
construction sites and the participants had gathered to protest and confront the police. The
protesters’ contesting of the construction in Miryang was also the chief context in which
movement media were produced and received. In contrast, although online and urban
sites were significant in terms of attracting constant public attention and mobilization of
participants, they were a supplementary focus in this study in terms of understanding
movement media within this environmental conflict from the perspective of Miryang
villagers’ world views. Thus, I chose to concentrate on studying on the one hand the
protest sites of Miryang, and on the other the Miryang residents’ multiple connections,
relationships, and associations with other sites that included online spaces and urban
areas.

2.2.1 Participation Observation: Uneasy Entry
Following the Miryang residents was not an easy process at first. Even
approaching them for a long conversation—let alone interviews—was difficult. Only
after I passed several social and political boundaries was I able to interact with the
residents meaningfully, all of which I had not expected until I started my fieldwork in
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Miryang. Nevertheless, I later realized how foundational these initial obstacles turned out
to be in terms of developing my analysis based on the relationships between urban
supporters and Miryang’s rural residents.
When I arrived in South Korea at the end of May 2014, my first task for my
fieldwork was to identify a key informant or contact person who would introduce me to
and guide me in the field. Even if back in the United States I had followed the news about
the Miryang struggle, I would not have known personally any protest participants. To be
able to enter the field, I also needed some basic and practical knowledge such as how I
reach protest camps that were located in the middle of the mountains. I had not been to
Miryang before, even for sightseeing. Therefore, I began by contacting an official
institution, Green Party Korea. From checking this group’s internet homepage
(http://www.kgreens.org/), I found two recent online posters which called for volunteers
to work as The Protectors of Miryang Protest Camps (see below).
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Figure 1: Recruiting posters advertised on the website of Green Party Korea.

These posters informed potential volunteers of the current situation (i.e., that only
four protest camps now remained in Miryang while there had been ten before), the
immediate need (i.e., to join the residents’ sit-ins in the camps in order to help sustain
their resistance), and how one can participate (i.e., go to the Miryang train station at
specific times: 5 pm on Tuesdays and Thursdays or 2 pm on Saturdays and Sundays after
filling out one’s name and cell phone number in the google form hyperlinked on the
poster). Interestingly, the poster included instructions about which camp each volunteer
should go to according to where one came from. For instance, as I was from Seoul, I was
supposed to go to the #129 protest camp; each camp was named for the number of its
closest planned transmission tower. Given that there were sixty-nine towers to be built,
the alignment of each camp with each tower was a convenient way for the residents to
recognize the protest camps. In this way, people from Busan were matched with the #127
camp while those from Ulsan were allocated to the #101 camp. I immediately sent a text
message via the number printed on the poster. After introducing myself as a researcher, I
received a response with the phone number of an activist with whom I was to meet at the
Miryang train station before going to the #129 camp together. As described above, online
spaces—such as websites, Facebook pages, blogs—often became bridges to Miryang’s
protestors, especially for people who did not have any prior connections.
I entered the field site of Miryang with the position of voluntary supporter from
an urban area, as did many other protest participants. Starting with my involvement in a
sit-in from June 3rd to the 5th, I participated in the Miryang environmental protest via
three round trips between Seoul and Miryang in June 2014. During this first month of
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fieldwork, I primarily was able to observe how the sit-ins, candlelight vigils, press
conferences, and street performances were organized and maintained not only by the
residents, also by the various activists and ordinary citizens located at several sites around
the country. In particular, I was able to be an eyewitness to how the protest camps were
broken down by The Vicarious Administrative Execution, an action undertaken by the
2,000 police force on June 11, 2014.
Meanwhile, having encountered and spent time together with other supporters at
the protest sites, I exchanged Facebook IDs and phone numbers with them. This
exchange automatically resulted in each other appearing in our own smartphone
messenger applications like KakaoTalk that is used prominently in South Korea. As a
consequence, I received several new ‘Facebook friends’ and was invited into many
chatrooms on KakaoTalk. While these online connections were the result of initial inperson encounters, they often became important links for resuming in-person contacts
later as needed. Moreover, these online contacts led me to several relevant websites and
significant social media spots that became important sources for my online participant
observations that I conducted between July and November 2014.
It took me more time, however, to gain trust from the residents themselves. Even
with my participation in the field as a volunteering supporter, there were still awkward
moments that arose whenever I introduced myself as a doctoral student studying in the
United States. In particular, The Korean word Mi-kuk (meaning the U.S.) seemed to
almost automatically create some emotional distance between the villagers and myself.
Although I explicitly emphasized that I had lived in America only for a few years, my
current identity nonetheless led the residents to assume that I must lack some shared

46

contexts with them. For example, one female villager called me “Miss America,” saying
“You should especially eat both beef siraegi (dried radish leaves) soup and soybean
soup—Koreans usually eat one type of soup at each meal—because you cannot eat these
dishes there.” Encouraging visitors to eat a lot was what elderly female villagers do all
the time at the protest camps. Yet in my case the reason she brought up this topic was
immediately connected to some image she had about America where one cannot eat
Korean food. Thus, this is an example of the way my presence registered to the villagers
with a sense of deficiency.
Still, the above illustration of viewing me as lacking may appear less severe than
some villagers seeing me as a direct target of suspicion. I was speechless when one male
villager asked me one day, “Did KEPCO send you as a spy?” He felt that I might have
hidden some intentions that were dangerous to the residents. Such suspicions were
difficult for me at first, although I was aware that I should not take this hostility
personally because the residents had experienced such ‘spying’ situations previously. It is
important to note that this type of uncomfortable and conflictive social encounter was not
only my experience. Actually, it appeared to be a part of the social consequences that the
residents had to face as a result of the long-term protests in Miryang. For them, Miryang
was like a war zone with their constant physical confrontations with policemen and
construction workers as much as the psychological warfare between the construction
‘pro’ and ‘con’ residents. As a consequence, the villagers’ discourse was full of rumors
and continuous slanders as much as intense anxieties and doubts towards each side. In
these circumstances, any elements that generated more uncertainties or ambiguities were
treated negatively. As a result, if strangers came to the Miryang’s protest sites, they
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needed to be very clear about whose side they were on, whom they knew on the
participants’ side, and why they came there as outsiders. Otherwise, they immediately
become targets of suspicion. The villager in the above conversation was not relieved even
after hearing my answer that “I came here solely for the purpose of research which is not
funded by KEPCO at all.” He kept asking me, “Why on earth would Americans be
interested in our fight? Your research doesn’t make sense to me!”

2.2.2 Participation Observation: Becoming a Media Producer
These initial challenges forced me to observe more carefully how the other
outsider participants were acting at the protest sites. I decided to mimic and follow their
practices, such as guarding the protest tents at night on the mountain, eating meals
together with the villagers, taking photos of protesting villagers for their witnessing
visuals, and so on. In the process of doing those activities, I identified not only the salient
relationship between urban supporters—a lot of them were media producers like
photographers, documentary directors, artists, writers, and many other citizens operating
their own smart phone cameras—and the villagers, but also the clear division of labor
among them utilized to sustain the protest activities. To be able to participate more
deeply, it was clear to me that I needed to take on a particular role: that of producing one
of their media projects. Local activists’ attitudes towards me—which signaled some
boundaries implicitly and explicitly—were another sign to me that I should do something
to pass over the boundary that I recognized.
This sense of needing to become more trusted by the protesters led me to suggest
to the spokesperson and a leading activist Jung-hwan that I offer my writing to the protest
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committee’s White Paper Project; indeed, I became one of its co-authors when this work
was later published in December 2015. I also presented Jung-hwan with a one-page
summary of my dissertation research that was written in Korean to show him that my
research was legitimate. He accepted my participation in the White Paper project, which
became a turning point in my fieldwork: now Jung-hwan was one of my study’s key
informants as much as a vital social bridge. He was especially trusted by the elderly
female villagers who were at the front of the protests. Jung-hwan actually introduced me
to the villagers as a trustable outsider, which gave me access to interviewing the residents
at their homes. In other words, now I had the position of ‘urban media producer’ and
thereby I became registered within the protest participants’ production circle to which I
refer to as ‘movement media.’
But this ‘privilege’ had its own price as well. I now could not gain full access to
the other side of the conflict, such as to KEPCO’s employees or to residents who agreed
or came to agree with the construction eventually. Given that the villagers themselves
were intensely divided and antagonistic toward each other, it was very difficult for me to
enter both camps without being stopped. In this sociopolitical circumstance, I chose to
explore the ‘against’ villagers over the ‘for’ villagers, that is those who were protesting
the construction of the transmission line over those who were in support of this project. It
was an inevitable decision if I were to focus on examining ways in which the protests
were generated. As a result, I participated in Miryang’s several protest sites mapped out
in the pictures below: the #129 protest camp; the spaces for candlelight vigils located
both in the downtown area and near to #115; the downtown office of The Miryang
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Committee against 765kV Transmission Towers; and the residents’ homes in the villages
that were located sporadically along the transmission line.

Figure 2: Map re-created from the image in the blog of The Miryang Committee.

During the initial part of the fieldwork period, I slept at the protest camp. Then,
after I procured a studio room in the downtown between January and March 2015, I
commuted to a newly built protest camp located near #115, the residents’ homes and
farms or the Miryang committee’s office. I often got a ride from residents and supporters.
Even if I was able to use public transportation like a bus or taxi, I preferred to get a ride
during which I had the opportunity to chat with the residents; I found that this type of
‘time in motion’ in a car often created an effective setting for an informal interview. In
turn, the residents seemed to feel that the inside of their cars was comfortable in terms of
sharing their stories, emotions, and honest thoughts while they were driving. Another
good space for conducting such informal interviews turned out to be the residents’ farms.
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While helping out with farm works such as picking peppers or pulling weeds, I was able
to hear protest stories as well as rumors and gossip which helped me to better understand
the protestors’ emotions, norms, and ethics.

Table 1: Specific sites, the length of stay, and number of visits.
Site

Stay or
Number of Visit

Miryang,
Focused
Site

June 2014 to
June 2015
(online observation
between July to
November in 2014)

Seoul

8 (cultural and
political events like
book concerts and
press conferences)

Pusan
Daegu
Naju
Waegwan

2 (screening)
1 (fundraising)
1 (protest)
1 (healing camp)

Changwon

1 (screening)

Figure 3: The several sites where I stayed or visited during my fieldwork.

Outside of Miryang, I also visited several urban areas in the midst of following
the residents’ protest activities. As seen on the above map and table, I visited Seoul,
Pusan, Daegu, Changwon, Waegwan, and Naju in order to study such cultural and
political events as screening events, book concerts, press conferences, and street protests.
Except for eight visits to Seoul, I visited these other urban spaces only one or two times.
Still, these visits were significant for my multi-sited ethnography of movement media
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because I was able to observe how the urban audience reacted to the Miryang residents
and their visual images and verbal discourse as well as how the residents themselves
framed their protests in front of the urban public. Sometimes I attended a screening event
sponsored by local environmental groups of twenty people in Pusan. Since it was a more
internal meeting (I coincidentally participated by the invitation of one documentary
director whom I interviewed), there was an intense discussion after the screening that
gave me the valuable opportunity to study how public discourse about the Miryang
residents was produced and transformed.
I wrote field notes after coming back from each field experience. Sometimes the
notes were more personal: writing about my hard emotions and my difficulties and
frustrations in addition to recording what I had observed on each day. Other times, the
notes became more informative with the inclusion of specific information or hyperlinked
sources that I had heard or learned about. In the middle of the fieldwork, I strove to make
notes as the circumstances allowed me. For example, during the candlelight vigils as I sat
in the middle of crowds, I freely wrote how the performance was organized, what kinds
of music were performed, and how speakers mentioned certain themes. If the space were
open and public, I also used videos and photos for my record. Such other media were
helpful for recalling my memories when I wrote my field notes later, allowing me to
attend to some points that I had lost during prior observation. Later, I read over my forty
field note entries several times before I coded and analyzed them.
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2.2.3 Interviews
I conducted semi-structured interviews with forty participants: twenty-two
residents and eighteen media producers. I had prepared a standard list of questions and
started with this list, but I almost always let the interviewees take their own direction
during the conversations. The interviews ranged from fifty minutes to four hours in
length. As for the media producers, those interviews mostly took place in public settings
of urban areas like restaurants, coffee shops or their workplaces.
In the case of Miryang residents, they often preferred to have interviews at their
own homes. Interviews also were conducted at the protest camps and farms. Without my
specific intention, an individual interview sometimes became a group interview of two or
three people because either the residents themselves wanted more participants or the
setting of their home or farm itself included the presence of other residents who happened
to join the conversation. These group interviews gave me the opportunity to observe
interactions and conversations among the subjects during the interviews themselves,
which I could not have had in the situation of interviewing an individual person. I ended
up interviewing some residents more than two times, including informally because of the
circumstances (e.g., I got a ride from them multiple times or I stayed a couple of nights at
their home). Before starting each interview, I would obtain permission to tape-record the
interview. I also took notes, which gave me a nuanced sense of the interview later.
Using snowball sampling, I asked interviewees to recommend other potential
interviewees, which turned out to be a good way to extend my pool of interviewees.
However, whenever I asked the protesting residents if they could introduce me to any of
the ‘pro’ residents, most of them reacted negatively at first even with my emphasis on
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research. They would say, “There would not be much or worthwhile to hear from them
[i.e., the ‘pro’ residents]. They would either lie or make excuses.” If I insisted, they still
would let me know only a couple of names and their phone numbers after careful
deliberation. One resident actually checked with me later whether I indeed did interview
any of the ‘pro’ residents. She thus seemed to want to know what was going on among
her counterparts.
In addition to the protesting residents, I was able to interview five residents who
eventually agreed with the construction. Two of them were in leading positions in the
running of the local developmental projects which were funded by the KEPCO. Still,
many of them refused my interview requests, either when I called, texted, or visited them.
In the case of KEPCO employees, when I called to one known among the residents to
have been dispatched from the company’s headquarters to manage the conflict, he
directly refused my interview request. He said, “How could I trust that you would not use
an interview for a certain type of attack?”
For the transcription, I used the software, Express Scribe, which enabled me to
log audio files easily. Before starting to transcribe, I initially listened to the recordings
carefully along with looking over the memos that I had written during the interviews.
Then I marked the parts to transcribe via the function of logging onto Express Scribe. As
for the key interviewees, I transcribed all of their words during the interview. After
coding these interview transcriptions, for the comprehensive analysis I compared the
codes with those from my field notes.
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2.3 Scenes and Moments of the Miryang Protest
2.3.1 Sit-in sites

Figure 4: The protest camp at the construction site for the # 127 transmission tower
(taken by the Miryang committee).

Figure 5: The protest camp at the construction site for the # 129 transmission tower
(taken by SY Choi).
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2.3.2 Candlelight Vigils

Figure 6: The candlelight vigil at downtown 1 (taken by the Miryang committee).

Figure 7: The candlelight vigil at downtown 2 (taken by the Miryang committee).
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CHAPTER 3
BRANDING NEW HEROES: THE ICONICITY OF MIRYANG HALMAE AS THE
SHADE OF THE NEO-DEVELOPMENTAL ERA

This chapter analyzes ways in which the iconicity of Miryang Halmae as
movement media was produced and received in the two central spaces of the protest: the
sit-ins and the candlelight vigils. In particular, I focus on a set of practices directly and
indirectly related to creating, expanding, and embracing the meanings of the visual
images of the Miryang elderly female villagers. The meanings of such imageries—that
range from views of the women as victims to guardians and teachers—have enabled the
protest participants to respond to the legal, discursive, and political challenges and
antagonistic contexts. Following these processes, I identify the emergent political culture
based on new intergenerational social relations that interweave the residual culture of
rural residents with the oppositional consumer culture of urban supporters.
I argue that the public appearance of the protesting grandmothers materializes the
emergent political culture conceived in the shade of the neo-developmental state that has
not retreated, despite its fluctuating hegemony. Furthermore, I discuss the double-edged
feature of this activism that is fueled by the direct relationships between respectable role
models and their followers in the emergent political culture. The remaining chapter is
composed of the following sections: a scene of a clash in the mountains; the embodiment
and witnessing of injustices in intergenerational relations; discourse on the Miryang
grandmothers that inverted them from victims to guardians in the politics of Gohyang
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(hometown); the grandmothers as emergent teachers in the rituals; and lastly concluding
remarks.

3.1 In the Mountains
From far away, the mountains of Miryang (밀양, 密陽, Full Sunshine) clustered
like quietly layered sea waves. The hills slowly rose up a bit before gently crashing down
onto the villages that they surrounded. The summer view of Miryang’s northwestern rural
areas from a moving car looked totally green and peaceful from the fresh eyes of a firsttime visitor like myself. Then Gajin, a female activist in her early twenties from The
National Committee Against Miryang 765kV Power Transmission Towers (an association
of activists who have supported the Miryang struggle), screamed out, “Wow. They’ve
even painted fluorescent blue color onto the steel towers? Unbelievable!” Now a bit
sensitized, my eyes were able to capture the bodies of tree-rugged fields and mountains
that were laid down as if they had been treated by acupuncture with a line of towershaped steel needles. Mr. Park, a middle-aged male villager having picked up Gajin and
me from the Miryang train station, replied while driving his truck, “I know. KEPCO
bastards said it’s nature-friendly. What bullshit.”
It was June 3, 2014, the first day of my arrival in Miryang. A week ago, when I
had contacted the number on the online advertisement publicly recruiting “The Protectors
of Miryang Protest Camps” on the Green Party Korea website, another activist Ms. Lim
had paired me up with Gajin. It was easy to recognize her in the Miryang train station
because she wore a fluorescent pink T-shirt with a printed motto “We’re all Miryang”
along with an iconized illustration of a ‘fighting grandmother.’ I was aware of the
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difficulties that I might encounter when entering the protest scenes as a supposed
“protector” of the protest camp. Yet I could not predict exactly what I would have to do
in the camp simply by hearing this intense dialogue between a villager and an activist on
the way to the protest camp.
The Pyungbat (Plain Field) village, one of the four persistently protesting
villages at that time, was located at the top of the Hwaak (Flower Peak) Mountain (at
3,054 ft.) with its thirty households. The village is famous as a site for rejuvenation of
health, also having its tourist landmark, Unjuam (Rock in the Clouds). Upon getting off
the truck at the entrance of the village, I found that my prior amicable impressions from
far away were quickly quashed. In their place, a state of war completely filled the chilly
mountain air. Under my feet on the road were painted gigantic warnings: “KEPCO and
POLICE. DO NOT COME HERE!” On the various banners hanging from the trees and
temporary buildings were printed mottos like “Stop dividing the villagers and
constructing the towers” radiating the resentment of the residents.
The camp was composed of three temporary buildings and one tent that housed
the guards. The main building on the upper hill, where the villagers stayed, occupied the
exact space where the transmission tower was planned to be built. One hundred feet
behind the main building was the guards’ tent. If any suspicious movement or situation
was identified, the guards were supposed to strike a Jing (a traditional Korean percussive
instrument made of brass in the shape of a flat basin) that hung in front of the tent; its
especially loud sound functioned as a siren for the residents. On the front of the main
building itself, closer to the entrance, were two other residential buildings for male and
female supporters who came from outside.
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“Halmeonees (Grandmothers)! Long time no see!” With cheerful screams and
happy smiles filling her face, Gajin ran to the five elderly female residents ranging in
ages from their 60s to 80s and hugged them one by one when we entered into the main
building. Gajin was in turn welcomed warmly by the ‘halmeonees’ as if she had been
their own granddaughter. The 355-square-foot building was fully furnished with wellarranged blankets, temporary closets, a gas stove, and various electronic goods like a rice
cooker, kimchi fridge, and TV set. After asking if we had eaten dinner yet, one female
villager quickly brought up seven kinds of side dishes from the kimchi fridge along with
warm rice and soup. While we all were eating, Gajin shared news about both her recent
part time assistant job doing artwork and about the protests in Seoul. Her main
conversational partner was Woo Guem-soon halmeonee. Having the nickname of “field
commander,” Woo halmeonee had a reputation as ‘a general’ who audaciously confronts
policemen by fully exercising the ‘tactics of the weak,’ such as leading a nude protest of
elderly women that actually drew extensive media attention in May 2013.
Having finished eating the dinner, Gajin and I went up to the guards’ tent to do
our ‘duty.’ Pointing out the other side of the mountain, she said, “Do you see the light
there? It comes from the police’s container box where they reside all the time. If we turn
on our flashlights here, they would see this light easily and know we now protect this
place.” As an inexperienced guard, I carefully listened to her explanation. She
emphasized how important it was to sit on the chairs in front of the tent and hold lit
flashlights in order to quickly respond when something urgent happened. Accordingly,
we watched the dark air for over six hours while sitting outside of the tent, despite the
freezing mountain air. Gajin also instructed me how to respond to the police. “Never
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confront police physically but focus on recording a video. You can protest with your
voice by yelling at them, but your main role here is to record what they do to the
grandmothers.” The instruction based on this division of roles was matched with what
Woo halmeonee said later when I interviewed her, “It is we who fight. Your duty is to
witness all of what they do to us and let the world know their acts here.” It did not take
much time to experience what Gajin had instructed me to do.
It was 10:10 am the next day when fifteen policemen wearing mountain-climbing
clothes appeared at the protest camp. Only Woo halmeonee and Gajin were in the main
building because the other halmeonees had gone to the town to vote. The local election
was being held on that day. Woo had insisted on going to vote later in the afternoon, just
in case the police would come. Her intuition was right. On seeing the policemen, Woo
halmeonee kept yelling at them, “Son of bitches! How dare do you come here? Get the
fuck out! Get away now!” The screaming of Gajin was also sharp and strong, “What are
you doing here on Election Day? What is your purpose? Shame on you!” Woo
immediately pushed the siren’s button attached to the main building so that the residents
of the whole village would know an emergency had occurred. Remarkably enough, only
two people—Woo and Gajin—were needed to handle fifteen policemen and push them
away. The policemen began to back off, but they did so slowly. Some were trying to
soothe Woo with a patronizing tone. “Yes, yes, we’re getting out now. Don’t worry.
We’re going now” while others were trying to check out the surroundings around the
main building as much as possible. Some policemen even politely bowed to Woo’s
husband who immediately had come up after hearing the siren alarm.
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Still, Woo halmeonee did not let them go in peace. After quickly checking where
Gajin was—she was just behind Woo’s back—Woo grabbed one of the retreating
policeman by the collar and laid down to presumably add her whole weight onto her
seizure of this man. Then three policemen hurriedly surrounded her and tried to peel her
off him. Woo desperately clung to the policeman as strongly as possible to create a scene,
yelling at all of them, “Kill me. Just kill me. Bastards!!” In addition, Gajin was
continuously screaming at the policemen, “You police! What are you doing here? What
are you doing to halmeonee? Don’t you have shame?” At the same time, she was
shouting directions to me, “Record that guy!” as she was pointing out a specific
policeman who was holding a video camera. According to Gajin’s direction, when I
zoomed in the policeman with my smartphone camera, he suddenly turned around so as
not to be recorded. Meanwhile Woo, even after losing the policeman whom she had
grabbed, still kept following him as he retreated down the hill as she yelled, “Seize them!
Seize them all! Call 119!” Gajin also told me, “Follow them! Follow and record them
closely!” As the policemen travelled down along the unpaved, narrow path, they began to
beg Woo, “Please stop following after us. You might get hurt. We’re going now.” Woo
replied, “I’ll die in front of you today! In front all of you!”
When all the policemen departed at 11:50 am after a few more tussles, Woo and
Gajin began their next action. Via the village broadcasting system connected to the main
building, Gajin announced that there had been a police ambush. Woo called Jung-hwan,
the spokesperson of the struggle and a leading activist of the Miryang Committee Against
765kV Transmission Towers as well as Mr. Kim, a journalist of the progressive online
newspaper Voice of People. After reporting to them what had just happened, Woo also
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called the Secretary of the Miryang City Mayor and complained about why the disguised
police could appear at the camp on the day of the local elections, thus treating this as a
breach of an implicit truce. While Woo was calling, Gajin and I edited the videos so we
could easily send relevant clips to the Miryang Committee and to Mr. Kim. Gajin was
quick to check, pick, and send relevant photos and video clips taken on our iPhones.
What she took was apparently different from mine in terms of angles and positions from
which viewers were exposed. Her video turned out to be more sympathetic to the
victimhood of Woo halmeonee than were mine.
Soon Jung-hwan arrived at the camp by car from the committee’s office located in
the downtown in order to listen to Woo’s accounts of the police presence before writing a
press release about this incident. A few hours later, the turmoil of this police visit started
to appear on the online platforms of eight local and national newspapers. Some had
sensational titles like “Physical clash between the police and the protesting villagers.”
Others had a more sympathetic nuance that Miryang halmeonees had suffered from the
physical force of police, along with the photo that was taken by Gajin and included by
Jung-hwan in the press release that he had sent out.
Woo was a very exceptional figure in comparison to the many other elderly
female villagers with whom I interacted during my fieldwork. Not many of them could
have performed as she did with such bold, decisive and strategical moves in the
confrontations with the police that were described above. Nevertheless, the scene did
show some patterns that were not caused solely by the unique traits of Woo, which I
observed repetitively in other situations as well. First off, as demonstrated by the police’s
video recorders and the supporters’ smartphones utilized in the above scene, ‘cameras’
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had a strong presence whenever a confrontation took place. There were almost always
people—in both sides of the confrontation—who took responsibility for holding cameras
and taking pictures, as I was carefully instructed by Gajin as soon as I arrived. Secondly,
the images and videos captured at the confrontations were shared, organized, and
circulated through diverse forms (e.g., press releases, Facebook updates, documentaries,
illustrations, cartoons, and art work) as well as channels (e.g., mass and social media,
smartphone messenger applications, press conferences, photo exhibits, and candlelight
vigils). The Miryang Committee as well as other participants regarded these images and
videos as precious common resources and records of the protest. Lastly, there was an
established repertoire about the victimhood or the iconicity of protesting elderly female
villagers of Miryang that enabled the above conflict—based solely on a press release
issued by the Miryang Committee—to be picked up and covered immediately by the
local and national media. What made the practice of taking and securing visual images
during a conflict so central to the participants in terms of communicating their activism
against the construction of a mega-scale power transmission line? The next sections
analyze how the participants’ practices of producing images and videos at the sit-in sites
began and evolved in response to various antagonistic contexts.

3.2 The Embodiment and Witnessing Injustices in Intergenerational Relations
3.2.1 Sit-ins as the Residents’ Visual Labor
Staging a day-and-night, long-term sit-in at the KEPCO’s construction sites was
one of the most crucial protest practices of the villagers against the corporation’s building
of sixty-nine 765kV transmission towers in Miryang. Holding a sit-in at the construction
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sites, mostly located in the fields and mountains, meant that the residents—to sabotage
the building process—physically inserted their bodies into every construction phase
undertaken by the corporation. Such interference by the protestors started as the act of
sitting on the mountain roads to prevent the construction workers and vehicles from
approaching the building sites. This form of protest then developed into attaching their
bodies directly to large machinery ranging from bulldozers and backhoes to parked
helicopters carrying construction materials. Finally, the protests culminated in setting up
encampments or temporary buildings to occupy the exact sites where towers would be
built.
These types of sit-in, lasting almost three years between 2012 and 2014,
constituted the intensive labor which villagers actually referred to as “Chool-geun (going
to work).” Such protests accompanied constant confrontations, such as rough verbal or
even physical tussles between the residents and KEPCO workers or subcontractors who
often were assisted by the police force. This process was full of corporeal hardships,
danger of injuries, psychological tensions, emotional frustrations, and insults, as seen in
the interview with Ms. Kang Soon-im below:
Our hands and feet were all frozen in the winter because we hugged the trees at
the construction sites all day long so the workers could not clear the site for the
building. In the summer, we climbed up the mountain at three in the morning
every day to arrive at the site earlier than the workers. One day the workers tried
to scare us off by threatening that we would be arrested. I went to a worker
holding an electronic saw and put my feet under the working machine, saying,
“Chop up my leg first before you cut down the trees here”; then they had to close
off the machine while cursing us. Despite the insults, we could not give up
because we had to protect our lands.
Such reliance on their own bodies was the villagers’ last resort. Since the moment
when they received unexpectedly the official land expropriation mail from the local
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government in 2008, what they repeatedly realized until 2011 was the reality that there
was no place for their voices to be heard and reflected in the energy policy and its
execution legally, institutionally, or politically. The residents had confirmed this situation
whenever they strove either to represent themselves via the local political and
bureaucratic elites, like the National Assembly member and the city mayor, or to
challenge the construction decision through debates that took place in such institutional
settings as the Conflict Arbitration Committee operated by a governmental body called
the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission. KEPCO’s response had been aggressive
in its defense of its construction project in the wake of the residents’ protests. Its severe
legal suits imposing criminalization and economic threats against the protesters’ actions
(e.g., a huge fine of $850,000) had been combined with the offer of an economic
compensation package in exchange for agreeing to cease their protests. Consequently,
many male-dominated village leaders had retreated after accepting KEPCO’s financial
terms, as had many previously failed rural resistors against the government-imposed, big
corporations-lead construction projects (Eom 2012; Jang 2016). When all possible
institutional and discursive stages for disputes had dissipated, what remained for the
villagers was solely to hold a sit-in with their own bodies at the construction sites.
Against the legal aggression of KEPCO that was accompanied by criminalization
and economic threats, the ones who chose to stage these sit-ins were mostly middle-aged
and elderly female residents; thus these “grandmothers” became the forefront of the
protest after the male village leaders retreated (Kim 2015). These women were
comparatively immune to arrest given that they were perceived as “weak” subjects who
were not equal competitors in their physical assaults on opponents, unlike their younger
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and/or male counterparts. Their “physical weakness,” however, paradoxically became
their “rhetorical strength” expressing ‘injustices’ via their visual acts. The elderly female
residents would chain their necks and waists to one another, remove their clothes, and
hold a sit-in in a pit with dangling leather ropes. These acts comprised their actual
physical strategy to avoid being dragged out or grabbed by the police. At the same time,
these actions became visual performances of “embodiment of violence perpetrated by an
‘other’,” particularly within two contextual factors: firstly, the protest by Lee Chi-woo, a
male farming villager in his 70s who had burned himself to death on January 16, 2012
(Yang, 2011) and secondly the expansion of the scale of police intervention since 2013.
The protesting residents of the Plainfield village where I visited would call the
pit—the deep hole that had been dug beside the camps’ main building with claimed
explosive materials—their grave. The ‘grave’ was for them an icon by which to deliver
their sense of desperation as much as their strong will against the construction,
communicating the message “Over my dead body.” Prepared for police interference,
Plainfield residents had equipped the pit with iron chains and leather ropes that they
could place around their necks and bodies. After the turmoil of the police presence in the
above episode, Mr. Park, a villager who had been charged with transporting supporters
from outside between the village and the train station, commented: “What the police
cared the most about was the pit.” The police might have intended to prevent any
physical danger from taking place in the pit—especially in relation to the claimed
explosive materials—when they would tear down the camp in the Vicarious
Administrative Execution scheduled a week later. Still, his comment indirectly shows
how the residents understood their visual act of sit-ins as a powerful rhetoric of the
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embodiment of injustice.
Conceptualizing ‘visual labor’ in an examination of the Mano River War in West
Africa, Hoffman (2011, p. 949) points out that “the realities of constantly being available
to be seen—in the ubiquitous presence of digital media—were crucial to understanding
the spectacular performance of violence.” Similarly, the female residents’ efforts in
mobilizing extra objects like iron chains and leader ropes in a setting like a pit became
their visual labor to embody the injustices as well as their way to increase the possibilities
of being seen. To be able to complete their visual acts, however, the villagers needed
witnesses who would materialize their acts into the visuals that would be circulated in the
ubiquitous streams of digital media beyond the geographically confined mountains and
fields of Miryang. The role of witnessing media producers thus can be understood within
this context of visual labor.

3.2.2 Witnessing: A Response to “We also need ‘our’ cameras.”
The practice of witnessing the villagers’ sit-ins began among several local
Miryang citizens who belonged to Neoreun-Madang, a grass-roots cooperative
association. Self-immolation has been considered to be a powerful rhetorical act in
contemporary Korean history, appearing in the public realm particularly among those
who have been politically marginalized and excluded (Cho 2016; Park 2004). Given that
this act previously was undertaken mostly by younger workers or college students in
urban areas, the self-immolation of an elderly farmer was exceptional, signaling to those
outside of rural Miryang that something seriously wrong had been occurring in the
region.
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In response to growing public attention toward this incident, some members of
Neoreun-Madang formed a group which later became the Miryang Committee Against
765kV Transmission Towers (hereafter, referred to as ‘The Committee’). The Committee
had a critical role in informing the larger public and mobilizing the witnesses—from
professional journalists to independent documentary directors, photographers, media
activists, and ordinary citizen supporters—to respond to the villagers’ urgency of “we
also need ‘our’ cameras.” The witnessing visuals were particularly important for the legal
defense of the residents due to the asymmetrical power of the corporation which had
mobilized the visual representations of the conflicts very effectively. Based on that visual
evidence, KEPCO had sued more than ninety residents already by November, 2011.
The production of witnessing visuals at the sit-in sites implied in part an
awareness of the police who also operated numerous cameras for collecting evidence that
could be used for the arrest of protesters. All these cameras created tension, conflict and
competition among those who captured visual images that would serve their quite
disparate purposes, depending on the operator’s legal and political objectives. Given this
tense context, at first the main goal of protesting media producers was to emphasize the
physical and emotional sufferings and victimhood of the elderly female villagers by
visually following their protesting process and inserting women’s voices over the
pictures. For instance, the four-minute video titled A Halmae Wonders Why, screened at
the candlelight vigils and uploaded to YouTube, shows these features effectively. This
video highlights the visual scenes of elderly females as they climb up the mountain with
great difficulty to go to the construction sites, sob intensely while yelling at policemen or
workers, attempt self-injury by tying ropes round their necks, and lie down as a result of
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fainting or exhaustion. These visuals were often intermixed with narration or interviews
about what the residents were thinking and feeling, as described here:
If you were me, would you exchange your whole life with money? Would you
sell your Gohayng (hometown) where all your ancestors had lived? Where would
you rely on at the last moment if you ruined all these beautiful nature and
hometown villages?
(Segment of written narration that ends with a profile picture of Ms. Oh in A
Halmae Wonders Why)
Shedding light on the ordeals of the elderly female villagers was basically meant
to mobilize public support by provoking moral indignation and a sense of injustice by
visually claiming the legitimation of the residents’ territorial argument against the
KEPCO. In this way, media portrayals of suffering ‘old bodies’—that often became
iconic and identified with the suffering of ‘the land’ due to the construction—were
utilized from the collaboration between media producers and the villagers to turn their
sit-in sites in the mountains into public spaces of protest.

3.2.3 Establishing a New Type of Social Relation
The protesting residents appreciated the supporters’ staying with them at the sit-in
sites. As demonstrated, witnesses’ video-recording was essential in situations involving
the protestors’ direct collisions, relieving their sense of isolation and anxiety in the
middle of the mountains. Even the mere material presence of the on-site witnessing
cameras—either from citizens’ smartphones or professional journalists’ cameras—
frequently created a gentler response among the dispatched policemen and KEPCO
employees. Concurrently, the physical companionship of supporters enabled many other
activities, ranging from keeping guard at night to decorating protest camps to socializing
and chatting during the longer periods of standstill confrontation. With such
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acknowledgements, the female villagers often conveyed their gratitude by feeding meals
to the supporters with rural hospitality and material care in the inter-generational
framework of social relations (Kim 2015). This sense of familiarity and camaraderie can
be observed in the interview with a male resident, Mr. Lee Young-gook below:
Have you heard about “the princes and princesses” of our camp? This is how our
Halmaedeul (grandmothers) call the supporters who have come here frequently.
Halmaedeul treat them as if they are their own grandchildren. Actually,
supporters often gain weight while they stay here because the grandmothers
encourage them to eat all the time.
This unique sense of solidarity based on quasi-familiar, inter-generational
relations bloomed also in the Miryang protest camps’ spatial and material contexts, such
as the circumstances in which domestic labor—cooking, washing dishes, cleaning, and
putting on fresh bedding—was collectively shared among the female residents and the
supporters in their maintenance of the homey and everyday-grounded framework of their
occupation of the construction sites. In particular, the participants’ eating meals together
three times a day in the protest camps contributed to dismantling the binary that can exist
between private households and public domains of protest in urban areas. Moreover, such
practices facilitated a sense of family or community whose de-establishment had
deepened from the widespread instability of everyday life in neoliberalized South Korea
(Song 2006).
The urban supporters’ particular sense of identifying the protest camps as ‘home’
is well expressed in the documentary Home Sweet Home 101 (2015). The director
emphasized that she paradoxically found peace and healing at the forefront of the sit-in
sites of Miryang in which the protestors tried their best to make every day joyful for one
another in order to withstand the long-running protest. Likewise, Korean cultural studies
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scholar Joo (2012) captures such “emotional hunger” as the dominant feeling constructed
in this “frustrated” era. Against being uprooted and dispossessed in the neodevelopmental regime, the protest participants therefore found the elderly female
villagers to be the center of filling these ‘hungers’ at the sit-in sites; here is where the
protesters were able to be healed by exchanging mutual comfort.
An appreciation of the urban supporters might be facilitated even more by
examining the different ethical standards that were present between the residual rural
culture and the dominant urban consumer culture in regard to the traditional notion of
hospitality. For instance, practices such as offering a ‘homemade’ meal to a visitor was
not considered out of the ordinary among most of Miryang’s rural residents, but rather
simply a basic ethical act that any human being should undertake. Such an ethical stance
was at the root of why many female elderly villagers often expressed their complicated
feelings about the situations in which they had to fight with the young policemen whom
they considered as their own grandchildren. For example, in an interview an elderly
female villager Kim Deok-soon recalled the moment that she had encountered young
policemen at their posts as she had driven the persimmon-loaded cultivator (an
agricultural machinery). She told me, “What could have I done (except give them fruits
as I always do)? On the one hand, I was so angry to see the presence of the police again
and again. On the other, however, they were just ‘kids’ to me. They just stood there
because they had to, not because they wanted to. So, I said to them, ‘Take off your hats.
I’ll pack some persimmons there!’”
In comparison, from the perspective of the urbanites, such hospitality—especially
offering meals—was a huge favor or extra kindness which in their urban homes required
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one to do additional care and labor where home-cooked meals are frequently substituted
for buying prepared meals or going out to a restaurant. The specific emphasis of urban
supporters on how grateful they felt for the hospitality of ‘halmeonees’ is shown in the
remarks of the interviews: “I have never been to the terrific protest sites like here which
serve the citizen visitors so well (Activist from The United Against Disability
Discrimination)” and “I think I was able to endure such frequent confrontations in the
protest camps due to the strength I received from the meals that I ate with the
grandmothers (Documentary Director of Miryang Arirang).”
This new type of inter-generational, social relations was strengthened by another
preeminent idea which was shared particularly among those who had prior experience of
activism. This idea was embodied in a sense of respect for “the grandmothers” as “rarely
humble but determined” protesters who refuse to be co-opted. In particular, being amazed
by the grandmothers’ strong will and perseverance often went together with references to
other observed scenes of “retreated or compromised” social movements, as reflected in
the following interview excerpts with media activists:
At first I was surprised a lot by the bold attitude of the elderly female residents. In
the case of the labor movement, workers rarely act without any prior discussions
and guidelines. Since unions often take care of the situations collectively, workers
tend to be passive in terms of initiating any voluntary action. Contrastingly, here,
these grandmothers were audaciously blocking construction vehicles or grasping
onto helicopters … I wondered where this power came from. (Ms. Song Ah Young,
an experienced media activist)
The prior male village leaders seem to me to be very similar to the typical type of
union heads who often prefer to meet with a CEO than with workers. KEPCO
approached them by stimulating such a self-aggrandizing desire to acquire their
cooperation with the construction. Grandmothers would never accept that
because they do not have such an eagerness for fame in the first place. Based on
this approach, they could achieve even what the Korean environment movement
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could not do: generating public awareness of the issue of electricity. (Ms. Lim Jin
Kyung, a prior labor activist who organized the citizen supporters in Seoul)

This view of identifying the elderly female villagers as uniquely upright,
dissenting agents is situated in South Korean politico-economic and -ecological contexts
in which resistance by institutionalized labor and environment movements has been
impotent in response to the rise of the neo-developmental state since the 2000s (Kim
2015). In sum, within the context of the sit-ins ‘Miryang Halmae’ has evolved into a
social center around which the urban dissenters or those frustrated with the regime have
gathered and established a new type of intergenerational relations with specific affective
sensibilities.

3.3 From Victims to Guardians in the Politics of Gohyang (Hometown)
The impact of the residents’ visual acts on attracting public attention is noted in
the appearance of a backlash in the form of the discourse of “external force” contesting
the meaning of the villagers’ visual practice. Rooted in the residual sensibility of the Cold
War era’s branding of social movements as “commies or reds aligned with North Korea,”
the discourse has had a particular narrative frame: the “fundamentalist” anti-nuclear,
environmental activists came to Miryang from the “outside” to seduce the “innocent”
villagers into extreme protesting.
A representative example of this discourse is an article from the right-wing
newspaper Chosun-Ilbo that was written on October 7, 2013. With the title “The Unified
Progressive Party (UPP) digging a grave pit for the villagers,” the article highlighted one
particular photo image which looked like gallows in a rather scary setting, taken at night
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without any villagers in sight. Placing this photo as the counter-image, the article
attempted to discredit the rhetorical power of the residents’ visual acts by denying their
ownership of the struggle and articulating it instead with demonized radicalism. It also
revealed the dominant notion that elderly female villagers in rural areas might be too
“innocent and passive” to organize and perform such a determined sit-in on their own
(Hwang 2012; Yang 2011).
This framing was recognized seriously both by the protesting villagers as well as
by the media producers. In particular, this discourse of “external force” went hand in
hand with the central government’s proposal of a development project for Miryang City
(i.e., the Nano Fusion National Industry Complex) as well as the KEPCO’s expanded
economic compensation package that included individualized direct cash deposits to the
residents. Consequently, a large number of the residents gave up the struggle in response
to the joint operation of the central and local governments, police force, and conservative
media, all aligned with the KEPCO and all banding together to use a carrot-and-stick
approach to try to appease the protesters.
The practice of narrating or historicizing the lives of the grandmothers emerged
after this joint strategy of the KEPCO. With a more universalized counter-frame, urban
supporters and activists were now defined as the “protectors of human rights” of the
Miryang residents who “resist to be displaced” by “state violence” carried out by massive
police intervention. Their resistance then was interpreted as a move to secure not solely
where they live, but also who they are via the detailed narrative of how they have created
their lives in Miryang. Within this framework, the media producers often strove to locate
the government and corporation’s act of uprooting the dissenting villagers from the
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protest sites within contemporary South Korean history. These attempts were explicitly
realized in an oral history book project titled Living Miryang (2014) in which 17 villagers
collaborated with 17 human right activists, reportage writers, journalists, and women
studies’ scholars in documenting their life stories. This process was visually recorded by
photographers and video activists as well. Miryu, one of the co-authors, wrote about why
they initiated this project:
We gathered around December 2013 when the struggle at the sit-in sites became a
bit difficult… we thought there were more stories we could listen to and share…
With the intention not to end up describing the residents only as “fighters” and
creating a distance from or an isolation of them, we hoped that our solidarity
would be stronger when their voices were vividly delivered.
In the case of the film documentary Miryang Arirang (2015), Ms. Lee in her late
80s leads the narrative—along with other three female residents—with her story that was
fraught with scars from Japanese colonialism, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
What she felt about the struggle is presented side by side with her life experiences about
prior wars in the documentary as follows:
This [the struggle] is a war. Since I was born and have been living here, I
experienced Daedonga Jeonjaeng (World War II) to the 6.25 War (Korean War).
In Daedonga Jeonjaeng, the Japanese took our food and iron. The commies came
and demanded food for their meals during the 6.25 War. But this war (against
transmission towers) is the most painful to me because it is happening here near
my home every day without distinguishing day and night. The effects that follow
will continue as well. Construction noise also has made me crazy. Whenever
helicopters pass by my house, the floorboards tremble as if an earthquake has
happened. It’s too much, too much. I have had no country from the era of the
Japanese until now.
These efforts to situate the struggle within a larger temporal horizon through the
residents’ grass-roots life stories were a way to convince the public that the
environmental struggle of Miryang villagers is connected to the core absurdities of living
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in Korea filled with continuous injustices that historically have sacrificed the weak.
Bringing the residual idea of Gohyang (hometown) into the discussion can be understood
as an extension of such efforts. Gohyang usually has the connotative meaning of a rural
area beyond its denotative meaning—a place where a person was born and lived out
one’s childhood—in the South Korean cultural context. In particular, the notion of
Gohyang emerged as collective imaginary for a resting space or relief, comfort, warmth,
and restoration that often are provided by the care and support of a mother or
grandmother; these images are often presented in an historical context fraught with
colonization, civil war, and intensive industrialization and accompanied by abrupt
change, anomie, and trauma that people were forced to handle (Kim 2006; Roh 2014).
Gohyang had an actual social and politico-economical grounding as well. That is, the
peasant family was a “rural economic and social institution” without which “compressed”
South Korean urban industrial capitalism would have not been possible. Its contributions
extended from “the appropriate release of rural surplus labor and the formation of
indigenous industrial capital to the supply of affordable foodstuffs for urban people and
the provision of emergency material and social relief for urban-based family members”
(Chang 2010, p. 82).
Given this symbolic capital of Gohyang, framing the grandmothers as the
guardians of gohyang was a strategy of the protest participants to garner its cultural
currency to support the Miryang residents as well as their response to the backlash
discourse of “external force.” Such an iconicity of the Miryang grandmother associated
with gohyang is well expressed on the poster for the documentary Miryang Arirang. On
the poster, the center of attention is the back view of an old woman bent with age,

77

walking on an uphill road by holding on to a cane. Viewers cannot see her face, but still
can identify that she lives in a rural area given the surroundings, and can sense her lament
by the quote that appears over the poster’s title: “The years which I have struggled not to
have my gohyang taken away … how indifferent are the Haneulnim (the spirit of the sky)
and Jihanim (the spirit of the underground) …” There is also the caption at the bottom:
“The Miryang grandmothers live with this struggle every day.” Tension exists on the
poster between the grandmother’s supposed will for continuity and an implied force that
results in discontinuity, thereby inviting viewers to feel empathy for the woman’s pain,
frustration, and loneliness in her attempts to protect the gohyang as much as to support
her efforts.
It is important to note that the symbolic empowerment of the Miryang
grandmothers by the protest participants (e.g., the determined guardians of gohyang
beyond their victimhood) became intensified in inverse proportion to the protesting
villagers’ greater and greater defensive position within the local context. To date, the
protesters have been besieged by the state-run energy corporation, the central and local
government, and the police. Now the residents who converted from ‘against’ to ‘for’ the
construction have become the strongest social pressure and the source of frustration and
conflict for those residents who still refuse to give consent to KEPCO. This situation
strengthened especially after the protesting residents lost their four remaining camps—
which had actually blocked the construction—due to police crackdown and KEPCO
finally completed the whole construction by September 2014. The protesting residents
were left with numerous lawsuits and huge fines in addition to the pain, trauma and stress
that they had to endure during the long-term struggle. In the next section, I investigate
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how the protesting villagers responded to the internal political consequences of Miryang
by expanding their scope of activities to the national level, and how such rituals as
candlelight vigils, documentary screenings, and book concerts became the space in which
the diverse meanings of Miryang Halmae were introduced and received. The more
uplifted meaning of Miryang grandmothers as emergent teachers for future generations
can be understood in this regard.

3.4 Emergent Teachers in the Rituals
“What the …? Policemen are around every corner of the roads here,” the taxi
driver complained as he was transporting Gajin and me from the Miryang train station
when we arrived at Phyungbat village. The young policemen posted at the village’s
entrance tried to see inside the passing vehicles. Behind them were their four police cars
with three steel container boxes and stacked police shields, signaling that the police were
now staying near the construction sites twenty-four hours a day to prevent any access
from the residents. Staring at the policeman who approached the taxi to check with the
driver, Gajin responded to him with an angry tone, “You’re right. I cannot believe what
I’m seeing now.” The village had been transformed into a giant prison whose gates to the
outside world were constantly inspected by the police.
It was June 24, 2014, the second day of “Season Two,” which the Miryang
committee had titled in its circulation of a June 23rd press release. Calling the protest
“Season Two” was a response against the public assumptions that the struggle of
Miryang might be over after the police operation in the Vicarious Administrative
Execution on June 11th. Gajin had contacted me a few days after the execution as to
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whether I wanted to join her in interviewing ‘the grandmothers.’ Upon my immediate
agreement, she added, “You know? Although we call it an interview, it would be more
likely to create a chance for the grandmothers to talk about how they feel. Our listening
to them in itself would be an act of consolation, especially at this moment (after the
demolition of the camp).” Her comment was interesting to me because the word wee-ro
(consolation) was one of the most commonly used words along with the word gong-gam
(empathy) when the supporters would conceptualize their acts of coming to Miryang and
staying with the elderly protestors while I was doing my fieldwork.
Inside the ‘prison,’ the residents were busy in recreating their new place in a
private yard as an alternative to the prior encampment from which they had been
expelled. The protesting villagers required a ‘space’ where they could gather with visiting
supporters. Reflecting such a need, the residents called the new space Sa-lang-bang (a
guest room), not the former term Nong-seong-jang (a sit-in site). The four guest rooms
were being built, some of which were being equipped even with Wi-Fi so visitors could
use the internet in the space. Maintaining a protest community was the common point
which many residents and activists frequently emphasized in their interviews:
“We—the residents who remained to protest—should gather together again and
again. That’s why we constantly create extra activities like making china or
homemade organic cosmetics so we can keep meeting, talking, and eating meals
together. Only when we are assembled, then supporters from outside can come as
well. If we fail to maintain us, we will be easily divided and converted by the
‘pro’ residents. A few of them are now the informants of KEPCO, pushing us to
give our consent for the construction. It is so easy to give up the fight when we
become isolated (Ms. Song Mi-hui, a female villager in Dong-hwa-jeon village).
I think a mode of ‘hang in there’ is really important in a struggle, of which the
residents seem to be strongly aware. Even if the villagers actually lost, it is still
significant for them to sustain themselves in a protest. It is not only to prove that
their struggle has been right, but also to prevent any possible backlash from
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happening to them. (Ms. Lim Jin Kyung, a prior labor activist)
When Gajin and I arrived at the yard where only a rusty container box still stood,
Mr. Park—who used to transport the visitors between the train station and the village—
greeted us. He was working on water supply and drainage with fifteen young men and
women in their twenties who were part of The Group of Green Volunteer Activities in
Rural Communities for Life and Peace.6 Inside the box were two elderly female villagers:
Kwon Jin-ok in her 80s and Hong In-sook in her 70s. Hong had taken charge of feeding
people in the protest camp, including short-term and long-term supporters. Wearing
black-dyed and permed short hair and light make-up, this 70-year-old woman was used to
interacting with people in a gentle and elegant fashion. Preparing meals for many people
must have been hard work for her. Nonetheless, as witnessed by her efficient
arrangement of food preparation, she seemed to have a clear sense as a host and provider
of the camp. But now she was just sitting with a tired, depressed face in a much narrower
container box after losing the camp’s members to a sit-in. Even if Gajin tried to create a
conversation in the form of an interview which was intended to ease the difficult feelings
of the villagers, the grave and mournful atmosphere in the yard did not dissipate easily.
It was then that a pick-up truck with two male villagers passed by. Two
‘Halmeonees’ started to swear at them loudly. “Look at those bastards. Son of bitches!
How could you live shamelessly after getting such dirty money from KEPCO? You don’t
deserve to live here!” The truck stopped. The two men in their 40s got out and began to
yell at the Kwon and Hong: “Why do you insult us so harshly? What did we do so
6

Found in 2011, The Group of Green Volunteer Activities in Rural Communities for Life Peace was a
loosely organized network across the unions of part-timers and university student associations and ecology
clubs. Its goal has been to build solidarity with rural communities conflicted with the construction of
nuclear power plants and mega-scale power transmission towers.
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wrong? What could we have done against what the government was doing? You guys
said Woo Geum-soon would win, but what happened eventually (referring to the
execution with a sarcastic tone)? We were right (about giving up the struggle)!” That
moment sparked a fight and each party kept yelling at each other for ten minutes to the
extent that I could not distinguish who said what at all.
Notably, Gajin did not record the scene with her camera. Neither did I. At some
point, she simply asked the two ‘pro-KEPCO villagers, “Please just go. Halmeoness are
feeling very sensitive at the moment.” One guy turned to us and shouted, “Who are you?
What are out-of-towners like you guys doing here? You go! Mind your own business.
Ah! You might be out of work (mocking tone). If you had any job, you could never have
the time or reason to come here. Because of people like you, residents get blamed more
for bringing outsiders onto our turf.” The reason with which he began to degrade Gajin
and me was exactly aligned with the discourse of ‘external force.’ Peculiarly enough, he
added an unasked rationale to defend himself, “Originally I was also against the steel
towers. But I conceded painfully after having heard these towers were very important to
the export of nuclear power plants to the United Arab Emirates.”
What he claimed was that he sacrificed his individual interests patriotically for his
country’s developmental goal. These two pro-villagers were tenants who neither would
stay living in the village long term nor share the concerns of the protesting residents
about the health issues related to mega-scale electromagnetic waves and the sharp drop in
real estate prices. Regardless, his ‘heroic’ claim was the ‘other’ side of the discourse: that
of ‘external force’ in which good citizens or subjects are defined as those who cooperate
with ‘what the government does’ because they would not be ‘commies’ who are aligned
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with North Korea. In this way, the protesting residents were pushed and pressured by the
residents who gave up the resistance.
As seen in the above conflictual encounter, the pro-KEPCO residents often
blamed the con villagers and their continuous struggle for the irrational radicalism of the
‘commies.’ The antagonistic division between the ‘for’ and ‘against’ residents also
intensified because the KEPCO-funded compensation package that included the local
developmental projects and individualized direct cash deposits to the residents became a
constant source of internal conflicts, which I analyze in detail in Chapter Four. To make
matters worse, many residents were going to be on trial, expecting a combined total fine
of $200,000. Urban supporters and visitors also were decreasing since the protesting
residents had lost their front line of the struggle: the protest camps.
This multi-layered crisis that prevailed in the local context was the background
which drove the Miryang struggle to become multi-sited across the country. Now the
protesting villagers journeyed to be connected with other protestors—including the ones
who visited the Miryang protests—physically outside of Miryang. As with cultural events
like documentary screenings and book concerts, the trips also had a fundraising goal in
order for the residents to deal with the long-term legal disputes ahead. Paradoxically, the
huge amount of fines that the corporation and the police imposed on the protesting
participants became the very driving engine that encouraged the residents to continue
their resistance and expand their energy activism to the national level. Accordingly, the
darker the domineering presence of KEPCO shadowing the day-to-day worlds of the rural
Miryang became, the lighter the iconicity of the protesting grandmothers became. Thus,
the meanings of the protesting grandmothers were expanded to regard female Miryang
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villagers as emergent pedagogic figures for future generations beyond the guardians of
the past, gohyang.
One of the outputs generated from such endeavors was the book The Anti-Nuclear
and Anti-Transmission Tower Expedition: A Report on ‘Bad Electricity, written by
Miryang Halmae (grandmother) and Halbae (grandfather). Published in May 2015, the
book provides an account of the Miryang residents’ journey across the country to visit
twelve villages and areas affected by nuclear power plants and mega-scale transmission
towers. This eight-day field trip included stops at residents’ protest committees, civic
organizations, and actual power plants, as well as the promotion halls run by Korea
Hydro & Nuclear Power, a subsidiary of KEPCO. Sixteen Miryang villagers participated
in this journey along with four activists of the Committee, one expert from the civic
organization Energy Justice Actions, four photographers, and seven video activists. What
the villagers felt, heard, and observed during the trip is presented in the book via four
different individual residents’ narrative voices.
Now the protesting Miryang grandmothers were becoming more future-oriented
and connected to a larger anti-nuclear energy activism, as shown in the printed remarks
on the book cover: “At first, we thought only about the steel towers in our villages. Now
we know they cannot be separated from the dangerous accumulation of nuclear power
plants. We realized so many things from our ten-year fight and this trip. We would like to
share this with the world now, especially with young people.” The enhanced iconicity of
the Miryang grandmother is textually embodied in the manuscript as the emergent,
mobile, and pedagogic social and political agent, based on her maternal thinking and
intimate credibility through her commitment to energy activism. This iconicity also is
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audio-visually materialized by her voice as a speaker—who participated in “the
expedition”—in subsequent nationwide cultural events organized over four months in the
form of a book concert. As an alternative pedagogic figure, the Miryang grandmother
was now registered as an icon who attempts to connect herself to the younger generation
in urban areas to share what she has learned during the struggle and to encourage
urbanites to reflect on energy issues for a sustainable environment.
While rituals like book concerts and movie screenings began in urban areas
during the later period of the struggle, particularly in 2015, the candlelight vigils in
Miryang had become prominent spaces at which the evolving meanings of Miryang
Halmae as movement media were gathered, integrated, and received. Begun in memory
of Lee Chi-woo’s death on January 16, 2012, the weekly candlelight vigil in Miryang
developed into the central ritual for the protesting participants. The 150th vigil especially
demonstrated the ritual’s features because it was held on June 14, 2014, three days after
the police crackdown of the protest camps.
I attended this 150th vigil. To travel to Miryang from Seoul, I took The Urgent
Hope Bus7 for Miryang which had been advertised on social media (e.g., the Facebook
page of Miryang765kvout) to mobilize citizen supporters. The bus—there were three
buses which departed from Seoul that were filled with 140 participants while a total of
750 people came to Miryang on this day—turned out to be a socializing space as well as
a room for supporters to prepare for their own performances in the ritual. On this five7

The Hope bus is a solidarity practice of citizens. It first appeared at the labor strike of the Hanjin Heavy
Industries in 2010 (Lee, 2016). The bus usually carried activists and newly recruited and mobilized citizen
supporters with diverse music performances and programs. The Hope Bus for Miryang was initially
organized in Seoul in March 2012. Since then, the buses from all around the country came to Miryang
several times more with such programs as “Planting flowers and seedlings at the spots of chopped trees in
the construction sites” in order for the urban supporters to show solidarity with the protesting villagers.
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hour drive to Miryang, a microphone was circulated to every single person on the bus so
that participants could introduce themselves, share why they participated, and what they
felt. While many citizens expressed their empathy for the residents’ hurt, they also shared
issues from their own contexts along with what they expected to achieve from going to
Miryang. For instance, Ms. Sunmi Oh, who introduced herself as a mother and a member
of a small local civic group for alternative education that is related to environmental
issues, “I go to Miryang to console Eoreusindeul (honorific way of referring to the
elderly) because it has been really uncomfortable for me to be just at home after watching
the news about the demolition. But I go there to get some energy from the residents as
well. Diverse opinions and people I will encounter there will also help me have a clear
idea about how to act around energy issues where I live.” After getting to know one
another on the buses, we learned several popular songs whose lyrics were revised
according to the protest context. In addition, blank paper with the printed icon of the
Miryang grandmother was distributed for us to write on; the well-written ones were later
recited in front of the villagers at the vigil.
On arriving at the candlelight vigil, all the participants first ate dinner together at
the prepared outside setting. Eating a meal in sync was a significant part of the ritual in
which the principle about food at protest sites—that everyone is equally served—was
enacted. The participants also greeted and socialized with one another before the vigil
began. Such vigils regularly consist of musical performances (as warm-up preludes
attracting participants’ attention to the central stage), short-video screenings (to provide
participants with the main issue of the day in a shared context), residents’ remarks (often
as responses to the presented matter), supporters’ words (mostly to express endorsement
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and solidarity in the form of commentary or recital), and ultimately some symbolic
performances like the supporters’ embracing the elderly females (as a confirmation of
support). From this process, the vigil turned into a space where the audience received The
Miryang Halmae as an interface to talk about broader problems beyond the Miryang case
within the participants’ performances (e.g., speech, reciting letters, songs), as seen below:
Living my whole life in Seoul, I have been ignorant about how electricity is made
and distributed while it has been sacrificing the wellbeing of many people and the
environment. Thank you for letting me know of this reality against which you have
resisted. The struggle of Miryang is connected to many other absurdities of the
nuclear energy regime around the globe. Like the grandmother illustrated in this
letter that I’m holding now, I will support and join in the protest wherever I will
be. (Hanseon, Activist of The Network for Global Activists and School of
Feminism at the 150th Candlelight Vigil)
In addition, what was accomplished through the ritual was the maintenance of a
sense of community in which the residents’ wishes to protect their gohyang and a future
for all were performed and confirmed with national and international solidarity (e.g., the
visit of Hukushima residents and the video message from the indigenous female activists
in Mexico, Honduras, and China who also contested power plant and dam construction).
This ceremony comprised the protest participants’ enlarged consciousness to demand the
revision of relevant energy policies and laws beyond the resistance to the individual
project of KEPCO.
The ritual was also a process of sharing complex emotions that ranged from
anger, despair, and sadness to joy, pride, and hope through which the iconicity of the
Miryang grandmother was affectively carved. Such intricacy of emotions is revealed in
the excerpt below from a letter recited at the vigils in November 2013. It was written by
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Shin Yoo-jin—a teenage student from the urban alternative school Haja Production
School located in Seoul—who participated in drum performances at the vigils:
FESTEZA is the name of the performance team I belong to, a Portuguese
combination of festival (festiio) and sadness (tristeza). I didn’t understand its
meaning for a long time, though. How could we make a festival when we are sad?
By meeting the Miryang grandmothers, however, I got that we could. Even that
we should. Because I observed how sadness turns into a festival of hope in their
enjoyment of our performances and dancing along with our music, although they
were full of anger and despair. The Grandmothers told me,“You’re trying to
change the world, not just Miryang. The change will be slow and insignificant.
Still, please be persistent without expecting quick results.” I appreciate these
words and I hope I will be of help in securing everyone’s own gohyang and
nature.
Sustaining their protesting community through ritual was important for the
remaining protesting villagers who were from 225 households at this point in time in
December 2015. The numbers had dwindled because a large number of the residents had
given up the struggle due to the joint operation of governmental power. Such power was
comprised of: 1) the central government’s economic pressure on the local government in
the form of proposing to the Miryang City a development project called The Nano Fusion
National Industry Complex, 2) the occupation of the police force with a total of 380,000
mobilized officers and a budget of 3.7 million dollars between 2013 and 2014, and
3) criminal charges and KEPCO’s civil suits that resulted in 383 apprehended protesters
and 69 villagers brought to trial. In addition, a backlash of conservative media spread the
discourse of “external force” that was added to the KEPCO’s expanded compensation
package which included individualized direct cash deposits to the residents.
Amidst these circumstances, the iconicity of the Miryang grandmother has played
a pivotal role around which a variety of dissenting voices was able to gather through such
rituals as the weekly candlelight vigil in Miryang. These rituals have since evolved into
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movie screenings and book concerts in other regions that usually invite Miryang residents
to speak. Furthermore, these processes have contributed to the creation of an emergent
public who criticize the conglomerate-centered electricity infrastructure and energy
policies. Most significant of all, the successful impact of these public protests is reflected
in part in the May 27, 2016 announcement by the government, more specifically the
electricity regulatory commission belonging to The Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Energy: the scheduled building of the Sinwooljin - Sinkyungi 765kV transmission line has
been cancelled.

3.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the processes of how movement media—the visual
iconicity of Miryang Halmae—were produced and received during the environmental
struggle of Miryang against the construction of a 765,000-voltage transmission line. The
production of this iconicity began with a concrete need of the protesting residents to
secure visuals for their own legal defense as well as for the mobilization of public
support. In these movement media, the protesters at first emphasized the victimhood of
the elderly female villagers. At the same time, the fields and mountains comprised unique
material and geographical settings for this production. The visual labor of the protest—
the residents’ sit-ins and the urban supporters’ witnessing of injustice practices—grew
into a new type of inter-generational social relations. These relations were the basis from
which the emergent political culture further bloomed against the political background of
South Korea; in this neo-developmental regime which has uprooted and dispossessed the
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local populations have flourished dysfunctional and retreating political parties, social
movement organizations, and mainstream mass media.
Concurrently, the protestors’ rituals such as candlelight vigils were the very space
in which the participants staged and embraced the enlarged iconicity of Miryang Halmae
as the guardians of gohyang or the teachers for the future generations. To the protesters,
these processes of receiving the iconicity in the rituals enabled them to sustain and refine
the emergent political culture so that they could continue their resistance by responding
to diverse political challenges and antagonistic local contexts like internal conflicts
between ‘for’ and ‘against’ villagers. Affectively carved, this emergent political culture
also was a unique combination of the residual culture of the rural residents (e.g., the
tradition of hospitality in an agricultural region) and the oppositional consumer culture of
urban supporters (e.g., the solidarity practice like the Hope Bus whose eventful and
spectacle-oriented features were an adaption to being in the cities and needing to attract
the attention of passerby’s). This uniqueness contributed to bringing in diverse groups of
participants to Miryang who ranged from urban workers, housewives, feminists, students,
environmentalists, teachers, alternative education activists to nuns and priests from
Catholic organizations.
Moreover, I argued and emphasized that the seemingly empowering development
of the visual iconicity of Miryang Halmae has been a paradoxical result of the darkening
situations surrounding the struggle. There was, however, a momentous silver lining: the
cancellation of the scheduled building of the new transmission line. Nonetheless, what
the evolving process of the iconicity eventually demonstrated is that crises—which the
corporation and government interventions impose on the residents—paradoxically have
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been the primary sources which have expedited the meanings of ‘protesting
grandmothers’ and expanded them via the protestors’ historicizing the lives of these
elderly female residents and connecting them to the younger generations. These results,
both intended and unintended, imply that the hegemony of the neo-developmental state
has not retreated.
Lastly, this type of activism that is based on the direct relationships between
respectable role models and their followers has a double-edged feature. On the one hand,
the participants’ producing and consuming the iconicity of Miryang Halmae have worked
as an interface by which the participants have been able to talk about injustice and
inequality. Through such outlets, these movement media have mediated the frustrations
and critical voices of the much broader public who are dispossessed by the South Korean
neo-developmental regime. On the other hand, this type of supporters’ activism can
become limiting when the participants remain only a ‘brand public’ (Arvidsson &
Caliandro 2015) who follow Miryang Halmae mainly because they view these
grandmothers as ‘environmental celebrities’ (Brockington 2009) or new heroes who can
exchange ‘comforts’ with their fans.
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CHAPTER 4
AUTHORITY, ALLUREMENT, AND INTIMACY: CORPORATE STRATEGIES
TO GENERATE DOMINANT ENERGY CULTURE

A crowd of teenagers in their school uniforms poured out of a fancy semi-glass
building located in the expensive Gangnam district of Seoul. It was a weekday afternoon
on June 19, 2014. As part of a group visit from a variety of educational institutions from
kindergartens to colleges, students filled the majority of the audience of the electricity
museum run by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (hereafter, KEPCO).8 As the
young people entered, the seven-feet diameter exquisite miniature exhibit entitled “The
first electric light bulb in the Gyeong-bok Royal Palace9 in 1887” set a historical tone that
oriented the audience to a narrative full of KEPCO’s triumphs of technological progress,
national development, and promises for the future.
I navigated through the museum and found it was composed of three parts—the
history of electricity, modern electricity, and environmentally-friendly energy—and
wondered how the transmission towers in the rural areas would be represented. Eight
days prior, the police had cracked down on the Miryang villagers’ protest camps. In
addition, the residents’ struggle against the 765kV transmission towers had been covered
by most of the national media for the past couple years. With this in mind, I paid

The electricity museum was opened in 2001 as a major part of KEPCO Art Center near the corporations’
headquarters and renovated after the export of nuclear power plant to UAE in 2009 in order to incorporate
the promotion of APR1400, the Korean model of nuclear technology. With free access to the public, the
museum offers a free tour to group visitors of more than twenty people. The opening page on the museum
website for group reservations is full of names of both public and private educational institutions.
8

9

Built in 1395, it was the main royal palace of the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897). Located in northern Seoul,
the palace served as the home of Kings as well as the government.
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attention to whether and how the museum had responded to the current contestation
surrounding the mass-scale transmission towers planted far away from large cities.
The museum, however, positioned “the farming and fishing communities” and
“the transmission towers” separately in chronologically different sections with
contrasting presentation styles. Moreover, the rural areas were presented as the recipients
of beneficial electricity provisions in the first national electric development project
(1962-1966) in the museum’s “history of electricity” section. It was also notable that the
presence of the farming and fishing communities was communicated in the past tense,
materialized by stationary miniatures inside a glass box. Any reference to the rural areas,
however, never appeared again after the museum’s offering them as background solely to
highlight KEPCO’s past achievements of complete distribution of electricity.
The transmission towers themselves belonged to the museum’s section entitled
“modern electricity,” spatially located after visitors first were exposed to KEPCO’s
futuristic public relations space. The dodecagon-shaped space looked like the inside of a
sort of spaceship, particularly with its neon blue fluorescent lighting. Its walls were made
of mirrors and each side had a screen showing a video that portrayed KEPCO as a “global
top green and smart energy pioneer.” Then visitors encountered the section of modern
electricity like a friendly science class with its opening motto of “humankind living with
electromagnetic waves.” It filled with the interactive exhibits ranging from an
electromagnetic bicycle to a claw crane type of game and two video screens entitled
“Electromagnetic Field in the Living World” and “Human Civilization and Energy.”
With the screens’ mentioning of the 3.5 billion-year-old earth’s magnetic field as well as
its analogy to sunshine, the underlying idea seemed to be that electromagnetic waves
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have a very natural and ubiquitous materiality which humanity has utilized for practical
purposes. Such amicable exhibits, having established the premise of ‘harmless’
electromagnetic waves embedded within such an enlarged time and space, next presented
their claim that the transmission tower with its low degree of electric and magnetic fields
did not harm human beings nor the environment.
Unlike this simple and virtuous portrayal by the museum, electromagnetic waves
emitted from power lines and electrical appliances have been quite a controversial
invisible materiality since the 1970s in regard to their hazardous effects on the human
body (Mitchell & Cambrosio, 1997; Mercer, 2002; Claassen et al., 2012). A lack of
scientific consensus over whether their radiation should be regarded as environmental
pollution, however, has located their impact within an uncertain regulatory realm, often at
the level of prevention advice. In South Korea, there have been multiple attempts since
the late 1990s to define electromagnetic radiation as environmental pollution with
regulatory criteria offered by a few lawmakers along with the Ministry of the
Environment. These attempts either were rejected by the National Assembly or blocked
by the Ministry of Information and Communication and the Ministry of Trade, Industry,
and Energy (Park, 2013).
In addition to such an unresolved controversy, there is the issue about land use. It
is because energy facilities—from dams and nuclear power plants to transmission lines—
comprise the category of “land-intensive technology” (Fischhendler, Boymel, & Boykoff,
2016) which in turn necessitates the taking of lands, regardless of whoever or whatever
has resided there previously. The disagreement between KEPCO and the rural residents
of Miryang over ‘who can or should use the land how and why’ has been a fundamental
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source of the conflict. The corporation was allowed to proceed with the construction not
because the dispute was settled, but because the protests were shut down by the long-term
assistance of the police force with a total of 380,000 mobilized officers and a budget of
3.7 million dollars to suppress the local resistance. This reality was totally disregarded in
the museum’s account.
Regardless, the dominant idea which KEPCO has promoted about electricity
infrastructure as a “politically neutral technological apparatus” and “universally
beneficial public good” has been challenged by emergent energy activism. In this case,
the protesters of the Miryang struggle questioned the current nuclear-centered energy
facilities and their construction processes with the notions of “danger,” “pollution,” and
“injustice” rather than “safety,” “efficiency,” and “good use,” as KEPCO has advocated.
With the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and the Miryang struggle, public attention and
language about nuclear energy have increased to the level of “problems” and “hazards”
despite the governmental framing of nuclear energy as a “realistic” and “competent”
climate response.
What do energy corporations like KEPCO do, particularly when their typically
technocratic, economic efficiency version of energy faces its opponents’ discourses and
criticisms? Prior communication studies about energy corporations have principally
analyzed the frames or rhetorical strategies used by industry actors (Fischhendler,
Boymel, & Boykoff, 2016; Kinsella, 2015). For instance, Schlichting (2013) analyzes
how the master frames of industry actors’ climate change communication moved from
“scientific uncertainty” to “industrial leadership in a climate protection” between 1990
and 2010. The basic assumption behind these approaches is that industry actors compete
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with other actors from journalism, government, or social movements in the discursive
arena by utilizing the same verbal ‘weapons’ of words, imagination, and interpretations.
Yet what if the art or skill of ‘meaning-making’ is not the only rule of understanding
energy?
This chapter investigates KEPCO’s communication strategies, focusing on how
this state-run energy corporation has striven to configure the dominant energy culture not
by modifying its core notion—that the electricity infrastructure is a politically neutral and
universally beneficial technology—but rather by applying other methods. More
specifically, I analyzed a set of monetary and temporal practices of KEPCO whereby the
corporation has interacted with the local residents of Miryang and the broader public
especially in and after the moment of handling its legitimacy crisis. The objective of this
analysis is to gain an understanding of how corporate money combined with temporal
management have been converted to a compensatory agenda as movement media which
assists an industry actor in its handling of the mainstream energy public. From this
analysis, I found that the corporations’ communication strategies were interlaced with the
dominant cultural and political fabric of everyday life so that their agendas could
seamlessly influence public engagement with energy issues.
By analyzing the metamorphosis of KEPCO’s communication approach that
accompanied a set of fiscal and temporal practices for its goal of refiguring the
mainstream, this chapter engages with a recent conversation that has run across
humanities and humanistic social sciences about how people understand and
communicate notions about energy that are based on their own values, ethics, beliefs,
habits, and the issues of power (Priest, 2016; Strauss, Rupp, and Love, 2013; Szeman &
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Boyer, 2017). The remaining chapter is composed of the following sections: i) authority:
bribes, delays, and exclusion in rural Miryang, ii) allurement: compensation, deadline,
and division within the Miryang public, and iii) intimacy: timely tips and friendly
authority in social media, and iv) conclusion.

4.1 Authority: bribes, delays, and exclusion in rural Miryang
Police raided a regional office of the Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) …
investigation into a bribery scandal involving the state-run power company. … it
attempted to pay a total of 17 million won ($16,400) in bribes to seven residents
opposing the firm's plan to construct high-voltage electricity transmission towers
in the region. The money was delivered through the chief of Cheongdo Police
Station… Meanwhile, KEPCO officials also allegedly…tried to give 10 million
won ($9,600) to a villager who was running for an election that would appoint
local agriculture federation members if elected.10
South Korea has indicted 100 people, including a top former state utility official,
of corruption in a scandal over fake safety certifications for parts in its nuclear
reactors …
Those indicated on Thursday include a vice president at Korea Electric Power
Corp (KEPCO) and a former chief executive at Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power
Co, who face bribery charges. The two were arrested as the scandal unfolded.
South Korea's tightly closed nuclear industry has been criticized for breeding a
culture of secrecy that led to corrupt practices among officials involved in safety
certification.11
High-ranking officials of the state-run Korea Electric Power Corporation
(KEPCO) and one of its affiliates were arrested on charges of taking bribes from a
supplier in return for favors… Kim's company supplied various
telecommunications equipments to KEPCO through the affiliate. He used
different ways to bribe them according to each executive's interest. He gave a
Hyundai Genesis rental car to Kang, while offering a Volkwagen New Beetle to
an IT department chief of KEPCO. He paid for golf lessons for a KHNP official's
son. Kim also provided 20 million won in cash and a 3.6-million-won German“Probe escalates into KEPCO bribery scandal,” news article published at The Korea Times on
September 16, 2014. http://www.ktimes.com/www/news/nation/2016/09/116_164688.html [Accessed on
April 19, 2017]
10

“South Korea Charges 100 with Corruption Over Nuclear Scandal,” news article published at Reuters on
October 10, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/korea-nuclear-idUSL4N0I01GL20131010 [Accessed on
April 19, 2017]
11
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made bicycle to a director at KEPCO KDN, as well as a car audio system worth
9.9 million won to another lower-level official…12
Despite some coverage of KEPCO’s attempts to bribe residents protesting against
the transmission towers in September 2014, the mass media primarily have highlighted
KEPCO’s briberies in the nuclear industry in the context of increased public concern
about the safety of nuclear power plants that began after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
disaster.13 To Miryang’s protesting residents, however, KEPCO’s strategy of bribing has
not been merely a distant threat. Rather, it has been an immediate hazard in particular to
communication among neighbors because bribing has been one of the corporation’s
powerful weapons for building invisible barriers amid them from the struggle’s
beginning. Consequently, KEPCO’s bribing practice was among the most frequent topics
whenever the Miryang villagers discussed the problems of communication in their
interviews for this study, as demonstrated below.
Did you just ask whether I attended the information session of KEPCO which was
held in 2005? How could I? I did not know there was such a thing because it was
held in secret away from most of Miryang’s residents except a few chosen village
heads and their associates. Turns out that they even gathered at a restaurant before
the session. What did they do there? They drank together and each of them was
bribed around $200 or $300. I heard this from the very people who were there.
They confessed to accepting bribes. Where would that money have come from?
Bribery is surprisingly prevalent in the countryside and KEPCO used it. There
was no single announcement about the construction project via village
broadcasting before and after the information session. (Interviewee Jang Seungmin, male resident)
KEPCO is an expert in bribing people. They were so professional and
sophisticated in terms of approaching each individual villager. For example, if
“Bribery scandal hits KEPCO,” news article published at The Korea Times on February 1, 2015.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/02/116_172794.html [Accessed on April 19, 2017]
12

13

The coverage of The New York Times about the 2013 the fake safety certifications scandal shows this
point well. “Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations,” published on August 3, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/world/asia/scandal-in-south-korea-over-nuclear-revelations.html
[Accessed on April 19, 2017]
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there is a male villager who has a background in the Marines and a young son
looking for a job, KEPCO would send him an employee having the same
experience with the customized proposal that the corporation can connect his son
with a promising job in one of its affiliated companies in exchange for his
consenting to the construction. People say there are up to five hundred methods
whereby KEPCO can bribe each person one by one and eventually let the local
community be divided and fight each other. Considering the ways in which
KEPCO employees have visited every household here in Miryang, I strongly
guess there must be a sort of ‘manual’ by which they work against the protesting
residents. (Interviewee Lee Hye-seon, female resident)
During these interviews, both Mr. Jang and Ms. Lee emphasized the importance
of complete disengagement in any conversations with the KEPCO employees. This
distance was the best defensive move that the residents could adopt. In particular, the
employees who attempted to visit the villagers’ private homes were considered to be
especially dangerous because they ultimately would offer up bribes disguised as ‘gifts.’
In this case, what KEPCO tried to buy out from the residents was not solely their
resistance, but their silence as well. Moreover, this silence often caused the ‘delay’ of the
resistant residents’ timely action to intervene in the construction, a result which was
helpful to KEPCO in gaining ‘enough time’ to complete their business without any
interference. In contrast, the bribed silence of some residents not only blocked the
protestors’ potentially immediate action, but also furthered a state of non-communication
among neighbors due to damaged social relations and distrust of each other. This vicious
circle was the very situation expressed by Mr. Jang in the interview above; he was furious
with the initially bribed village leaders who did not inform other residents about the
construction, even after they had attended KEPCO’s information session in August 2005.
Roper, Ganesh, & Zorn (2016) discuss ‘delaying’ policy actions and ‘garnering’
public support as climate skeptics’ goals in an examination of publications by The New
Zealand Climate Science Coalition, an internationally influential organization with strong
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links to U.S. conservative think tanks. They argue that polarization—by linking climate
change issues to prominent social discourses, particularly along lines of leftist versus
rightist ideologies—is skeptics’ essential discursive strategy by which they attempt to
generate constant debate and thereby delay any potential policy moves. Words loaded
with “doubt” (ibid, p. 776) are what climate skeptics use to drum up debate and thereby
postpone policy-making by way of polarization of the public; likewise, bribes were
KEPCO’s armory by which it was able to divide the villagers, garner the pro-construction
residents’ silence, and delay the protesting residents’ voices and actions. In other words,
via secrecy and silence, bribery acted to substitute or marginalize essential public
discussions about an influential construction project among the local community.
Protesting residents’ perceptions of bribery as a serious threat to communication should
be understood in this context. Then we may ask: what kinds of elements and conditions
allowed KEPCO and some Miryang residents to be complicit with illegal bribery?
First off, it is important to note the historical background of KEPCO that has
situated the corporation within a specific set of privileges and obligations under the
legacy of military-led industrialization and national development. KEPCO was born out
of a military coup d'état. The May 16 coup in 1961, organized and carried out by Park
Chung-hee and his military allies, enabled three private energy companies (Kyungsung,
Chosun, and Namsun) to merge and be reborn over a period of less than two months as
the state-led energy monopoly. Assigning a military general as president until 1981, the
Park Chung-hee government enacted the “Electric Source Development Promotion Act”
on December 5, 1978.
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The government specifically aimed to benefit from the construction of nuclear
power plants against the Oil Shock of the 1970s. The act exempted KEPCO from all
licensing procedures in all 19 development-related laws about acquiring lands and
building facilities after governmental approval. Under the guise of efficiency, the
monopoly was also free from any checks and interventions from the National Assembly
and local administrations as well as from residents whose lands and living environment
would be expropriated and affected by power plant-related facilities. This one-sided law,
enabling KEPCO to wield almost absolute power, was enacted within the context of a
military-led industrialization that competed with North Korea, South Korea’s communist
counterpart in the Cold War era. At this time in history, the government was the explicit
and ultimate decision maker and designer undertaking the task of efficient national
development and modernization (Chang, 2012; Hill, Park, & Saito, 2012).
In this regard, KEPCO was allowed to have business prerogatives as long as it
aligned itself with the governmental master plan of economic development. The primary
role of the corporation in this picture thus has been to provide a “stable power supply” for
multiple industries so that the industrialization process is firmly supported and
maintained. Nowadays, the corporation still follows the biannual governmental plan
called “The Power Supply Basic Plan.”14 Even if the characteristics of the corporation
have been changed slightly since the 2000’s restructuration process,15 its identity as ‘the

14

The Power Supply Basic Plan is the government policy covering overall issues about electric power,
such as the basic direction of power supply, the prospect of power demands, and the management of power
plant facilities since 2002. Before that, KEPCO aligned itself with previous governmental plans like The
Long-Term Power Supply Plan (1989 – 1999) and The Five-Year Power Resources Development Plan
(1962 – 1999). The latter was a part of the grand The Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962 –
1996) since the military dictatorship was inaugurated.
Accused of being an inefficient dinosaur as a state-corporation by the ‘free market’ discourse advocating
private competition, KEPCO has had to reduce itself by tearing off its role of electricity generation. As a
15
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sole electricity provider contributing to national economic development’ is still
embedded within the official discourse of KEPCO that ranges from the electricity
museum to governmental reports for developing countries.16 Also, this ‘mission’ still is
strategically highlighted in the official remarks of KEPCO executives whenever they
need to publicly legitimize their decisions and activities.
The legacy of military-led industrialization and the subsequent business structure
of KEPCO have not changed much. Although the Energy Development Promotion Act
was revised in 2003 to include an “Environmental Impact Assessment” and “Listening to
Opinions” of affected residents, its revisions still are insignificant. The act’s
inconsequentiality has been due to the fact that such revisions did not impose any
obligations on energy operators to respond to assessment results or citizens’ feedback.
Moreover, energy operators can choose which company carries out an environmental
impact assessment.
In the case of Miryang, KEPCO actually chose its own affiliated company,
KEPCO E&C, to assess the building of the 765kV power line which links the Singori
nuclear power plant complex and the North Kyungnam substation. When energy
operators submitted the assessment results to the local division of the Ministry of
Environment, local administrators could only make recommendations. This is why
KEPCO has been able to disagree effortlessly with the local environmental

result, it has covered only businesses involved with power distribution and transmission.
http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=006612&pageFlag=
16

For instance, see the government report of National Power Grid Development Project for Stable Power
Supply published by KEPCO in 2012. The report was created as part of “the Knowledge Sharing Project
(https://www.kdevelopedia.org) launched by the Ministry of Knowledge Economy and the Korea
Development Institute in 2004 in order to “share Korea’s development experience and to assist its
developing country partners.”
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administration about which criteria should be applied to evaluating the degree of harmful
electromagnetic radiation.17 In terms of the residents’ opinions, it is up to the corporation
whether to take them into account and furthermore, even if they do, they are not obligated
to follow through with them. Based on these conditions, all the efforts of KEPCO have
focused on gaining the approval from the central government, specifically from the
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, without attending to any other assessments.
At the offices of Myeon,18 the information sessions were held for three days from
August 23 to 25 of 2005. As a part of an environment impact assessment process,
sessions originally were meant to notify in advance residents whose residential and
farming areas would be affected by the 765,000 voltage-carrying power line so that their
responses would be reflected in the project. However, the actual process of holding the
sessions was subjected to the corporation’s primary goal of obtaining approval from the
government. Consequently, KEPCO preemptively publicized the event ‘minimally’ in
order that most of the villagers would neither know about it nor had any opportunity to
make ‘noise’ and delay the project.
For this purpose, KEPCO needed to recruit only a few residents, just enough to
take some photos of the sessions as proof that the required forms of environmental impact
assessment were filled out. The corporation achieved this goal by using the bureaucratic
superiority of the Myeon-jang (the Head of Myeon) over the Li-jang (the Head of the

17

While the Ministry of Environment has used the long-term effect- and human body-centered criteria of
2-3mG as the harmful degree of electromagnetic radiation, KEPCO has insisted in applying the short-term
and facility-centered one, 833mG. Later, this application became a controversial issue in the struggle.
18

Myeon (rural area) is one of the sub administrative units of a city along with Dong (city precinct) and
Eup (large village). A myeon has many small villages, each of which is an independent social and
geographical unit. Miryang has 5 dongs, 2 eups, and 9 myeons and the transmission line cuts across the
northern part of 5 myeons (Bubuk, Cheongdo, Danjang, Sangdong, and Sandwoe) that contain 28 villages.
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Village)19 within each village in order to mobilize the ‘secret sessions’ of participants.
Upon the request of each Myeon-jang, the Li-jang of every village scouted three or four
more attendees on average. Before each session, some of the Li-jangs held a preliminary
meeting at a restaurant with the chosen participants to assure that the attendees would
follow the instructions to remain silent about the session with other villagers.
KEPCO’s approach worked. Only 0.6% population (126 out of 21,069) living in
the affected area attended the information sessions. Accordingly, the majority of villagers
did not know about the existence of the building project until they received the official
land expropriation notice mailed by the governor of Gyungnam province at the end of
2007. Every aspect of the project already had been decided upon by this point in time.
Based on the assumption that local public servants and village leaders would be more
accountable to the needs of powerful higher-ups than to those of their constituents and
neighbors, KEPCO mainly targeted for bribery high-ranking local government officials
like the city mayor20 and such sub-leaders as the village heads.21 The corporation was
right: when Miryang City representatives responded to the corporation’s construction-

19

Li-jang is a resident elected by villagers to be a public servant representing them in modern villages of
South Korea. This official’s main role is to connect high-rank administrations and villagers. Thus, he or she
delivers notices from the upper institutions to villagers as well as helps residents deal with their
administrative tasks. Li-jang is usually considered to be good at administrative work as well as to have
wide social networks. For these reasons, the Li-jang often becomes the central person for new information
in the village (Kim, 2002; Son, 2011).
20

KEPCO created a questionable curve of the transmission line, which made sense only when it was seen
to avoid one specific restaurant owned by the nephew of Lee Sang-jo, the city mayor, elected three
consecutive times between 1995 and 2006.
Kim (2011) identifies “the leader-centric politics,” “the employment of reward programs,” and “the
tendency reducing life to work and money” as the governing strategies of the dominant regime in the rural
Saemaeul (New Village) movement in the 1970s. In this sense, KEPCO’s approach can be seen to align
with the 1970’s legacy of governing rural areas.
21
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related inquiry on February 8, 2003, they actually did not inform the residents nor the
municipal assembly that KEPCO was considering Miryang as a building site.
In his book titled Democracy, Inequality, Corruption: Korea, Taiwan, and the
Philippines Compared, political scientist You (2015) explores how economic inequality
between powerful economic elites and large poor populations affects corruption.
According to his comparative historical analysis, inequality fuels corruption by
encouraging electoral clientelism (economic elite’s vote buying that leads to political
corruption), bureaucratic patronage (economic elite’s patronage in bureaucracy that
causes bureaucratic corruption), and state capture (economic elite’s bribery as well as
illegal and legal campaign contributions that induce the mal-functioning of democratic
accountability).
Along with You (2015)’s emphasis on the mutual strengthening of inequality and
corruption and its facilitation of a vicious circle, concepts like “clientelism” and
“patronage” are useful to understand: how the residents were swayed by KEPCO’s
communication strategy and fail their resistance especially when they strove to resist
during the earlier period between 2008 and 2011. I argue that the residents’ following the
hierarchical, non-democratic rules of patronage and authoritarianism was the main factor
that let their resistance become vulnerable to failure. It was because such rules were more
advantageous to KEPCO as a well-networked, resourceful economic elite actor which on
the frontline could claim ‘scientific authority’ while exercising a wide range of patronage
in the backrooms.
Prior to the rise of the elderly female villagers’ sit-ins at the construction sites,
Miryang residents consistently had sought out authoritative figures to rely on—either
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‘godfathers’ (political patrons) or scientific experts. In their reaching out to higher-up
officials in the central government who were expected to ‘beat’ KEPCO, the residents let
a retired agent of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency—the former shadow power in
the era of the military dictatorship—be their face as the head of the initial anti-tower
committee. They also urged The Miryang Carmelites Nunnery, located in the area
affected by the transmission towers, to operate its own national Catholic network and
religious authority by which to connect to government officials or even to insiders within
KEPCO. In the election for a member for the National Assembly in April 2008, Cho Haejin, the candidate known for being close to the newly elected president Lee Myung-bak,
was elected.22
Although at first for a while the villagers were assisted by Miryang City and the
Municipal Assembly,23 these efforts eventually could not alter KEPCO’s proceeding with
the construction.24 The official video-recorded meeting25 held at City Hall on July 25,
When Lee was Seoul’s mayor, Cho served as his secretary and later worked as press secretary of Lee’s
presidential campaign as well. Cho also reflected the residents’ wish in his election pledge that he would
cancel KEPCO’s building project. Considering that Cho even had the nickname of “a man of the king” at
that time, the villagers trusted his promise. As an ex-Hyundai construction CEO (nicknamed “the
bulldozer” during the 1970s high-developmentalist era), Lee Myung-bak became the president in December
2007 with his election pledge of “747 Plan, 7% annual growth, $40,000 per-capita income, and the seventhlargest [world] economy.” It was an explicit appeal at that time in keeping with the path-dependent
mentality of South Koreans that returned to the “old and familiar developmental discourse” (Chang 2012;
Kwon 2010).
22

23

For example, the city financed and mobilized its Gwanbyeon-danchae (aided organizations) to help its
residents create a ‘good picture’ of the rally through the attendance of a sufficient number of participants.
In fact, when the villagers held their first rally downtown on July 25, 2008, around one thousand people
gathered. Given that the number of active residents in the committee was fewer than twenty, such a
participant size would have not been possible if they had not been organized by the city itself. The
involvement of the city was also reflected in the new name of the committee, The Committee of the
Miryang City to Fight for Null and Void 765kV.
24

Despite the demonstration, KEPCO announced six consortiums including Samsung Engineering and
Hyundai Engineering & Construction that would build the towers. It was on August 4, 2008, two weeks
after the villagers’ first rally. KEPCO also urged that the Central Land Expropriation Committee, which
belonged to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, finalize a decision for land expropriation
on January 12, 2009 in order to initiate the construction.
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2009 demonstrates how KEPCO used its financial resources and scientific authority to
defend the construction as planned. On this day, what KEPCO brought to the table was a
compensation package of economic rewards, including a project to increase farmers’
income as well as a scholarship foundation which would be run by the current leaders of
the anti-tower committee. The idea of compensation did not respond to any of the
residents’ own agenda (e.g., changing the route or nullifying the project, recognizing
harmful electromagnetic waves, and respecting residents as equal counterparts) nor to
their concerns (e.g., property damage, scenery loss, and health threats). Moreover, the
KEPCO representatives fiercely disagreed with the residents as to the harmful effects of
electromagnetic waves on human bodies and the environment. Kim Young-ho, Chief
Director of the 765kV Construction Bureau, emphasized:
The electromagnetic waves are usually in inverse proportion to the distance from
a tower like ones from any other electronic appliances. In the case of the 765kV
tower, one is totally out of its realm after 98 feet from a tower. On the subject of
electromagnetic waves, I can discuss this all day if needed. There have been three
thousand scientific publications internationally, but no clear causal relationship
has been found so far. If you want to study about that, we can even help you by
providing a list of experts: there are around forty professors around the country
who specifically specialize in the electromagnetic field.
These remarks reveal KEPCO’s frame of ‘scientific uncertainty,’ similar to that of the
U.S. industry actors’ climate change communication in the 1990s (Schlichting, 2013).
Concurrently, KEPCO’s representative condescendingly showed off the corporation’s
network with scholarly experts in order to present the company’s scientific authority to
25

At the two-hour meeting were 8 representative residents and 12 KEPCO employees. One notable thing
was that only 2 high-ranked employees primarily talked while the other employees just sat quietly. The
villagers took turns in talking about their concerns and complaints. Another interesting contrast was
between the content and the form of each party. The KEPCO employees managed to outmaneuver the
residents in pushing their focused agenda towards the construction while impressively maintaining a polite
and kind atmosphere. Contrastingly, the residents did not mind creating unpleasant moments with their
tense remarks, but their demands to KEPCO were too divided among themselves to push back the
KEPCO’s project effectively.
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the residents. This meeting finished without any substantial reconciliation, and three days
later KEPCO charged one of the villagers’ godfathers, the Miryang city mayor, with
dereliction of his duties via administrative appeal. This charge was clearly a
demonstration of power by the corporation which actually also had influenced the
mayor’s retreat from his position against the towers.
In response, the residents strove to reach out themselves to scientists and technical
experts in order to compete with the scientific authority that KEPCO had yielded against
them. In particular, the residents chose to expose the project’s invalidity from the
economic-technological perspective in order to contest the fundamental necessity of the
transmission line. Describing this approach as their strategic move, for example, resident
Son Ho-sik said in his interview: “In Kung Fu, a master can win even by taking
advantage of the opponent’s style of martial arts. Likewise, we wanted to prove that
KEPCO’s plan was absurd even from its own principles and perspective.” However, this
move meant that they did not foreground their questioning of the democratic, ethical, and
public legitimacy of the construction project. In other words, criticizing the complete
absence of ‘the worldviews and concerns of the people living and working on the ground’
in the project’s rationale was not prioritized, but rather positioned as a complementary
critique within their prioritized ‘scientific’ argumentation.
Even from this compromised position, the residents found that challenging
KEPCO via scientific argumentation was still an uphill battle. When the villagers
questioned the necessity of the 765kV transmission line given that the southeastern
region was self-sufficient in electric power (with the exception of a few metropolitan
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cities like Daegu),26 KEPCO defended the project not by its current situation but by their
envisioning of its prospects. That is, the corporation claimed the transmission line would
be essential for connecting the expanded future demand of the region’s big cities and the
enlarging forthcoming supply needs, particularly when the Singori V and VI nuclear
power plants were up and running in 2022 on the top of the soon-to-be completed Singori
III and IV in 2014.27
One might argue that forecasts of the future tend to reflect the assumptions of the
present. Thus, when KEPCO justified the project based on its prospects, the residents
were forced to decide if they would challenge the referenced current grounds which
enabled such anticipation. These core grounds were: i) the continuous increase of power
demands according to the economic growth forecast and electronic goods distribution
rate KEPCO referenced, and ii) the necessity of enlarging nuclear energy as ‘the’
decarbonizing response to climate change. Criticizing these premises meant that the
villagers had to challenge the deep-rooted ideology of ‘endless economic development’
as much as the idea of nuclear energy as the main decarbonizing strategy. Eventually, the
residents did not choose to strike at ‘the iceberg’ because they thought that confronting
government policy in a fundamental manner could be risky. In her interview in this study,
villager Won Sun-mi explained, “We did not want the LMB government—a nuclear

26

For instance, in the 2012 statistic, North and South Gyeongsang province were 156.7 and 226.0 percent
self-sufficient in electric power while its metropolitan city like Daegu was 1.8 percent (Jang, 2014).
27

Based on the Power Supply Basic Plan in 2008 and 2010, the government then planned to expansively
build the Singori nuclear power plant complex by completing Singori I and II by 2011, III by 2013, IV by
2014, V by 2018, and IV by 2019. The expansion is exceptional in comparison to the worldwide trend of
“nuclear industry in crisis” pointed out in the article of Renew Economy on February 6, 2017.
http://reneweconomy.com.au/nuclear-industry-crisis-29735/ [Accessed on April 19, 2017]
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energy enthusiast—to be hostile to us while we were already in difficult confrontation
with KEPCO.” Instead, the residents took a detour to alternative transmission methods in
order to contest the necessity of the 765kV transmission line.
Yet for the residents, consultations with scientists and tech experts was like the
filming of a spy movie due to the fact that these meetings had to be held secretly outside
KEPCO’s purview. Nicknamed “Electric Power Mafia,”28 KEPCO has been the largest
academic funder of the electrical engineering field in South Korea as well as the
monopoly that oversees a chain of subcontractors in the electric power industry. Thus,
most of the professionals who consulted with the protesters demanded the protection of
their identities in fear of retaliation. Choi Dong-wook, a male resident, describes the
process of acquiring the assistance of the experts:
To present convincing alternatives to the 765kV transmission method, we met
with many professors and experts secretly as if we were meeting with spies.
KEPCO is super gab (boss or predator) in the area of electricity. No matter how
great experts they were, the corporation could screw them by defunding their
projects or pressuring its subordinate small and medium-sized businesses,
including its own several affiliated company, not to hire their students. This was
why we could not explicitly reference their academic works or KEPCO suppliers’
novel technologies. We had to either find their foreign counterpart sources or
absorb their core content into ourselves as much as possible within the limited
time. Sometimes we stayed at their places for two or three days in order to learn
intensely.
To avoid exposing the experts’ identities, the villagers themselves had to perform
like experts. These performances enabled them to maneuver like a double-edged sword
during the six month-arbitration committee meetings29 with KEPCO that were held
The New York Times used this ‘nickname’ to reflect on public criticism of KEPCO’s corruption in the
article, “Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations,” published on August 3, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/world/asia/scandal-in-south-korea-over-nuclear-revelations.html
[Accessed on April 19, 2017]
28

29

The committee meeting was mainly held at Miryang City Hall every other week, which was open to
visitors. The participants around the discussion table were: three Miryang citizen representatives, the policy
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between December 21, 2009 and June 25, 2010. On the one hand, the protesters were
able to set an enduring agenda about alternative transmission methods that ranged from
the re-utilization of the already-built 345kV lines to the adoption of the new technology
of underground superconductor cables.30 On the other hand, the circumstances in which
the residents could not reveal their sources directly at the discussion table eventually
crippled their sustainable capabilities with such unclear scientific authority.31
Furthermore, they were helpless when KEPCO dismissed the alternatives with the claim
that the proposed methods were impossible or uneconomical. The corporation also
refused the residents’ request to provide pertinent data for simulation or for setting the
new electromagnetic field exposure criteria. As a result, the arbitration process eventually
was finalized on June 25, 2010, with only a plan to institutionalize economic
compensation for those people living near transmission lines. Thus, KEPCO did not

director of Cho Hye-jin as the Miryang representative from the National Assembly, the director of
economy and investment division in Miryang City, the deputy director of the electric power industry
division of the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy, the deputy director of the business support division
from the South Gyeongsang Province, the expert member of the governmental Anti-Corruption & Civil
Rights Commission, the chair and assistant administrator of the NGO Citizens’ Coalition for Economic
Justice, and KEPCO’s Miryang office chief and the site manager of construction and technology. The
meeting started with the mutual agreement that KEPCO discontinue the “Harmless electromagnetic waves”
advertising campaign if the villagers stopped protesting.
30

Neither KEPCO nor its invited experts had expected and prepared for the reality that the Miryang
residents would come up with such concrete alternatives, including specific insider knowledge like who
had offered what kind of talk in which academic conference. Mr. Son said in his interview, “We performed
so well that there were some professors who apologized to us after the arbitration meetings for
misperceiving us as ‘ignorant.’ Such people also became our secret allies later and helped us out. We made
our way like that.” As a result, the construction could be suspended because KEPCO was forced to spend
time in figuring out and responding to these steady ambushes.
31

The dilemma of hiding the expert identities also created unsatisfied uncertainties among the villagers. To
strengthen the villagers’ credentials and actively use experts’ expertise, the residents needed to reveal their
experts. At the same time, there was another need to hide these professionals in order that they could assist
the residents without concern of being targeted by KEPCO. Especially after one researcher who worked for
KEPCO got fired because of his secret assistance of the villagers, ‘protecting’ identities of experts became
important. The hard balance between these two needs often led to conflicts among the residents as well.
The interviewees often said, “Now I might be able to say who this expert was…” during the interviews.
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move much beyond its original purview, except in transforming its shadowy practice of
bribery into the provision of an official compensatory package.
In sum, KEPCO in authoritative modus excluded the local residents of Miryang
from the whole decision-making process with regard to the construction. Against the
local residents’ initial criticism, the state-run corporation defended the project with
arguments grounded in scientific authority and bureaucratic legitimacy that were based
on its well-connected network of experts and local public servants whom KEPCO either
funded or bribed substantially. Moreover, KEPCO even applied the same method to the
villagers, either by preemptively bribing a few village heads or subsequently offering
economic compensation to control the local resistance. Despite the villagers’ continuous
challenges, KEPCO’s approach succeeded because the residents strove to emulate the
corporation’s efforts by reaching out to their political patrons and technology experts.
Thus, the villagers aspired to bulk up their own ‘authority’ along with their obedience to
conservative rules (e.g., acceptance of the hierarchy of patronage and authoritarianism)
and hegemonic ideologies (e.g., the necessity of endless economic development and
nuclear energy as the only answer to climate challenge), both of which the corporation
had more of the upper hand than did the villagers. Consequently, given that the residents
depended on only a few ‘authorities,’ they paradoxically ended up reducing KEPCO’s
work of co-opting or attacking the Miryang residents by handling only these authorities
(e.g., charging the city mayor via administrative appeal or firing own employed
researcher who secretively assisted of the villagers). In this way, KEPCO’s initial
communication strategy worked well by interacting with the dominant authoritarian
political culture in the rural South.
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4.2 Allurement: compensation, deadline, and division within the Miryang public
Lee Chi-woo burned himself to death at 8 pm on January 16, 2012. It happened
after he had spent another all-day confrontation with the construction workers in the
middle of cold winter weather. Villagers’ physical fights with construction workers had
intensified at the building sites since the residents failed to push the project away in the
arbitration committee. As of April 2011, ninety residents were already sued by KEPCO
or its subcontractor company while the residents also sued the corporations by charging
them with violence. The workers had been coming to Lee’s expropriated paddy field with
excavators from the early morning at 4 am to build a 765kV transmission tower. When
they left his field, saying, “We will be back tomorrow” in the evening, Lee told his
neighbors, “This hell will end only when I die.”32 The neighbors considered his remark as
an expression of rage that they also felt. Yet it was too late in realizing that Lee meant
this literally when they found his burnt body at the entrance of the village which he might
have found the most public for his act of protest.
Lee’s protest became the moment of crisis for KEPCO. Its exclusive
communication strategy—which had been to rely on the state-run energy corporation’s
scientific and bureaucratic authority—could not continue. The unusual self-immolation of
elderly farmer turned the residents’ struggle into a whole different style. It also
accompanied a new type of participant, the elderly female villagers to whom KEPCO
could not apply its familiar method—that of buying out targeted people’s resistance or
cooperation by legal funding or illegal bribing. Unlike the previous male village leaders,
these women were neither interested in a ‘deal’ with the corporation nor demanded to be
32

The quotes are from the newspaper The Hankyoreh on January 26, 2012, in Korean,
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/516195.html [Accessed on April 19, 2017]
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acknowledged by KEPCO as an equal counterpart for any discussion. Instead, these
elderly female villagers solely occupied the construction sites—by hugging trees, sitting
on the roads, and building temporary buildings—and lived inside the protest camps with
only one demand to the corporation: “Get out of here and leave us alone.” To KEPCO,
the prior male village leaders were easier to handle because they were more tempted by
what the corporation could offer based on the shared authoritarian codes of patronage and
conservative rules of hierarchy. While the male village leaders often strove to position
themselves higher and higher as long as opportunities were offered, elderly female
villagers chose to stick to the low ground with their strength growing as much as
possible, particularly through their sit-ins at the protest camps.
In addition, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and the 2013 bribery scandal of
the nuclear industry led some environmental organizations and urban citizens to join the
elderly female villagers’ protests in their critical response to the link between the megascale transmission line and nuclear power plants scheduled to be built expansively.
Dissimilar to their predecessors’ male-centered vertical order, the elderly female villagers
formed a horizontal solidarity with a variety of urban supporters—teachers and students
of alternative schools, college students, artists, photographers, journalists, scholars,
workers, environmental activists, catholic priests and nuns, and housewives belonging to
food cooperatives—based on quasi-familiar and inter-generational social relations. Along
with the national fame and evolving iconicity of the protesting grandmothers, this new
breed of protestors created the spreading front which KEPCO could not crack or co-opt
easily by its usual way.
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KEPCO’s ‘allurement’ approach grew out of such a context with an updated
compensatory agenda. Against the new protestors’ questioning of the construction
project’s democratic, ethical, and public legitimacy, KEPCO came up with a consentproducing procedure based on an expanded compensation package. According to
KEPCO’s proposal released on September 11, 2013, the corporation would offer 18.5
billion Korean won (equivalent to $16.4 million) to 30 villages in 5 myeons as
compensation for the affected area of Miryang. Furthermore, 40% of the total amount
(7.4 billion won, equivalent to $6.5 million) would be divided and distributed among
individual households through direct cash deposit. The proposal also included another 7
billion won (equivalent to $6.1 million) of funds to build any public facilities such as a
farm products store for the villagers.
KEPCO instituted conditions that the money rewards be distributed to each
village only when it had ‘achieved’ consensus about giving consent to the construction.
This consent included terms such that the residents promise to never interfere with the
construction nor demand further compensation for any future damage relating to the
transmission line. In this regard, the core rationale of this new agenda was the same as the
previous one: that of KEPCO’s purchasing the voices and actions of local populations.
Only the scope of the acquisition was distinguishably broadened. With this rationale, the
corporation also decided the specific details and procedures of consensus-making onesidedly such as: 1) criteria by which each village would be compensated, 2) the definition
of consensus, 3) the process and rules of consensus-making, and 4) the deadline of this
consensus, solely based on its bylaws. Accordingly, any village located within 1.5
kilometers (0.9 miles) from the transmission line was defined as qualified for
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compensation. This consensus required such agreement by more than half of the
households of each village. A five-people-committee that was formed voluntarily in each
village could initiate a compensation process with KEPCO, once the committee
submitted a sealed consent form by December 31, 2013.33
In this design for consensus-making, the constitution of a “five-peoplecommittee” in every village was KEPCO’s proactive attempt to reconstruct a hierarchical
order against the new protestors’ horizontal connections. In particular, the ‘five-peoplecommittees’ of the thirty villages were positioned under the headquarters of “The conflict
resolution council”34 which KEPCO newly created with Miryang City to manage the
overall execution of new compensatory agenda. Miryang City became collaborative with
the corporation particularly after the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy and the
Prime Minister visited Miryang in August and September 2013 consecutively with the
promise of a ‘Nano Fusion National Industry Complex’ development project. Connected
to the conflict resolution council, the five-people-committees would play the brokerage
role of mobilizing the villagers’ consents and delivering them to KEPCO. Without any
specific qualifications for becoming a member, encouraging a five-people-committee to
be formed voluntarily in every affected village was actually KEPCO’s ‘open’ call to
allure potential villagers to be the frontline against the new wave of horizontal protesters.
33

The procedure had many arbitrary characteristics because it was basically designed to meet the needs of
KEPCO—creating more inclusivity in order to present it publicly—as revealed in the individualized cash
distribution method. KEPCO enabled these procedures by revising its own bylaws and returning to the
original version of prohibiting any compensation via direct cash distribution after the one-time execution in
Miryang. The deadline was also extended to December 31, 2014 because the protesting residents refused to
be pressured by the deadline that KEPCO imposed unilaterally.
34

Created on August 5, 2013, the council was composed of twenty people: five KEPCO employees, one
public servant from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy, two local public servants from Miryang
City, a staff member from the office of Cho Hye-jin as a National Assembly member, and ten village
representatives recommended by Miryang City.
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With this wide recruitment, KEPCO’s new compensatory agenda performed like
the corporation’s movement media: pushing away the protesters’ agendas and concerns
particularly among the Miryang public. As a result, as of January 6, 2014, 1,783 (81%)
out of the whole 2,200 affected households had stamped their seal of approval on their
consent forms. Six months later, as of July 2, 2014, 29 out of 30 villages gave their
consent to KEPCO’s terms.35 During this process, the residents who insisted on
continuing to protest fiercely collided with the converted villagers, including the ones
who joined the five-people-committees and involved in running the new fund. The stillagainst-villagers criticized the now-for-villagers as “betrayers” or “Hanjeon Ap-jae-bee
(the informants or tools of KEPCO).” In this context, what kinds of components and
situations drove former cons to pros?
It was the lost fight, anyway. At first, I also resisted intensively. Who would like
to have steel towers near one’s own home and work place? But we could not but
stop protesting because we could not win over the government after all. Look at
what happened (referring to the completed construction). No matter how
exhaustively people protested, the government finally pushed through the
construction… Then, what was left to us? We had to take what we could when we
could… Also, enough is enough! I could not protest anymore (shaking his head). I
was sick of being frozen on the winter roads and all bitten up by mosquitoes on
the summer-time mountains (referring to the protest act of occupying the
construction sites). It had been too hard year after year…without any hope of
yielding a good result. (Interviewee, Do Young-soo, male resident)
Summarizing his turning to the ‘pro’ position as an ‘inevitable’ choice, Mr. Do
explained the reasons why he changed his position from ‘against’ to ‘for’ and became a
member of both the five-people-committee in his own village and the conflict resolution

KEPCO sent out several press releases about the villagers’ consensus to publicize its achievement;
http://home.kepco.co.kr/kepco/PR/ntcob/ntcobView.do?pageIndex=2&boardSeq=21004187&boardCd=BR
D_000117&menuCd=FN06030103&parnScrpSeq=0&searchCondition=total&searchKeyword=%EB%B0
%80%EC%96%91 [Accessed on April 19, 2017].
35
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council. He constantly emphasized his contributions to the community in terms of its
“welfare” (e.g., newly built village hall, increase in the village budget from the monthly
rent of an apartment purchased by the KEPCO’s fund, holiday events). Nevertheless, at
the same time, he was dispirited and defensive—as reflected in his words of defeatism,
utilitarianism, and resistance fatigue—rather than being delighted and proud with the
achievements which he had just listed. It was a notable combination to me because most
of the protesting villagers whom I had encountered up to that moment were much more
straightforward, energetic, and confident than was Mr. Do, despite their various
difficulties resulting from the long-term protest.
Mr. Do’s complicated and dejected attitude can be better understood when we
consider how KEPCO’s new compensatory agenda was carried out by the collective
pressure of multiple actors in addition to its employees. That is, the public servants of
Miryang City, the Miryang police, the government as well as the mass media assisted
KEPCO’s urging of the residents to give up their protest via diverse methods on both
local and national levels. Such assistance to KEPCO can be summarized as below.
Table 2: Institutional Assistance for KEPCO.
•
•
•

KEPCO
Reminders of the deadline by when the residents should submit their consents
Warning of the fund’s lapse after the deadline
Presenting the possibility of litigation withdrawal in exchange for the consent
form
Assistance
Local

Miryang City
Warning about the
fund, home visits,
mobilization of aide
organizations, and
imposing of fines

National
Miryang Police
Government
Mass Media
Home visits,
Development Project The discourse of
summons to the
like Nano Fusion
“External Force”
police station,
National Industry
warnings of possible
Complex
arrest or withdrawal
of litigation
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Above all, KEPCO pushed the new compensation package on the residents by
aggressively reminding them of the deadline. Through repetitive texts, phone calls, mails,
and home visits, KEPCO employees constantly warned the protesting villagers of that
individual share of cash or the whole village fund could be nullified if they did not submit
their consent forms by the deadline. For example, in the official letter sent to the head of
Gojung village on March 14, 2014, KEPCO reminded the villagers that “the
compensation fund is subject to lapse once the construction would be completed because
the objective of the fund—the construction at good pace—itself would extinct.” The
corporation’s withdrawal of litigation also was presented to the residents as a ‘perk’ for
giving their consent to the corporation. In the interview, ‘changed’ resident Mr. Park
Chan-woong said: “Considering how exhausting and expensive the trial process would
be, I felt really relieved when KEPCO withdrew their litigations against me. The
corporation also turned in its petition to the police to help release me from the police
charges.”
At the local level, the Miryang City and the Miryang police supported KEPCO by
exercising their administrative and judicial powers. The local public servants and police
detectives visited the villagers door to door to persuade them to accept the package
quickly. Moreover, the city kept sending official letters which included the warning that
the funds could be returned to KEPCO if the residents would not take them in a timely
fashion, and that fines would be imposed for cases like the residents’ illegal occupation
of the construction sites. The local police station added its pressure by presenting the
residents with the possibility of arrest or the withdrawal of litigation depending on their
position based on secured visual proof of police’s photos and videos taken at the
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confrontation scenes at the construction sites. A protesting resident, Ms. Yoon Kangsook, criticized the local city and police:
If it were only KEPCO who had pressured us, not many residents would have
given up our fight like that. The public servants totally sided with KEPCO and
pushed us hard. The local detectives in the information division of the Miryang
police station were particularly persistent. Wherever the villagers were—homes,
protest camps, the farms, the hospital—the detectives would come with lots of
food and drink. With what money would they buy such things (implying the
budget from KEPCO)? With a friendly and caring attitude, they tried to hang out,
chat with the residents, and sometimes helped with farmwork; then eventually
they suggested that the residents should give up their protests for their own wellbeing. The public servants from the Miryang city were the same. They even
mobilized fifty aide organizations to put up banners all over Miryang to pressure
us. How could they do such things to their own constituents? This is no country
for us. We’re not just against the steel towers. We feel like we’re partaking in an
independent movement.
Ms. Yoon’s sense of “this is no country for us” or “we’re partaking in an
independent movement” was further brought about by actions of the government and
mainstream media. Both tried to sway the dominant public opinion in favor of the
construction at both the local and national levels, especially by the development projects
(e.g., Nano Fusion National Industry Complex) combined with the discourse of “external
force” (e.g., the news article “The Unified Progressive Party (UPP) digging a grave pit
for the villagers” in the right-wing newspaper Chosun-Ilbo on October 7, 2013). Miryang
City amplified these moves by its emboldening aide organizations36 to put up banners
with anti-protest claims (e.g., “Enough protests! Let’s go back to our everyday lives” or
“Now environmental organizations should get out of Miyang”).
36

Gwanbyeon-danchae (aide organizations) financed by the central and local governments—which have
existed up to now—have historical roots both in the Cold War and in the past military dictatorship. For
example, a right-wing organization Korea Freedom Federation was founded in 1954, based on its anticommunist association and the Korean War. The Living Rightly Center and the Saemaul Undong Center
were established by the leadership of Chun Doo-hwan (1980 to 1988) who became the fifth president via
the December 12 military coup in 1979 (Lee & Huh, 2006). Some aide organizations recently have been
mobilized by the government-led movements such as the Green Start movement and New Saemaeul (new
village)’ movement (Jeon, 2009).
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The mobilization of conservative public opinion, in particular among the Miryang
public, was specifically intended to socially marginalize and politically isolate the
protesting residents. In his book tiled The Miryang War, sociologist Jang (2016) points
out that the use of ‘isolation’ has been the consistent strategy adopted by KEPCO and the
government whenever they have had to handle local resistance and its connections with
civil society. Consequently, KEPCO’s compensatory agenda—imposed on the residents
with the assistance of administrative, judicial, and discursive actors—resulted in
traumatic and ongoing conflict between the ‘against’ and ‘for’ residents. In this vicious
circle, the ‘now-for’ villagers paradoxically became more obsessed with economic and
material compensation provided by KEPCO (e.g., the distribution of gift cards, the
budget for a ‘healing’ tour to a hot spring) or by Miryang City (e.g., more road
construction which could increase real estate values). Furthermore, these moves again
deepened the criticism of the ‘still-against’ residents and aggravated mutual blaming and
distrust to an unrecoverable degree.37

4.3 Intimacy: timely tips and friendly authority in social media
KEPCO was able to complete the construction in Miryang in September of 2014.
The energy activism generated from this environmental conflict, however, has challenged
the corporation’s dominant idea about electricity infrastructure as a politically neutral
technological apparatus and universally beneficial public good. The oppositional energy
discourse pointing out the socio-economic inequality of the conglomerate- and urban37

On March 23, 2017, there was the testimony of the Miryang residents at the National Assembly, along
with the 250-page report publication about the continual internal conflict among the residents as the aftereffect of the construction in the affected areas in Miryang, in Korean;
http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/43310.html [Accessed on April 19, 2017].
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centered energy systems and policies has received much public attention. Good Morning
KEPCO, its blog, was launched on May 30, 2014 in this context, along with other social
media channels such as Twitter, Instagram, and KakaoStory in addition to its Facebook
page that was created in 2012.38
The blog of KEPCO was created as intimate space. While it has five categories
(Charging your energy, Speeding electricity, Philanthropy, Recruiting, and Notices), the
first two have had the highest number of blog posts.39 In particular, the category
“Charging your energy” is composed of supposedly practical information for daily living.
Framed as “honey (Korean online slang meaning ‘very useful’) tips,” it covers timely
topics that range from consumer culture such as travel, leisure, festival, movie, music,
sports, and food to issues of health and taxes. The section “Speeding electricity” consists
of knowledge about electricity and the activities of KEPCO and related industries; it is
usually captured as common sense (e.g., Shall we talk about how electricity is produced
and provided?), curiosity (e.g. Why birds don’t get electric shocks when they stand on
power lines?), self-promotion (e.g., Global KEPCO: Environmentally-friendly Energy
Business in Ecuador and Dominica), reports (e.g., What is the finding from the Global
Electric Power Tech exhibit?), and practical tips (e.g., Four ways to extend the life of
your smartphone battery).

38

As of April 27, 2017, Good Morning KEPCO (blog.kepco.co.kr) had about two thousand daily visitors,
along with one million accumulated total visits (1,087,968). Its contents are cross-posted with other social
media outlets such as Twitter (twitter.com/iamkepco, 24,300 followers), Instagram
(instagram.com/iamkepco, 4,589 followers), KakaoStory (story.kakao.com/ch/kepco, 17,601 subscribers),
and Facebook (fb.com/iamkepco, 143,374 likes).
Out of the total 894 blog posts (as of April 27, 2017), the category of “Charging your energy” contains
563 posts (63%) and “Speeding electricity” 228 posts (26%), both of which comprise the majority of the
blog’s space in comparison to the rest such as “Philanthropy” (44 posts, 5%), “Recruiting” (29 posts, 3%),
and “Notices” (30 posts, 3%).
39
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Positioning itself as a caring and friendly information provider, KEPCO mingles
scientific ‘common sense’ and energy-related ‘claims’ (e.g., the response to The 2016
Paris Agreement about greenhouse gases emissions mitigation) with light-heartedness in
a pragmatic and intimate style that is used with its other information posts. For instance,
below a list of blog posts between November 15 and December 1, 2016 are tips and
reading material about consumer culture—in the areas of skiing, indie music, gardening,
baseball, and dessert—mixed with ones about news, knowledge, and the promotion of
KEPCO and the energy industry in general. Such examples are:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Everything about Skiing, Flower of the Winter [Charging your energy], December
1
Warm your heart with Indie Music [Charging your energy], November 30
Dream? Reality? The World of Lucid Dreams [Charging your energy], November
29
Please Remember The Tarayana Foundation [Speeding electricity], November 28
The New Global Market for Energy Business [Speeding electricity], November 25
BIXPO (2), the Festival of Electricity People [Speeding electricity], November 24
2016 Semi-Conductor Exhibit at One Shot [Charging your energy], November 24
The Meaning of the Strike Zone to Baseball Fans [Charging your energy],
November 23
Growing your Healing, The Orchids [Charging your energy], November 18
Everything about Dessert, 2016 Bakery Show [Charging your energy], November
16
BIXPO (1), The Future with New Light [Speeding electricity], November 16
Everything about the 2016 Seoul Lantern Festival [Charging your energy],
November 15
I argue the corporation’s communication strategy is to interweave specific values

and beliefs about energy with the dominant cultural fabric and popular imagination of
everyday life in order to set KEPCO’s energy discourse within a familiar and normative
sensibility. Discussing the role of radio and television in the basic processes of social
reproduction, Moores (2005) focuses on mass media’s “cyclicity” or “recursiveness” as
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the temporal and spatial arrangement of day-to-day lives and social institutions that gives
a particular ontological security, constancy, and predictability. In this regard, KEPCO’s
blog also follows such temporal practices of the mass media, focusing on giving the
audience ‘timely tips’ that align with annual holidays and regular events, as seen in such
post titles as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

New Year 2017(丁酉年), January 4, 2017
Being Along on Lunar New Year, January 25, 2017
Board Games with Chuseok (Korean Thanksgiving Day), September 13, 2016
Where are the hot spots in Seoul for the Full Moon?, February 22, 2016
What are the twenty-four lunar seasons? February 3, 2016
Introducing the new killer app for New Year Planning, January 4, 2016
Protect your liver at end-of-year or new-year-parties, December 29, 2015
Let’s go to the festivals in these Golden Holidays!, April 21, 2015
There is Goong-hap (marital compatibility) also in Foods, February 18, 2015
Enjoy your musicals at the end of the year, December 30, 2014
How to prepare tax returns at the end of the year, December 11, 2014
Home Theater in Chuseok, September 5, 2014

Furthermore, to target the youth audience in particular, the New Media Team of
KEPCO recruits a press group of thirty people or so every year.40 College students often
have been chosen with the assumption that they are supposed to be savvy about fastchanging trends of social media among young people along with their own sub-cultures
and sensibilities. In conceiving of KEPCO’s social media as online spaces interactive
with visitors, it is interesting to compare them with physical interactive promotion spaces
like the electricity museum. Opened and organized as an explicit educational space in
40

According to the online advertisement recruiting the 4 th press group on February 28, 2017, a reporter is
supposed to create two individual articles per month on top of other public relations activities in KEPCO’s
social media. In return, the participants are supposed to get benefits such as a writer’s fee, free tickets to
cultural events which KEPCO sponsor, and some opportunities to go abroad for volunteer experiences, in
Korean;
https://home.kepco.co.kr/kepco/CU/A/B/CUABPP00102.do?boardSeq=21028328&replyRole=&searchKey
word=&boardCd=&parnScrpSeq=21028334&searchCondition=&menuCd=FN1201&depth=0&pageIndex
=1&boardNo=0 [Accessed on April 19, 2017].
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2001, the museum involves the audience mainly with “learning” glorious narratives full
of technological progress, national development, and promises of nuclear energy for the
future. In other words, visitors are positioned as students playing with a variety of
interactive exhibits in a friendly science class, while KEPCO becomes the teacher with
scientific authority. Likewise, KEPCO’s social media are presented as approachable
friends. The corporation’s online ‘folks’ are not only knowledgeable about general areas
of electricity and energy, but also generous enough to share useful tips, fun stories, and
interesting information for day-to-day living. In this way, the social media of KEPCO are
outlets for its specific imaginative musings, beliefs, and values about energy development
and consumption by mediating and reconfiguring the dominant consumer culture.

4.4 Conclusion
Kang (2011), communication scholar and cultural critic, argues that
communication in Korea is rarely imagined as occurring among equal, reciprocal, and
independent individuals even as ideal, normative types. He presents one historical
explanation about how such a context has been created, especially from condensed
modernization. That is, a national project of modernization and state-led industrial
development in a short time led people to avoid uncertainty and eliminate differences
among individuals not to waste any time. Thus, both equal and different individual agents
have not been acknowledged and appreciated because validating them necessitates
negotiation processes and creates delay. As a result, communication is assumed to take
place along with a hierarchical-centralistic order of society in which vertical asymmetries
of power are normalized as the basic unit of social relations (Kang, 2011).
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Another explanation lies with the hierarchical order of collectivism within the
successive violent regimes of modern Korean history: Japanese colonialism (1910-1945),
the Korean War (1950-1953), and the military dictatorships in following a quasi-state of
war (1961-1987). In this historical trajectory, differences among individuals are rarely
accepted, given that such notions of difference are perceived as dangerous, threatening
and justifications for oppression in particular towards subordinates. In other words, the
South Korean modern state was born and maintained via antagonism against North Korea
on the basis of its legacy of Japanese colonialism and a Cold War regime led by the
United States in East Asia. The state, located at the top of the power hierarchy, has
constituted an ongoing disciplinary fear via demonstrative violence and collective
punishment by hunting accused ‘internal enemies who support North Korea’ (Kim,
2013).
The above socio-historical contexts have generated political cultures which are
saturated with authoritarian, development, and pragmatic tendencies in South Korea.
Given this framework, KEPCO’s communication strategies explored in this chapter
demonstrate how this corporation has striven to form a dominant energy public by pitting
its technocratic, economic efficiency version of energy—integrated with hegemonic
authoritarian, development, and pragmatic cultures—against oppositional ones (e.g.
environmentalism and grassroot localism). Thus, KEPCO has handled its legitimacy
crisis, not by modifying its rhetorical strategies or framings about energy development,
distribution, and consumption, but rather by mobilizing additional financial resources
(e.g., bribes, compensation, practical tips) distributed in practical and authoritarian ways
that match the dominant cultural ideas, notions, and behaviors of everyday lives.
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CHAPTER 5
GIFTING FOOD AS MOVEMENT MEDIA:
RECIPE FOR ENERGY ACTIVISM IN THE URBAN-RURAL RELATIONS

An air of festivity filled the room of Neoreun-Madang,41 a grassroots cooperative
of local citizens located in the downtown area of Miryang. As soon as I opened the door,
the smells of frying sausages and the sounds of boisterous laughter flooded out along
with the babble of voices in the background. It was the Saturday night of June 27, 2015.
To have a working-level meeting, thirty people or so—the leaders of protesting residents
from each village and the activists of the Miryang committee—gathered after finishing
their nearby 197th weekly candlelight vigil. In this cozy eight hundred-square-foot sized
space, they talked over beers and snacks, sitting around two long wooden tables or on the
floors warmed by Ondol, a Korean floor heating system.
“Can I get your attention? Let’s start the meeting,” declared the Catholic priest
Gong Jun-min. As a co-representative of the Miryang committee, he signaled the
meeting’s opening and then the loud atmosphere calmed down. There were two agenda
items on this day: the first was about planning a visit to Seoul to attend press conferences
in front of the Prosecutors’ Office and the Blue House (the Korean presidential residence)
Neoreun-Madang, meaning “spacious garden,” was founded on July, 7, 2010. As a form of social
enterprise, it was meant to be the base for the Miryang citizens to cultivate grassroots democracy in
carrying out various community projects regarding alternative education, agricultural products, and
environmental issues. For this purpose, eighty people who had belonged to multiple local groups raised
their initial investment of $45,000. The groups ranged from the Miryang chapters of the national civic and
educational organizations—such as People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, The Korean Peasants
League, Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union, and The Civic Solidarity for Children’s Books—
to the local literary society, the book club for The Green Review, and the Catholic church. In response to
the self-immolation of Lee Chi-woo, some members of Neoreun-Madang formed a group on February 2,
2012 that later became the Miryang Committee Against 765kV Transmission Towers (The Miryang
Committee).
41
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on July 2nd and the second was about preparing for The Memory Festival for the First
Anniversary of the Vicarious Administrative Execution scheduled to be held in the
Miryang Station Square on July 18th. The press conferences were to protest against not
only the prosecutions’ recent issuing of a warrant to take DNA samples of protesting
citizens, including Miryang residents, but also the promotion of Kim Soo-hwan, the Chief
of Miryang Police. Kim’s appointment to that of an escorting general with the
responsibility of presidential security occurred in response to his leadership of the police
crackdown of the Miryang protest camps on June 11, 2014. The Memory Festival was
planned to support and empower those remaining residents in their protest by means of
the solidarity of citizens invited to Miryang from all over the country.
The meeting’s discussion appeared to have a pattern. Once the priest Gong would
introduce an item to discuss, Mr. Yoo Jung-hwan as the Executive Secretary of the
Miryang Committee would follow up with specific details in order to offer the residents
some initial seed ideas and proposals. Then the residents would respond with their
agreements or disagreements as well as add other opinions to Yoo’s original suggestions.
Reflecting upon these responses, Mr. Yoo again would come up with revised ideas and
planning. After checking that there was no opposition to these revisions, the priest Gong
would confirm such consensus and move on the next item. In this way, the particular
details of these events (e.g., the locations, timelines, and programs) were discussed one
by one. In general, the residents would convey quietly their agreement back to what Mr.
Yoo and the priest Gong had prepared and suggested.
The tenor, however, changed completely when the discussion reached how to
prepare the food for the festival. “We expect more people to come than our initial
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expectation of three hundred people. It can be up to five hundred. So, how about
simplifying the types of food we prepare and enlarging the quantity of each food
instead?” Once Mr. Yoo opened up the discussion, many female residents jumped in. Ms.
Woo Guem-soon (representing Pyungbat village) began with the main dish: “In the last
meeting, we planned to make bibimbab [mixed rice]. But, it’s not a good idea in the hot
summer.” Responding to this remark, Ms. Son Mi-hui (representing Donhwajeon
Village) suggested, “How about making cold cucumber and seaweed soup if we go with
the basics (i.e., white rice, a bowl of soup and multiple side dishes)? It’s cooling.” Ms.
Yoon Kang-sook (representing Yeosoo Village) disagreed, “Cold soup is not appropriate
for dinner, even in summer time.” Ms. Kim Sang-mi (representing Yonghwoe Village)
tried to find the middle point, “Then let’s decide on the day of the festival after checking
the weather.” Then Ms. Kang Soon-im (representing Wuiyang Village) had another idea,
“Is it necessary? Let’s just make several types of soup.”
At this point, almost all the female villagers seemed to have an opinion and
wanted to share it either with everyone or with their neighbors sitting beside them. All at
once, the villagers’ passionate engagements had transformed the vibe into a loud bazaar,
mingling agitated and anxious faces together with continuous laughter and chatter
throughout the whole space. Weathering this tidal wave of voices, Mr. Yoo managed to
put forth a revised proposal about the food. He shouted, “Then how about this? Godap
[Village] is responsible only for the rice. As for Yonghwoe, Yeosoo, Gojeong, and
Donghwajeon, each village takes charge of a soup for one hundred people, whatever type
it prefers!” The brief peace that emerged from the villagers’ agreement with Mr. Yoo’s
proposal did not take long to dissipate when an intense debate resumed and persisted for
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another half an hour over other items consisting of kimchi, a couple of side dishes,
drinks, and rice cake (a traditional style of feast dessert) in terms of who cooks what at
whose expense.
As seen above, the process of food preparation—deciding what to eat, how to
prepare it, with what quantities, and by whom—was not considered lightly. On the
contrary, it was important and serious enough to comprise the hottest debate of the day. If
food and its preparation had been regarded as mere ‘resources’ and ‘logistics’ which
could be purchased and outsourced simply, the residents would have not engaged in such
a deep discussion. In particular, the female residents claimed full ownership of the food
preparation process and strove to reflect their ‘expertise’ as best as possible. Thus, what
is food to the residents and activists? Why is the offering of food to outside visitors so
significant and in what sense?
Borrowing from the discussion of “gifts” among economic anthropologists, this
chapter explores how a set of practices around gifting food has become movement media
to the participants of the Miryang environmental struggle in their creating energy
activism. Accordingly, this chapter views the villagers’ offering of food to visiting
supporters as a practice of gifting. Anthropologists have multilaterally examined giftgiving as an economic phenomenon that has been overlooked by Western economists. In
their book, Economies and Cultures: Foundations of Economic Anthropology, Wilk &
Cliggett (2007, p. 155) introduce that a gift “is such an effective and unique tool in all
cultures for moving things around and creating social connections and demonstrating
moral value.” That is, gifts can be simultaneously understood as a “rational exchange”
(e.g., achieving the redistribution of resources via functional gift giving), as a way “to
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build political and social relations” (e.g., creating social ties via mutual recognition or
producing status and prestige by reputation and new respect that gifts entail), and as
“expressions of moral ideas and cultural meanings” (e.g., symbolically affirming a sense
of personhood or the core values of cultural groups) (Wilk & Cliggett, 2007, pp. 155157).
In understanding how the process of gifting unfolds, the ideas of “exchange” and
“reciprocity” are the basic elements. In his classic book The Gift: The Form and Reason
for Exchange in Archaic Societies, Mauss (1924/2011) captured three moments which
comprise the act of gifting: the bestowing of a gift, the receiving of a gift, and the
reciprocation of a gift. According to him, the obligation to reciprocate a gift after an
individual has received one—based on the recognition of the giver’s presence entangled
in the gift—was the core part of the exchange system. Through this reciprocation,
individuals maintain the system, and ultimately, their social world. In this regard, “giving
or receiving a gift is always an invitation to continue the relationship” (Wilk & Cliggett,
2007, p. 162).
While early anthropologists like Mauss highlighted that “gift economy” existed in
pre-capitalist societies as opposed to the impersonal commodity-producing capitalist
system that lacks communality, morality, and social aspects of production and exchange,
contemporary scholarship has explored how the idea of reciprocity is deeply integrated
within an operating capitalist society as well. For instance, studying the activities of
traders in foreign exchange markets in a global investment bank in Zurich, Cetina &
Bruegger (2004) show how the reciprocal orientation of traders and their face-to-face

131

interactional dynamics constitute relationships that instantiate the technology systems of
global financial markets.
This chapter draws specifically on Sahlins (1972)’ discussion of the three forms
of reciprocity generated in gift exchange: generalized, balanced, and negative.
Generalized reciprocity refers to a type of giving that overlooks how much was given,
with the assumption that at some time in the undefined future something will be given
back. Sahlins found that generalized reciprocity usually takes place in the closest social
relationships, households, and families, as seen in parents’ offering of food and clothing
to their children without expecting any return at the time. Moreover, he uncovered that in
such dire circumstances as deficiency of goods and few individual possessions there
prevail such practices as “food distribution” in these “hunger seasons.” Sahlins (ibid, p.
274) describes:
Hospitality (generalized reciprocity) is commonly practiced in the hunger season,
when families go all over the country ‘looking for porridge’ … The obligations of
kinship result in a particular type of food distribution, both within the village and
the surrounding neighborhood, which is not found in those modern communities
in which a more individual domestic economy is practiced. … An expansion of
sociability and generosity is expected because a reversion of food to domestic
isolation would be turned into disaster.
Balanced reciprocity, in comparison with generalized reciprocity, is more like a
direct exchange in which something is traded or given with the expectation that
something of equal value will be returned within a relatively constrained time period.
This type of reciprocity tends to occur at a social level that is more distant from the
family, yet still among people who know each other well such as friends or extended kin.
A key aspect of a balanced reciprocity system is that “without reciprocation in the
appropriate time frame, the relationship ends and the exchange system falters”; it is
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important to note that balanced reciprocity created from gifting may be different from the
barter process because “the gift is given with only a promise of a future return gift” as
opposed to bartering that entails “immediate trade of one item for another, as each tried to
get the best deal possible” (Wilk & Cliggett, 2007, p. 163).
Lastly negative reciprocity, according to Sahlins, is an attempt to get something
for nothing. In his framework, the main characteristic of negative reciprocity is that both
parties are trying to obtain more than they give, which makes them opponents. In this
regard, gambling and coercion can be seen as forms of negative reciprocity because
nothing is exchanged. Wilk & Cliggett (2007, p. 163) contend that “negative reciprocity
is the most impersonal of the three types and exists in cases where people do not know
each other or do not have a system of trust”; these scholars use the example of corporate
buyouts of companies. In this type of transaction, capitalists purchase their competitors’
companies and try to take advantage of the others’ weaknesses by firing or devaluing
employees as part of a package buyout without the necessity to know them.
Applying these three forms of reciprocity, this chapter investigates how the
participants of the Miryang protest constituted their activism by centralizing their
practices of the gifting of food. I argue that these practices can be viewed as movement
media in the ways that they create spaces of action to connect varied social groups and
pull in or enlist their diverse cultures from both rural and urban areas for social change.
In other words, the protesters’ gifting of food that accompanies the multiple reciprocities
tended to act as centripetal blenders mixing and integrating diverse social groups’
identities, values, meanings, ethics, and techniques, which shaped the unique pattern of
the Miryang movement. In this process, the communitarian and traditional culture of this
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rural area along with the social media culture of progressive urban youth and the
alternative consumer culture of urban housewives all were blended together and
constructed into the emergent energy activism.
In the following sections, this chapter more specifically examines: i) dual
reciprocities in the sit-ins, ii) reciprocation as the mediator of the varied cultures, and
lastly iii) refusals of negative reciprocity. The objective is to highlight how the protest
participants reconfigure a new type of everyday-grounded energy activism from emergent
urban environmentalism and residual urban-rural relations. Previous communication
scholarship has concentrated on illuminating the ‘symbolic’ dimension of food as a
nonverbal message or language to express identities, political values, social affiliations,
and cultural meanings (Boerboom, 2015; Brummett, 2014; Cooks, 2009; Cramer, Greene,
& Walters, 2011; Lizie, 2012). Rather than directly equating food as a symbolic means to
create messages, this chapter aims to understand the evolving process of the broader
political culture that is found in contemporary environmental protests through sorting out
the complex web of reciprocities that is woven into the set of food practices.

5.1 Dual Reciprocities in the Sit-in sites
Miryang villagers surprised me at first by their passionate ways of responding to my
videos. I found it very fresh as a media activist because I have rarely seen such
enthusiasm from the workers in the labor movement in which I had been involved for a
long time. Whenever the residents found an agreeable interview midst the videos, they
would immediately clap their hands, shouting “Yeahhhh” or “You’re so right!” In the
opposite case, they would curse it directly. These intense reactions seemed to come from
their prior lack of being heard through the media. They reminded me of the reason why I
started my media activism in the first place as much as my role as a person holding the
camera there. (Ms. Song Ah-young, a media activist)
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Visitors got fed by halmaedeul (grannies) in Miryang. I have never seen such a protest
site. When I came to Miryang first via The Anti-Nuclear Hope Bus in March 2012 after
the self-immolation of Lee Chi-woo, the residents welcomed us with rice wine and spring
onion pancakes as soon as we arrived. After listening to their remarks on the stage along
with watching a short documentary about the conflict, we were invited to each village for
an event of planting flowers on the tree-chopped construction sites. There, we ate again
the meals that the grannies made for us. The warm interactions with grannies in the whole
process were very touching and moved my heart. They kept appearing in my mind after I
got home. So, I went again and again… I think it was the power of meals and the power
of grannies. (Mr. Baek Young-chul, documentary director)
One of the common remarks of the urban supporters whom I interviewed was
“feeling an obligation to do something for ‘the grandmothers’” based on an emotional
attachment with them (e.g., “feeling sorry to the grannies if I cannot come to Miryang” or
“I feel pressured to do something for them in the place where I live if I cannot go there”).
Thus, why did the supporters feel a special obligation to the elderly female residents
beyond supporting them with solidarity? I propose here that these urban supporters’
emotional ‘debt’ can be understood by the ‘double reciprocity’ which they experienced as
a result of the villagers’ practice of gifting food.
One layer of this dual reciprocity appears to have begun with the villagers treating
the urban supporters’ visits—which were based on their environmental consciousness and
shared moral indignation about injustices which the villagers were experiencing—as
precious gifts which they received. In addition to receiving the supporters’ gifts with
gratitude, the residents immediately reciprocated with ‘delicious’ food from the very
moment they met the urban visitors. That is, the residents welcomed visitors with their
full appreciation to the degree that moved the hearts of the experienced activists. In the
above interview, Ms. Song expressed her feelings of being excited and rewarded by a
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new type of audience. This audience had reminded her of the worth of her work through
their immersive responsiveness to what she offered: audiovisual materials.
As for the villagers, the uphill battle with KEPCO that they had experienced with
harsh isolation and marginalization moved them to enthusiastically receive ‘the gift’ of
support from outside. At the same time, their recognition of outside visitors as grateful
gifts in and of themselves gave them the obligation to return the favors in the form of
offering hospitality in terms of food and housing. Even if the visitors had not expected
the villagers’ warm hospitality, it was more like exchanging gifts with a balanced
reciprocity from the perspective of the Miryang residents. Their viewpoints are well
shown in the following interview:
To block the construction, we at first experienced all sorts of things during
sleeping out in the open. One day, raining water flooded into our tent and we had
to get out from our sleeping bags and blankets. On that night, we just sat down
under the trees in the dark. Such sleepless nights on the cold bottom of the
mountain road were countless. We eventually had to build our temporary
buildings on the construction sites. After having experienced those hardships, I
was so happy and grateful when the supporters came. We always did our best to
treat them well. Only when they were fed and warmed well, I could relieve
myself. (Ms. Hong In-sook, a female resident)
Another layer of dual reciprocity was created from the specific context of the sitins. Due to the occupation as a protest tactic, the participants had to be in the middle of
fields and mountains all the time in order to guard the construction sites. This created
conditions marked by few individual possessions and the deficiency of goods. Moreover,
regardless of such material scarcity, the protesters still had to be well fed to sustain their
bodies during the lengthy daily and nightly sit-ins. These conditions led the residents to
make a special effort to provide every visitor—whoever came—with meals three times a
day no matter what.
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This ‘strengthened’ form of hospitality turned each sit-in site into an unusual
space that combined on the one hand the style of a domestic household like ‘parents’
regular offering of food to their own children’ and on the other the features of expanded
sociality, communality and morality. In such a unique spatial and social context which
cut across distinctions between private and public, food thus acted as a villagers’ gift to
be distributed to all supporters without any conditions, thereby entailing a generalized
form of reciprocity. Through actually experiencing the specific hardships, tensions, and
anxieties of occupying the construction sites from the viewpoint of the villagers, the
urban supporters were able to receive ‘this gift’ more gratefully and admirably. In this
way, a strong alliance between the villagers and the supporters took shape based on this
dual reciprocity that was initiated by residents and nourished by the supporters’ feelings
of emotional debt.

5.2 Reciprocation as the Mediator of Cultures I: Urban to Rural
Urban supporters’ reciprocation of the gift that they received from the villagers
manifested in two general forms. The first was in the transport of materials from the
outside world to the Miryang sit-in sites to support the villagers’ protests. Food items
were the most frequent donations by the supporters to complement the food provisions
already at the sites. Some supporters would carry such food (e.g., water, wine, side
dishes, lunch boxes) onto the site themselves while others mailed items (e.g., rice, fruits,
drinks, snacks), along with other materials (e.g., heater packs, blankets). Still others
ordered a one-time food truck delivered to Miryang or donated money via the official

137

bank account of the Miryang Committee so that residents could buy exactly what they
needed at each protest site.
The second form of supporters’ reciprocation was to offer their own labor and
time to help to reach the goal of maintaining the Miryang sit-in site. Such aid included
guarding the site, chopping firewood, and assisting with farm work that villagers often
had to place on the back burner due to their spending time at the protests. This was also
venue at which supporters would share with residents their skills, such as performing
music, painting, writing, handcrafting, creating videos, designing posters, and updating
social media posts about the villagers’ protests that included the use of photography of
the food itself.

Figure 8: Urban Groups and Organizations involved in the Miryang Protest.

These varied forms of reciprocation thus in turn mediated the urban subcultures of
the alternative civic groups and political organizations which became involved in the
Miryang protest, based on their own progressive identities, environmental values, ethics,
and ideas about alternative energy. First off, as shown above, these groups and
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organizations were composed of: i) small-scale grassroot energy action groups (e.g.,
House of Miryang in Gwang-myung, the Seong-dae-goal Community, the Moon-Tak
Network, the Hae-ddeum-citizen Group for Alternative Energy in Northern Seoul, the
Eunpyung-Miryang Solidarity Group, the Anti-nuclear Citizen Action Group in Daegu);
ii) alternative schools (e.g., Haja Production School, School of Sungmi Mountain, School
of Sun, the Anti-Nuclear School); iii) consumer cooperatives (e.g., The Icoop
Cooperative, Hansalim); and lastly iv) environmental or religious organizations (e.g.,
Green Party Korea, Women’s Environment Solidarity, Anti-nuclear Catholic Solidarity).
After encountering one another in Miryang, these groups and organizations also
became intertwined in creating The National Network Against Transmission Towers
based on their common ground of anti-nuclear energy activism. The goals of this group
were to better support the Miryang protest as well as to build networks among those
residents who were involved in similar issues about transmission lines in Miryang,
Cheongdo, Dangjin, Hoengseong, and Yeoju.
While reciprocating gifts via food, goods, or their own labor, these groups and
organizations in turn brought the residents of Miryang the agenda of ‘nuclear energy’ and
the sensibility of ‘solidarity.’ That is, the viewing of the Miryang conflict over a megascale transmission line as a consequence of a ‘problematic’ expansive nuclear energy
policy of an oppressive government was the key idea that these groups and organization
brought to the table, so to speak. This idea was discussed frequently through
conversations (including interviews) between the residents and the supporters during the
sit-ins, as well as through supporters’ remarks and media materials which they would
share at the weekly candlelight vigils. In addition, the values and ethics of acting in
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solidarity were another significant concept to them. Moreover, the very presence of urban
supporters who voluntarily came to Miryang itself was a good example of what solidarity
was like and would come to mean to the villagers. Both the issue of nuclear energy policy
and this orientation towards solidarity allowed and required the Miryang residents to
learn to think and act beyond the scope of their village in order to solve their own
problems.
Whether to align with the progressive and alternative culture of the urban
supporters—which entailed the embracing of their new ideas and values—was one of the
important diverging points between the residents who had remained in the protest and
those who had opted out. In other words, the still-against-villagers gradually came to
align themselves with the progressive outsiders’ alternative ideas, values, and ethics by
integrating them with their own experiences, thoughts, and interactions with the
supporters. In comparison, the now-for-villagers refused to accept the agenda of ‘nuclear
energy’ as well as the principle of ‘solidarity,’ both of which implied to them the need to
think and act with people beyond the geographic locale of their village of Miryang. Those
who had changed their opposition and now favored the transmission line also ended up
agreeing with such frames as “external force” that branded these ‘outside’ urban
supporters as “radical fanatics” who strove to use the “innocent and ignorant (elderly
female)” villagers for their own protest politics; with this framing, they thereby were
condemning the outside supporters as the very cause of the divisive conflict among the
villagers. In the interviews, the now-for-villagers often used this frame of external force
along with other forms of antagonism toward the urban supporters, as shown below:
Honestly, I think the residents who still protest are heroes. But I really don’t like
the people who came from outside, from some political parties or unions. They
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are not Miryang folks to begin with. Why did they come here and intervene in our
matters? I’m angry because they encouraged the ‘innocent halmaedeul (grannies)’
to keep protesting. (Mr. Do Young-soo, a male resident)
I won’t agree with KEPCO about the construction, although I don’t do anything to
show my disagreement publicly at the moment. Despite my disagreement, I hope
the protest will be finished so we can live in peace. In this regard, it’s upsetting to
see that that the external force came and took over the protest of Miryang
residents, letting it remain unfinished. (Ms. Won Sun-mi, a female resident)
These interview segments suggest that these ‘now for villagers’ wanted to end the
current mode of living along with the protests. Moreover, both interviewees point to the
urban supporters as the sole reason in understanding the divergent position held by the
still-against-residents who refuse to stop protesting. This claim appears to be both halfright and half-wrong, given that the reciprocities made between the protesting residents
and the urban supporters appear to be what really matter rather than the supporters’ mere
presence in Miryang or the pure will of the protesting residents. Moreover, the split
between the two groups of villagers partly occurred at those moments in which the nowfor-residents discontinued their reciprocity with the supporters. Both the protesting
residents and the supporters sensed these moments with anger or frustration during which
the now-for-residents directly or hesitantly refused to receive the supporters’ gifts—such
as food or the act of taking witnessing visuals—in the confrontational contexts of the sitins, as revealed in the interviews below:
Since October 2013, I felt that something was changing. One day the supporters
collected money among themselves and ordered a food truck to go to the village
hall so that everybody could eat dinner together. There I noticed a few people
changed their minds (from ‘against’ to ‘for’) because they started to complain
about the food, nitpicking about its taste and quantity, and blamed the priest of the
Miryang Committee for that. The priest was not there to begin with, let alone
ordering the food! This was a clear sign to me that those guys would betray us
soon. (Mr. Jeon Ho-yeol, a protesting male resident)
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In the confrontational situations with the police, whenever the police chief said
things about external force along with pointing to my video camera, I found some
residents were hesitant to defend my presence in comparison to others who would
actively refute and declare their alliance with us, saying things like “This is our
camera. So, what? What’s wrong with that?” One day the chief told the residents
that they would back off only when the cameras would be shut off as if they had
come there because of the witnessing cameras. When some residents actually
signaled me to close down my camera in compliance with such nonsense, I felt
frustrated that something was going wrong. (Ms. Lim Jin-hui, a documentary
director)
In contrast with the ‘for’ villagers, the ‘against’ villagers—who decided to
continue receiving the supporters’ gifts—reciprocated the anti-nuclear agenda based on
the national and transnational scope of solidarity in their activism. This interchange
transformed their prior engagement in conservative rural culture into a new alignment
with progressive and alternative culture. This new alignment was reflected in their
activities in three ways: i) going on a national tour or pilgrimage with the themes of labor
and the environment with such cultural forms as “year-end party”, “book concert” or
“screening event”; also visiting other sites protesting the brand-new construction of
nuclear power plants or transmission lines, ii) participating in an event geared to “global
activism” about the issues of state violence, feminism, and energy activism which the
feminist or environmentalist organizations held in the cities, and iii) strongly allying
themselves with Green Party Korea through the local election and the Party’s annual
meeting.
The 72-hour-year-end party between December 15th and 17th in 2014
demonstrated strongly how the villagers’ practice of gifting food was ritualized in their
reciprocating solidarity with other protest sites. Once the Miryang residents arrived at
each site during these three days (see itinerary mapped out below), they would gift food
(e.g., persimmon, pepper, rice, apple, rice wine) that they had prepared, along with
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holding a ritual of bestowing “The Pledge of Solidarity.” Then the grannies themselves
would wrap a red muffler around the necks of those whom they visited and would hug
them along with uttering words of consolation or encouragement. All such affective
interactions (e.g., the moment of mutual crying when the visiting Miryang residents
hugged the workers who had been exhausted from a lengthy strike) and the residents’
remarks were captured and recorded by the accompanying media activists and
photographers to be shared later with more people.

Figure 9: The Itinerary of the Tour and The Pledge of Solidarity.

Furthermore, there were other specific necessities which prompted Miryang
residents to travel outside of their village, in the “year-end party” in December 2014, and
the national tour of “book concerts” and “screening events” that took place between
February and April 2015. These needs included fundraising to cover their legal expenses
as well as maintaining vigor and positivity among the decreased number of resisting
residents to prevent any backlash from happening to them. Given the lowered visits of
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urban supporters—especially after losing the protest camps from the police crackdown in
June 2014 and after KEPCO’s completion of the transmission towers in September
2014—these outside travels also gave the residents the opportunity to continue meeting
with other protestors to update them about Miryang’s current political climate.
Reciprocating the anti-nuclear agenda at this expanded national level strengthened
the residents’ transformed ways of meaning-making, identities, and values around the
notion of solidarity. In particular, the elderly female residents often would embrace issues
of other protestors—such as of workers, street vendors, evicted residents from building
private golf courses, disability right activists, and the bereaved families of victims from
the Sewol Ferry drowning disaster—as well as develop their own sense of solidarity
towards them. In addition, the elderly protesters frequently would affectively express
their own emotions either in the rituals, diverse small meetings, or interviews in order to
convey their sadness, empathy, joy, and pride to their allies, as demonstrated below:
I feel so sad and sorry to hear you out. As much as we love all the earth and the
sky, we grannies often end up feeling hurt more frequently and deeply. Still, at the
same time, I also feel so happy and grateful to meet such many, many good
people. (Ms. Choi Ok-soon, female resident, at the meeting with the bereaved
families of Sewol Ferry victims)
When I saw the workers’ sky protests—a new form of labor resistance in Korea
that appeared in the struggles of Hanjin Heavy Industry, Ssangyong Motors, and
Hyundai Motors—in our tours, I became so heart-stricken [with tears in her eyes
from recalling those moments]. Why should working people be treated like that? I
used to think I was living in a great country. Now I don’t. Too many things are
wrong in this country. (Ms. Yoon Kang-sook, female resident, in the interview)
I didn’t understand why people protested before. Thus, I used to blame them
whenever I saw their demonstrations on TV. Now I feel almost automatically that
I would like to join and help as soon as I see any people protesting on the street
because now I know how they might feel and how difficult ‘doing demos’ is.
Concurrently, I don’t think our demo [protesting against the transmission line] is
just a demo for us. [because of its connection to the nuclear power plant
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complex]. I go to our protest camps with the thinking that I’m now going to
protect my country. (Ms. Han Seo-hee, female resident, in the interview)
After experiencing how to locate their own resistance within an expanded national
context with other protesters, the Miryang residents also tended to reciprocate their
energy activism even at a transnational level. This global move was undertaken by means
of their positive responses to invitations from The Network for Global Activists and
School of Feminism for “The Testimony of State Violence by the Feminists in Korea,
China, and Mexico” on July 9-10, 2016 as well as from The Network of Green Youth for
“The Winter Camp of the Youth in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan for the Society without
Nuclear” on January 15 to 18, 2015.
Moreover, the Miryang residents strongly engaged with the Green Party Korea,
as mentioned above. This involvement triggered an unprecedented result in the 2016
local election: the proportional support of the Green Party Korea in Miryang was higher
than that of the country’s average. As recognition of their commitment, the Green Party
gathered in Miryang on June 25, 2016 for its annual meeting where the villagers were
able to come together again and connect to the party members who had travelled there
from all over the country.

5.3 Reciprocation as the Mediator of Cultures II: Rural to Urban
As for the urban supporters, the act of posting on social media was one of the
most common ways that they would offer their own time and skills in reciprocation of the
gifts that they received from the villagers. This uploading of their posts about the
Miryang protests or about the residents themselves meant to the supporters that they were
lending the residents their personal online reputation combined with their offline
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credibility—no matter how strong or influential these credentials might be—by eliciting
attention from their audiences and steering their support to the villagers’ resistance. This
process often mediated the community-oriented agricultural culture of rural Miryang. In
other words, whenever the supporters’ social media posts captured the villagers’ images
at the protest camps or portrayed some touching moments or funny episodes, these posts
often became the intermediaries responsible for introducing to the outside world the
villagers’ specific sociocultural worlds rooted in their rural lives. More specifically, these
worlds tended to be composed of the residents’ agricultural viewpoints and identities as
well as their values and meanings embedded in their life experiences that paralleled
contemporary Korean history.
Among others, food was the most popular topic in the supporters’ social media
posts. Food often appeared in their emphases either of the villagers’ community
orientation in the context of confrontational protests or of the affective dimension of their
intimate interpersonal relationships with “the grannies.” The presence of food was also
strong in more formal accounts: for instance, a photo image of ‘eating meals together’
would be used to such a degree that it almost became a formula in the official blog42 or
the accounts of the Miryang Committee on Facebook.43 That is, food was noted, updated
and declared in social media in order to deliver a sense of community-spirited solidarity
whenever the Miryang committee announced a press release, public event, or follow-up
report.44 The scenes of eating food together also were juxtaposed frequently with images

42

http://my765kvout.tistory.com/

43

https://www.facebook.com/my765kVOUT/

Food as a symbol of elderly female residents’ friendship and hospitality was often quoted in the public
statements of other social organizations as well. For instance, Another Culture, a feminist organization,
awarded the 7th Ko Jung-hui prize to “the Miryang grandmothers” on October 13, 2014, stating “We award
44
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of the police force, large-sized construction vehicles or the completed towers whose
coercive and silent features were visually highlighted. The excerpts below are from some
of the Miryang committee’s blog posts which portray food as the pride of farmers as
much as the vigor of the protest community:
The 100th candle light vigil will be held on April 24 in front of Youngnam-ru
downtown. This vigil will be held like a lively feast based on the agricultural
products from four myeons. The residents and the visitors will enjoy the dinner
together with rice wine, along with a screening event and various musical
performances. (From a press release on September 17, 2013)
We are now rebuilding our protest camps in all seven villages by bringing in new
containers and fixing them up, inside and out with nice decorations. There, we
will meet with our supporters again, eat meals together and chat over eating fruit.
Sometimes we will drink So-ju (an alcoholic drink) over Baek-sook (a specific
type of chicken soup with rice). These camps will be guestrooms, restaurants,
educational space, and, finally the physical proof that KEPCO has never
ultimately won over the resisting residents. (From the press release about “The
Season Two of the Protest” on June 22, 2014)
Rotating the location, we had the 165th candle light vigil at the guesthouse that
was newly built in Pyungbat village. Despite the chilly weather, many supporters
came from Pusan, Incheon, Mokpo, and Seoul. We ate stir-fried glass noodles and
vegetables with rice made by Phyungbat Halmae together and started the vigil by
singing songs. (From the report of the vigil on October 14, 2014)
Posting of comparisons of how things are different in a rural area from cities was
another vehicle by which the supporters could introduce the villagers’ life worlds
integrated with the residual agricultural culture. For example, Mr. Kwon Hyuk-jin, who
joined the Miryang committee as an activist in summer 2014, posted how the holiday of
Jeong-wuol-Daeoboreum—the day of the first full moon of the lunar year—could be
experienced differently in Miryang from his hometown of Seoul. Through his Facebook

the prize to the Miryang grandmothers because they have demonstrated the possibility of a new vision and
sensibility of social movements. With their firm belief in community and inter-generational sustainability,
they have shown a multiplicity of new political subjects as farmers and protestors who offer meals to the
visitors with warm hospitality.”
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post with seventeen photos, his writing vividly detailed how the male residents built a
twenty-feet high “house of the moon” out of branches, straw, and bamboo to be burnt
later when the full moon appeared. Expressing how amazed he was by the skills and
wisdom of the residents during the construction process, he strove to intimately
familiarize his urban friends with the daily context of living in which the Miryang
villagers’ perspectives were rooted.
This type of effort also was revealed in another of Mr. Kwon’s posting: a
humoristic series of the Miryang Dialect Dictionary in his Facebook account on February
12, 2015. Introducing words and phrases heard from the Miryang residents that he could
not understand at first, he added a usage example for each word that came from the
protest context or from his mistakes. Each of these episodic narratives would end with his
asking for viewers to “pay more attention” to the Miryang protesters. They would go like
this:
Ddae-gi: Miryang dialect of Hwatu [popular gambling cards in Korea]
This is one of the words I recently heard the most since we set up a new protest
camp in front of the #115 transmission tower against the test transmission of
KEPCO in December, 2014. Maybe it was also because I played it a lot with the
Eeomnideul (Mothers) at the camp these days during the times they entertained
themselves while spending time in the camp. At first, I mistakenly understood it
as a jak-dae-gi (meaning, a stick). Thus, when I responded to the request of
“Bring Ddae-gi here” by saying “Stick? What are you going to do with that all of
a sudden?” I ended up becoming a laughing stock again. Usage example:
Although I started as a novice of Ddae-gi, I’ve improved so much that I
sometimes win money from the Eeomnideul these days.
I hope people pay more attention to the Miryang residents and to their news in
addition to these dialect lessons. Today is the 49th day since we resumed our stay
in the protest camp.
In addition to social media, books and documentaries were also effective
intermediaries through which the urban supporters strove to share the viewpoints of the
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Miryang residents that they had uncovered. Through particular relationships or notions
which primarily occur in rural settings, they would explore the agricultural context of
Miryang. For example, a documentary director Mr. Baek Young-chul said in an interview
that at first in his heart he did not understand the villagers’ protests, especially the part
about their relations to the land: “I just perceived their resistance in my head in regards to
the issues of justice or their rights as land owners. But, as time went by, I start noticing
how the residents as farmers treated their land and agricultural products as if these were
their own children!” To Mr. Baek, that was his ‘aha’ moment which drove him to
visually connect in his documentary Miryang Arirang (2015) such features of the
villagers as farmers to the reasons why they fought against the transmission line so
persistently and passionately.
Likewise, the books of Living Miryang (2014) and The Miryang War (2016)
specifically highlight the residual notion Wool-ryuk [combined strength]. This notion
used to refer to a form of labor cooperation that neighbors offer one another without
expecting any remuneration. The term was inherited from a past historical time period
when agriculture was the main mode of production in this society. Back then, wool-ryuk
was needed to do collective work for the whole village (e.g., digging a spring,
constructing a farm road) or during the busiest periods of farming to help households that
were composed of only the old and weak. In particular, the interview quote from the
villager Ms. Cho Gye-soon in Living Miryang shows that this tradition has continued in
rural Miryang:
People cannot live without the help of others. No matter how much money you
have, you eventually need the cooperation of others who would exchange your
money for what you need. I also have lived well by the help of my neighbors. We
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all live by wool-ryuk. Yes, wool-ryuk. I and my neighbors have been like that
before the transmission construction came, divided us, and ruined us.
The sociologist Jang Hoon-kyo interprets that wool-ryuk reappeared in the residents’
protesting against KEPCO as “the agency of healing one another and connecting
themselves with protestors outside of Miryang” in his book The Miryang War (pp. 270271). He attempts to understand this idea of “wool-ryuk” as a source of agricultural
culture, through whose understanding the villagers might be able to transform and
cultivate their encounters with strangers from the ‘outside’ and transform them into close
and intimate relationships such that they would have with neighbors.
As seen above, the urban supporters—composed of such varied groups of people
as students, activists, journalists, scholars, photographers, reportage writers, documentary
directors, teachers, priests, nuns, housewives and workers—mediated the communityoriented agricultural culture of rural Miryang in the process of reciprocating ‘the gifts’
that they received from the residents. Furthermore, this process was developed further by
means of the activities in which urban supporters participated in the rural lives directly or
indirectly through the mediation of farming or agricultural products. For instance, some
supporters joined an agricultural cooperative called The Mini Farm-the Friends of
Miryang45 as consumer members while others participated directly in the local farming
on a regular basis.46
The Mini Farm-the Friends of Miryang was founded when “The Season Two of the protest” began in
June 22. According to the announcement at the regular general meeting held on March 26, 2016,
(http://cafe.daum.net/my765kvout/GgIv/70), the cooperative that had started with 78 citizens grew into 108
producers and 392 consumers with an investment of $23,000 after a year and a half in December 2015.
45

There are two types of participation in the villagers’ farming. One is a more organized, yearly one-timevisit like the case of The Group of Green Volunteer Activities in Rural Communities for Life and Peace
(https://socialfunch.org/2016ecogreennh), a network across the unions of part-timers and university student
associations and ecology clubs. The other type is to participate in the villagers’ farming on a smaller scale
(usually under ten people) but more often and regularly, such as monthly visit on a weekend.
46
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5.4 Refusals of Negative Reciprocity
The protesters’ development of reciprocities through gifting went hand in hand
with another practice, that of refusing negative reciprocity. Given that negative
reciprocity is an attempt to get something for nothing or to take more in return for giving
less—an action which may create opponents—this counter-practice of protest participants
often acted to ‘police’ one another or intervene in controversial behaviors of both
residents and supporters. Problematic behaviors considered to impair healthy reciprocities
and accompany inner conflict among the protest participants were mainly of three types:
i) residents’ receiving gifts from KEPCO employees, ii) supporters’ demanding for
money or material rewards from residents as compensation for their participation in the
protest, and iii) residents’ treating their relationships with urban supporters as
opportunities for personal profit. On the one hand, identifying and accusing others of
these behaviors often would bring about tensions, complaints, or the destruction of
relationships among the protest participants. On the other, the practice of refusing
negative reciprocity eventually would enable the gifting of food as movement media that
would become intact channels for positive reciprocities for the movement in the long run.
When it came to home visits by the KEPCO employees, what the residents said
the most in the interviews was that KEPCO would always appear with “gifts.” The
corporation’s gifts were diverse, ranging from food and material goods like cosmetic gift
sets to proposals which would meet the individual villagers’ specific needs (e.g., money,
job opportunities for their children, discounts on their electric bills). These gifts were
intended by KEPCO to propose bartering with the residents: that is, the immediate trade
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of the corporation’s material goods for the villagers’ consent to the transmission line
construction, which implied that the participating residents would stop their protests.
The KEPCO employees tried to barter with the residents by persistently pursuing
one-on-one meetings at each of their private homes as opposed to collective meetings that
were open to the public. If the employees’ first attempts were rejected or the residents
were active protestors in the first place, they would usually turn to gifting with balanced
reciprocity in the subsequent preparation stages. In other words, the employees would
start with attempts to visit the residents’ homes without showing consent forms directly at
first. Instead, they would bring small food like a cake roll or a pack of orange juices or
even go without anything in order to unarm the villagers’ alertness towards them. Once
they succeeded in getting themselves inside the residents’ homes, they would request a
coffee or meal from the villagers because this would give the employees ground to
reciprocate the residents’ hospitality. If this worked, then the employees would visit the
residents again, this time with a more expensive gift like whisky or beef—the price of
beef is quite high in South Korea—in return.
No matter how cordial these interactions might have been at an interpersonal
level, the objective of this reciprocity eventually would be subject to the corporation’s
buying out the residents’ protests through its direct exchange between some material
rewards and the villagers’ consent. Thus, the protesting villagers grew to become
intensely cautious against receiving any gifts or even visits from the KEPCO employees.
This caution was also extended to criticizing those residents who did receive gifts from
KEPCO, which worked as mutual reminders among the residents who remained in the
protest not to let the exchange with KEPCO take place.
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Another refusal occurred during a situation in which a supporter demanded some
material rewards or money from the residents or supporters in exchange for their protest
participation. Even if these types of ‘supporters’ were rare, they did exist and would
appear at the sit-in sites where food and housing were offered for free. Accordingly, once
this type of attempt happened, it would create intensive anger and conflicts, especially
from other supporters who were loyal to the principle of mutually balanced reciprocity
through gifting. Accordingly, these ‘supporters’ often were kicked out of the Miryang
protest sites. For instance, in every sit-in site there were a couple of men who were
expelled because they tried either to raise funds for themselves from other supporters or
to demand money with the excuse of needing transportation fees or unnecessary food
(e.g., beer, cigarettes) from the residents.
The most recent refusal had been made to a few residents who tried to take
advantage of their relationship with the urban supporters. In particular, such attempts
would occur when the urban supporters’ activities evolved into participating in local
farming or into buying the residents’ agricultural products after the sit-in period. Some
villagers utilized the opportunity for gaining cheap labor for their own farming or selling
less qualified agricultural products through the cooperative, The Mini Farm-the Friends
of Miryang. These approaches would elicit negative responses from supporters (e.g.,
complaining to the cooperative after they received unqualified persimmons or apples;
unreciprocating gifts by stopping the purchase of products or visits to Miryang) and
subsequently harm these relationships between the residents and the supporters. To
prevent such cases from happening again and to maintain an intact urban-rural
relationship, the protesting residents would discuss these issues at their regular meetings,
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with an emphasis on the importance of sending their best products to the supporters or the
consumers.

5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated how the protest participants of the Miryang
environmental struggle created their energy activism through the practice of gifting food
as movement media, in particular within the context of urban-to-rural relations. The
process of reciprocating gifts between the rural residents and the urban supporters
entailed both generalized and balanced reciprocities, whose subsequent trust, intimacy
and friendship became the grounds for enabling the mediation as well as the
transformation of multiple cultures into emergent, daily-grounded energy activism. The
refusal of negative reciprocity also played the role of setting boundaries to maintain that
these reciprocities remain intact and mutually positive among the participants, which was
essential for this long-term environmental movement.
The preparation of food involves labor, which equipped the participants with a
stable axis around which they could socialize and materialize solidarity. To maintain sitins and feed many people continuously outdoors, the participants had to cooperate with
one another to meet the constant needs of fire, water, and food ingredients as well as of
the washing and care of dishes, cooking utensils and outside kitchen facilities. A great
deal of labor—gathering vegetables from the yards, buying groceries, making firewood,
repairing temporary facilities, cooking, washing dishes, cleaning up, and preserving
food—also needed to be mobilized and distributed among the participants. Thus, in
spending time together in eating, sharing labors and organizing materials, the protest
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participants grew to know each other well and to understand why each person joined the
struggle.
In their analysis of food in the Occupy Wall Street Movement, Sutton, Naguib,
Vournelis & Dickenson (2013) uncovered how food could structure and foster social
relationships and alliances that comprise the very glue of a movement. They pointed out,
Food created a platform to bring a broad range of people together… a space
where people could meet, talk, and find common ground for action… Alliances
were built through the everyday work of feeding the occupation and these
alliances informed the political goals and demands… Farmers could provide food
and activists could provide a highly-visible platform for airing the grievances of
these small producers. Food represented a sophisticated strategy for growing the
movement and building alliances by practicing mutual aid and opposing corporate
control of space, cities, farms and lives. (Sutton, Naguib, Vournelis, & Dickinson,
2013, pp. 362-363)
Meaning-making from these newly formed social relationships in protests,
however, is neither pre-decided nor uniformly processed. Rather, it is variously
constituted and often contested, depending on who brings what kinds of perspectives,
cultures, and politics of boundaries into the protest scenes. In the case of the Occupy
Movement, on the one hand the movement participants regarded the kitchen at Zuccotti
Park as a symbolically living laboratory for alternative social forms. The sheer abundance
of food was interpreted as the depth of their desire for an alternative society. Moreover,
the newly visualized social relationships which developed from feeding the occupiers
were seen to make the symbolic meaning of the occupation—of a reclaimed commons
from a highly privatized, corporate city—alive and growing (Sutton, Naguib, Vournelis,
& Dickinson, 2013). To the right-wing media, on the other hand, the occupiers’ food was
viewed as a rhetorical resource for discrediting and criticizing the movement. By
bringing the norms of “food review” and the popular sense of “foodie culture,” the
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opponents of the movement either equated the occupiers with 1% by highlighting the
presence of five-star chefs’ “elitist” food in the Occupy Kitchen or reviewed the taste of
their food negatively within the frame of “dirty hippies” (Pason, 2015).
As read above, previous scholarship has demonstrated how food in a social
movement can facilitate the generation of new social relations that in turn have the full
potential for social change, as much as how the symbolic meanings of food in protests
can be contested or contradicted. The protest participants in the Miryang struggle also
had a double system of interpretations about gifting food, depending on their current
political position. If one were against the transmission line, KEPCO’s gifting of food or
other material rewards would be regarded as dirty play or an illegitimate strategy while
the grannies’ gifting of food would be registered as affective care or commitment to the
community. If one agreed with the transmission line construction, this person by contrast
would find that the supporter’s food had a poor quality or lack of sincerity while
KEPCO’s gifts would be understood as legitimate rewards for their agreements. In this
regard, this chapter has striven to capture this complex web of reciprocities under the
surface of such contradictory symbolic messages operating around food, gifts, and gifting
food. In doing so, it has aimed to better understand the role of food-related practices in
protest politics, in particular with regard to the evolving process of the broader political
culture.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This dissertation has explored movement media with the objective of addressing
the limitations of literature in the area of alternative media, more specifically in terms of
this scholarship’s inclination to utilize crude instrumentalism, binarism, and technologycentric dissociation from cultural contexts. When alternative media are isolated from a
particular web of sociocultural and political relations, they tend to confine their
understanding to a theory of ‘tools’ that eventually falls upon the highlighting of the
function of bounded objects of texts or technologies, thereby either empowering or
oppressing human subjects. In this regard, the relating of alternative media to their very
condition of existence from various angles is crucial to enriching our understanding of
the broader media landscape and its place in society. Accordingly, I conceptualize
movement media as an organized set of practices that creates spaces of action to connect
what is separated and mediate cultures for social change by drawing on the dialectical
aspects of practice theory and cultural studies. In doing so, I aim to connect an
understanding of movement media starting with ground-level practices to the larger
formation or transformation of political culture that is integrated with dynamic power
relations.
Aligning with the research goals above, the dissertation conducted an
ethnography of movement media in an environmental conflict between the rural villagers
of Miryang and the Korea Electronic Power Corporation over the construction of a
765,000-volt transmission line. More specifically, this study has examined the places,
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roles, processes, and consequences of movement media in understanding how ordinary
people have constituted their energy activism against the transmission line construction,
as well as how the corporation has responded to the residents’ resistance. In each analysis
chapter, the dissertation has identified specific movement media, answering why they
appeared, how they persisted, and what their consequences were in terms of transforming
or maintaining the larger political culture.
As for the protestors who needed their acts of resistance to attract public attention,
support, and participation, movement media were not simply particular objects or
technologies such as Facebook accounts, blogs, messenger smartphone applications,
listservs, books, or documentaries, even if such objects and technologies did exist in the
protest scenes. Instead, I have argued that movement media for these protesters could not
be understood without: i) the evolving meanings of the Miryang Halmae that were
enabled by these women’s visual labor and by the witnessing of the sit-ins, and whose
approaches had matured as observed in subsequent rituals, and ii) the positive
reciprocities between the urban supporters and the rural villagers that were entailed by
gifting food. These meanings and reciprocities were the primary driving engine of the
Miryang environmental movement that attracted a variety of individuals, groups, and
organizations and in the process constructed an emergent political culture which
cultivated energy activism. Like the water or wind, these meanings and reciprocities were
existing in the very mode of moving, not remaining stationary. Nonetheless, to the
Miryang residents who had been situated in the marginalized rural area of an urbancentric society and never had experienced any sort of social movement, those ephemeral
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meanings and vulnerable reciprocities were what they could invest in and were how their
protests were enabled and persisted as a result.
This dissertation also shed light on what could be the movement media from the
perspective of the state-run energy corporation. In particular, this corporation needed to
respond to the local resistance of Miryang so that it could maintain the dominant energy
culture, thus securing its provider position of electricity as a politically neutral and
universally beneficial technology. To KEPCO, movement media comprised the
compensatory agenda composed of the corporation’s discourses and actions of
distributing illegal bribes, legal compensation packages, and practical tips for general
consumers. Although the agenda adjusted to the changing political circumstances and
target populations, it consistently interacted with the dominant mode of culture—be it
either authoritarian or developmental or pragmatic—to reach its goal of establishing
mainstream beliefs, values, and notions about electricity production, distribution and
consumption.
The contribution of this dissertation to the alternative media scholarship is to
uncover a different way of understanding different or oppositional media within the
protest context. Previously, the viewing of alternative media habitually and eventually as
static objects (e.g., videos, the internet, smartphone applications) has imprisoned this
scholarship from focusing on those phenomena which have refused to be kept within the
objects’ architectural solidity. Once we turn our analytic attention to the movement as a
fleeting but visible phenomenon, the movement media also can be viewed in a similarly
complex way, especially through an organized set of practices. That is, the meanings,
reciprocities, and compensatory agendas as movement media are difficult to grasp
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completely at first sight, in just the same way that water and wind are. Yet they are still
there, alive and centripetal enough to attract and ‘move’ the minds and hearts of the
people as much as enlist their skills, resources, meanings, values, identities, and
associations. In the Miryang case, only when I followed and combined together specific
practices—such as gifting food, visual labor, and direct cash deposit—was I able to
understand how these practices gradually turn into certain spaces of action, often
demarcated by particular visible forms, spectacles, and consequences. This multi-layered
analysis shows why scholars need to expand their idea of movement media beyond the
previous instrumental technology-centric approach. Such an expansion has the potential
to advance our knowledge about alternative media in regard to why they emerge and how
they continue without sacrificing their concrete, in-depth contexts as the ways that
enabled a multi-sited ethnography of movement media—which bridged the disparate
geographical and sociocultural conditions of urban and rural regions—in this
examination.
Nonetheless, this dissertation is limited in the sense that it could not analyze indepth dynamics of gender and class during the protests. The dimensions of gender and
class divisions were relevant and significant components in explicating not only why
certain types of participants became the axes of the struggle, but also how the meaning of
owning the land varied according to the different gender and class positions of the
participants. With such an approach, the analysis would have reached a much clearer
understanding of the centrality of elderly female residents and urban middle-class
housewives among the participants. Moreover, such analyses might have better explained
the economic aspects of why certain residents were not affected by KEPCO’s
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compensation approach and persisted their protests while others caved in to such
treatment by the corporation and stopped their protests.
Despite these limitations, this dissertation has empirically detailed through
ethnographic analysis the place of movement media within the particular actions,
conditions, and political imaginations of ordinary people who have created their own
activisms. Moreover, this investigation has laid a foundation for future studies to explore
different types of patterned junctures among various media-related and sociocultural
practices in the analysis of movement media within other environmental movement
contexts (e.g., energy activism against oil pipelines in the United States). Theoretically,
this research demonstrates that a practice approach to media can be better applied by
connecting it to a cultural studies’ approach to culture, based especially on this field’s
features of grounded view, eclectic flexibility, and diverse politicization. Lastly, this
dissertation study also encourages future research to explore the geographical dimensions
of alternative media across rural and urban areas, particularly in environmental conflicts
and contestations.
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